Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 24SMCV00748, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV00748, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV00748 Hearing Date: February 19, 2025 Dept: M

CASE NAME: Rice, et al., v. Bavandi, et al.

CASE NO.: 24SMCV00748

MOTION: Demurrer to the Complaint

HEARING DATE: 2/19/2025

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations omitted.)

“Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿in what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿how¿that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.)

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant City of West Hollywood’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452(c), (d).)

ANALYSIS

Defendant City of West Hollywood demurs to Plaintiff Kenneth Rice and Lynn Rice’s complaint on the grounds that it is barred by the sham pleading doctrine. The sham pleading doctrine prohibits a plaintiff from amending a complaint to omit harmful allegations from prior pleadings, without explanation. (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425.) Under the sham pleading doctrine, “[a] plaintiff may not avoid a demurrer by pleading facts or positions in an amended complaint that contradict facts pleaded in the original complaint, or by suppressing facts which prove the pleaded facts false.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corporation (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877-878.) Where an amended complaint omits harmful allegations without explanation, the Court may take judicial notice of the prior pleadings and disregard any inconsistent allegations in the amended pleading. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 751.) The sham pleading doctrine is not intended to prevent honest complainants from correcting erroneous allegations or to prevent correction of ambiguous facts. (Ibid.) Instead, it is intended to enable courts “ ‘to prevent an abuse of process.’ ” (Amid v. Hawthorne Community Medical Group, Inc. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1383, 1390–1391.)

Defendant observes that Plaintiffs have filed two actions pertaining to the same traffic collision. First, on February 16, 2024, Plaintiffs brought suit against Defendant Uber’s driver Karan Bavandi and Defendant Uber Technologies. (RJN Ex. A.) On May 24, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC), adding a cause of action for Dangerous Condition of Public Property against Does 11-25. (RJN, Ex. B.) On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs filed Tort Claims with the City of West Hollywood. (RJN, Exs. C, D.) The City formally rejected Plaintiff's claims on May 30, 2024. (RJN, Exs. E, F.) On July 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Doe Amendment naming the City of West Hollywood as Doe 11. (RJN, Ex. G.) On July 24, 2024, Plaintiffs served the City with the original Complaint and the Doe Amendment, naming the City as Doe 11. (RJN, Ex. H.) On August 27, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Request for Dismissal without prejudice as to the entire action. (RJN, Ex. I.) On September 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant action. (RJN, Ex. J.) Defendant notes that the Complaint in this action and the FAC in the initial action are nearly identical. On October 2, 2024, the cases were deemed related. (RJN, Ex. L.)

The sham pleading doctrine does not apply to the case at hand because there is no contradiction between the two actions. The instant complaint alleges compliance with the Claims Act. The FAC alleged that Plaintiff had not yet named any government entity the lawsuit and that should “Plaintiffs determine that a government entity is a proper defendant in this action, Plaintiffs will comply with any and all applicable government claims statutes prior adding any government entity as a party to the lawsuit via DOE amendment or otherwise.” (FAC ¶8, emphasis added.) The instant complaint consistently alleges that Plaintiffs have presented their claims to the City. (Compl., ¶ 12.)

Even if there were a contradiction which might require the application of the sham pleading doctrine, the undisputed record shows Plaintiffs’ compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act. Under the Act, parties with a claim for money or damages against a public entity must first file claim directly with that entity; only if that claim is denied or rejected may the claimant file a lawsuit. (Gov. Code §§ 905, 945.4.) This provides the public entity with an opportunity to evaluate the claim and decide as to whether it will pay on the claim. (Roberts v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 474.) Failure to allege facts in the complaint demonstrating compliance with the pre-litigation governmental claims presentation requirements subjects the complaint to a general demurrer. (State of Calif. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) The claim presentation may be generally alleged. (Esparza v. Kaweah Delta District Hospital (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 547, 554.) Claims for personal injury or damage to personal property must be presented “not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code § 911.2.) Claimants have six months after a formal rejection to bring suit against the public entity. (Gov. Code §§ 913, 945.6.)

Plaintiff timely filed the doe amendment adding the City to the first action within two months of the City’s rejection. The prior action was then dismissed without prejudice. While still within six months of the City’s rejection, Plaintiffs filed this action. On these facts, there is simply no defect in the claim presentation.

Defendant otherwise raises no issue with presenting successive actions. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs knew of the City’s identity and its connection to the incident prior to May 28, 2024, and thus could not truthfully rely on the doe allegations. The allegations of the FAC establish, as a matter of fact, that Plaintiffs did not know of the true identity of Doe 11 (the City) at the time. Even if Defendant’s argument was well taken, Defendant has not shown how Plaintiffs’ knowledge of the City’s identity would affect the validity of the causes of action asserted here. As discussed above, the claims were timely filed within six months of rejection.

Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED.