Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 24SMCV00396, Date: 2024-07-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV00396, Date: 2024-07-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV00396 Hearing Date: July 3, 2024 Dept: M

CASE NAME: Whitton v. Volkswagen Group of America Inc., et al.

CASE NO.: 24SMCV00396

MOTION: Motion for Leave to Amend to File a Second Amended Complaint

HEARING DATE: 7/3/2024

Legal Standard

If a party wishes to amend a pleading after an answer has been filed, or after a demurrer has been filed and after the hearing on the demurrer, or if he or she has already amended the pleading as a matter of course, the party must obtain permission from the court before amendment. (CCP §§ 473(a)(1), 576.)

Motions for leave to amend the pleadings are directed to the sound discretion of the court. “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading . . ..” (CCP § 473(a)(1); see CCP § 576.) Policy favors liberally granting leave to amend so that all disputed matters between the parties may be resolved. (See Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Absent prejudice to the adverse party, the court may permit amendments to the complaint “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 [internal quotes omitted].) Where leave is sought to add entirely new claims, the court may grant leave to amend if the new claims are based on the same general set of facts, and the amendment will not prejudice the opposing party. (Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600-602; Glaser v. Meyers (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 770, 777 [holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting amendment of complaint, which originally alleged constructive eviction, to allege retaliatory eviction where the new claim was based on the same general set of facts].)

Although denial is rarely justified, a judge has discretion to deny leave to amend if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490). An opposing party is prejudiced where the amendment would necessitate a trial delay along with a loss of critical evidence, added preparation expense, increased burden of discovery, etc. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488 [leave properly denied where plaintiff sought leave on the eve of trial, nearly two years after the complaint was originally filed and gave no explanation for the delay which prejudiced defendant who did not discover or depose many of the witnesses who would support the new allegations and had not marshaled evidence in opposition of the new allegations].)

Procedurally, a motion for leave to amend must state with particularity what allegations are to be amended. Namely, it must state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted and/or added, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(a)(2)-(3).) The motion must be accompanied by a declaration specifying: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(b).) The motion must also be accompanied by the proposed amended pleading, numbered to differentiate it from the prior pleadings or amendments. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(a)(1).) It is within the court’s discretion to require compliance with Rule 3.1324 before granting leave to amend. (Hataishi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469.)

Analysis

Plaintiff April Whitton moves for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint (SAC). The proposed SAC seeks to add a fourth cause of action for Defendant Volkswagen’s violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Plaintiff’s counsel submits a compliant declaration in support of the motion. Plaintiff explains that on February 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) in order to remedy a clerical error (the original Complaint omitted the Negligent Repair Cause of Action against Defendant Audi Fletcher Jones). In the weeks following the submission of the FAC, counsel re-evaluated the FAC to determine if any potentially viable causes of action or theories of liability had not been pled. As a result of this analysis, Plaintiff determined the complaint could have included a claim for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

This explanation shows that the proposed amendment is based on the same exact set of facts previously alleged. (See Compl. ¶¶ 7, 19 & FAC ¶¶ 8, 31.) Thus, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff delayed in bringing this legal theory, even though she could have brought this theory with the initial complaint. That said, any delay was insubstantial. This action is still in its infancy. Plaintiff initiated this action less than six months before requesting leave to amend. Moreover, there is no evidence that Defendant could possibly be prejudiced by this brief delay. Since Plaintiff’s delay was not prejudicial, the motion cannot be denied due to the delay.

Accordingly, the motion for leave to amend is GRANTED. The Court will address any substantive inadequacies with the SAC upon a procedurally proper motion, such as a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings.