Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV00205, Date: 2024-08-23 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 24SMCV00205    Hearing Date: August 23, 2024    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Monique Searls, et al. v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, et al.

CASE NO.:                24SMCV00205

MOTION:                 Defendant Mercedes Benz USA’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

HEARING DATE:   08/23/2024

 

Background

 

            On January 17, 2024, Plaintiffs Monique Searls (“Searls”) and Mazzy Nations Entertainment Education Rehabilitation Center University (“Mazzy”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a Songs-Beverly Act action against Defendants Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“MBUSA”) and Sonic Calabasas M. Inc. d/b/a Mercedes Benz of Calabasas (“MB Calabasas”) (collectively “Defendants”).

 

            MBUSA filed its Answer to the Complaint on February 20, 2024. MB Calabasas filed its Answer on February 26, 2024.  On April 2, 2024, MBUSA filed the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on August 12, 2024. MBUSA filed its reply on August 16, 2024.

 

Legal Standard

 

Under California law, the trial court has authority to compel arbitration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.2 where a written agreement for such arbitration exists and one of the parties refuses to arbitrate.¿ Specifically, the statute provides that, “[o]n petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement arbitrate the controversy exists.”¿ The statute further sets forth four grounds upon which the trial court may refuse to compel arbitration: (a) the right to compel arbitration was waived, (b) recission of the agreement, (c) there is a pending action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction; and (d) petitioner is a state or federally chartered depository institution.¿ 

 

“[T]he petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence . . ..”¿¿(Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc.¿(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284¿(Guiliano).)¿“In determining whether an arbitration agreement applies to a specific dispute, the court may examine only the agreement itself and the complaint filed by the party refusing arbitration [citation]. The court should attempt to give effect to the parties' intentions, in light of the usual and ordinary meaning of the contractual language and the¿circumstances under which the agreement was made.”¿¿(Weeks v. Crow¿(1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 353.)¿ “To determine whether a contractual arbitration clause requires arbitration of a particular controversy, the controversy is first identified and the issue is whether that controversy is within the scope of the contractual arbitration clause.”¿¿(Titolo¿v. Cano¿(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 310, 316.)¿ “Doubts as to whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute are to be resolved in favor of sending the parties to arbitration. The court should order them to arbitrate unless it is clear that the arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to cover the dispute.”¿¿(California Correctional Peace Officers¿Ass'n¿v. State¿(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 198, 205.)¿¿¿¿ 

 

“[A] party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. [Citation.] In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination.”¿¿(Giuliano, supra, at p. 1284.)¿¿ 

 

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

 

Defendant’s Request

Defendant MBUSA’s request for the Court to take judicial notice of the complaint filed on January 17, 2024, is GRANTED under Evid. Code § 452(d) as it is a court document.

 

Plaintiffs’ Request

Plaintiffs request for the Court to take judicial notice of Martha Ochoa v. Ford Motor Company (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, referred to as Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 1, is GRANTED under Cal Evid. Code § 452(c) as it is a published opinion of the Court of Appeal, Second District.

 

Plaintiffs request nos. 2-3 are DENIED as the Court did not rely on these documents.

 

Analysis

A.    Existence of Arbitration Agreement

In determining the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, the court considers “two ‘gateway issues’ of arbitrability: (1) whether there was an agreement to arbitrate between the parties, and (2) whether the agreement covered the dispute at issue.”¿ (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961 (Omar).)¿¿

1.     Agreement Between the Parties

The moving party can meet its initial burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement by attaching a copy of the Agreement to this motion bearing the signature of the opposing party. (See Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 541-543 [“The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the¿respondent's signature.”].) Alternatively, the moving party can meet its initial burden by setting forth the agreement’s provisions in the motion. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see also Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219.)  

 

Here, MBUSA provides a copy of the Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement (“Lease”). (Ameripour Decl.; Exh. 2.) The Lease provides in relevant part,

 

Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort or otherwise (including any dispute over the interpretation, scope, or validity of this lease, arbitration section or the arbitrability of any issue), between you and us or any of our employees, agents , successors, assigns, or the vehicle distributor, including Mercedes-Benz USA LLC (each a “Third-Party Beneficiary”), which arises out of or relates to a credit application, this lease, or any resulting transaction or relationship arising out of this lease (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at the election of either you, us, or a Third-Party Beneficiary, be resolved by a neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.

(Id. at p. 4.)

 

“If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal. App. 5th 158,165 (Gamboa).) The evidence must be sufficient to create a factual dispute to shift the burden back to the arbitration proponent who retains the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the authenticity of the signature. (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755 (Iyere). Here, Plaintiffs do not present any evidence or argument contesting the existence of the Lease. Therefore, the Court finds that an agreement to arbitrate does exist. 

 

2.     Applicability to the Instant Dispute

 

Per the Agreement, “Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort or otherwise (including any dispute over the interpretation, scope, or validity of this lease, arbitration section or the arbitrability of any issue)… which arises out of or relates to a credit application, this lease, or any resulting transaction or relationship arising out of this lease (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at the election of either you, us, or a Third-Party Beneficiary, be resolved by a neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action. The Complaint alleges a violation of Plaintiff’s warranty agreement stemming from the lease of a 2023 Mercedes-Benz C-Class. (See. Compl.) The Lease covers the instant dispute because it provides an express warranty over the subject vehicle. (Ameripour Decl.; Exh. 2, p. 3.) Based on this, the agreement covers the instant dispute.

 

3.     Enforcement of the Agreement by Non-Signatory Defendants

 

Generally, only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce the agreement. (Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 613.) “Nonsignatory defendants may enforce arbitration agreements ‘where there is sufficient identity of parties.’ [Citation.] Enforcement is permitted where the nonsignatory is the agent for a party to the arbitration agreement [citation] or the nonsignatory is a third-party beneficiary of the agreement [citation]. In addition, a nonsignatory may enforce an arbitration agreement under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.”(Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1, 8–9.)

 

Here, MBUSA argues that it can enforce the arbitration provision as a third-party beneficiary because the Lease explicitly identifies them as such. (Mot. p. 5.) The Court agrees, noting that the previously quoted language identifies MBUSA as a third-party beneficiary of the Lease. MBUSA additionally argues it can enforce the arbitration agreement under the doctrine of equitable estoppel relying on Mance v. Mercedes-Benz USA and Felisilda v. FCA US LLC. (Mot. p. 6.) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that MBUSA has failed to meet its burden in establishing that equitable estoppel applies. However, the Court need not reach the merits of this argument as MBUSA has sufficiently established itself as a third-party beneficiary entitling it to enforce the agreement. Therefore, MBUSA can enforce the agreement as a third-party beneficiary.

B.    Enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement

Once it is determined that a valid arbitration agreement exists, the burden shifts to the opposing party to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence any defense to the petition.” (Lacayo v. Catalina Restaurant Group Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 244, 257, review denied (Nov. 13, 2019)). Plaintiffs’ opposition does not establish any grounds for the Court to conclude that the agreement is not enforceable. Based on this, the motion satisfies the requirements under C.C.P. 1281.2.

 

The Court also finds that a stay of the action is appropriate in this case once the motion is granted, as Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4 stipulates that the Court shall stay the action until arbitration is completed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.) Therefore, the Motion is GRANTED. The action is stayed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4 pending the outcome of the parties' arbitration.  The Court sets a status conference re arbitration for July 24, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.

 

Moving parties to give notice.