Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 24SMCV01263, Date: 2025-04-02 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV01263, Date: 2025-04-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV01263 Hearing Date: April 2, 2025 Dept: M

CASE NAME: Papas v. Hyundai Motor America

CASE NO.: 24SMCV01263

MOTION: Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

HEARING DATE: 4/2/2025

Legal Standard

With respect to attorney fees and costs, unless they are specifically provided for by statute (e.g., CCP §§ 1032, et seq.), the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.¿(CCP § 1021.) The prevailing party on a contract, which specifically provides for attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a); CCP §§ 1032, 1033.5(a)(10)(A).)¿The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine the prevailing party and shall fix, as an element of the costs of suit, the reasonable attorney fees.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a), (b).)¿Any notice of motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs under shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served and filed; if only attorney fees are claimed as costs, the notice of motion shall be served and filed within the time specified in CRC 3.1700 for filing a memorandum of costs.¿(CRC 3.1702; Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303, fn. 1.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.)

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿(Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.)

Analysis

Plaintiff Alex Papas moves for an award of attorneys under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code section 1794(d), in the total sum of: $25,804.66, including: (1) $13,436.00 in incurred attorney’s fees; (2) an additional $3,000.00 for Plaintiff counsel’s to review Defendant’s Opposition, draft the Reply brief, and attend the hearing thereto with a 1.5 time multiplier (for a total of $4,500.00); (3) a 1.5 times lodestar multiplier; (4) $663.91 in

uncontested costs and expenses; and (5) $486.75 in anticipated costs and expenses for a Court

reporter for the hearing on the instant Motion.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

Plaintiff shows entitlement to fees under section 1794(d) as the prevailing party. On January 31, 2023, Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Vehicle, a 2023 Genesis GV60 Performance, Vehicle Identification Number KMUKEDTBXPUO11702 (hereinafter the “Subject Vehicle”). (Tomas Decl., ¶ 3.) Subsequently, Plaintiff repeatedly had to return to the dealer for repeated problems with the Subject Vehicle, including five visits for repeated problems with the engine. (Tomas Decl. ¶¶ 4-9, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff requested repurchase on January 17, 2023. (Tomas Decl., ¶ 10.) On February 8, 2024, Defendant declined to repurchase Plaintiff’s vehicle in response to this demand. (Tomas Decl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff proceeded with this lawsuit on March 18, 2024. (Tomas Decl. ¶ 12.) On June 27, 2024, Plaintiffs and their counsel executed a Settlement Agreement and Release for $82,123.18 in exchange for the subject vehicle plus attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses by agreement or motion. (Tomas Decl., ¶ 14, Ex. 4.)

Plaintiff presents verified billing records showing an initial lodestar of $13,436.00, plus $3,000.00 in anticipated fees related to the reply and hearing to this motion. (Tomas Decl. ¶ 30, Ex. 18.) This accounts for 33.2 hours (plus approx. 6 anticipated hours) at various rates. Defendant principally takes aim at the charged rates. Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are as follows: (1) Hadi Gerami ($550/hr); (2) Kamau Edwards ($500/hr); (3) Oliver Tomas ($550/hr); (4) Clarence Serrano, Paralegal - $270.00; (5) Virginia Walls, Paralegal - $250.00; and (6) Jennifer Romo, Paralegal - $200.00. (Tomas Decl. ¶¶ 16, 36.) The Court finds these rates and hours worked to be reasonably incurred. Counsel all have over 20 years of experience in civil litigation, including other warranty cases against automobile manufacturers. Counsel provides information on each other attorney and the paralegals, justifying the sought rates. (Tomas Decl., ¶¶ 16, 37-38.)

The Court finds certain instances of overbilling. For instance, Defendant raises doubts that counsel took 4.7 hours drafting the declaration in support of this motion. (Ucciferri Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.) Defendant observes that counsel charged $268 (at 1.2 hours) for drafting a second amended complaint which was not filed. In light of these specific objections, the Court will adjust the amount of time spent on such tasks to reflect a reasonable fee. The Court will also award $1,500.00 as a reasonable fee related to the reply and hearing on this action.

The Court is not inclined to grant a multiplier in this case, negative or positive. The record indicates that this action involved no novel or complex issues. Plaintiff characterizes this case as “heavily litigated,” but the record contradicts this characterization. Plaintiff’s case appears to be a typical lemon law action, with no motion work or discovery issues. In fact, the parties apparently did not conduct formal discovery. Given this case history, this case did not significantly preclude counsel from obtaining other work. The awarded fees, based on the time spent prosecuting the action at counsel’s hourly rate, are sufficient to compensate Plaintiff’s counsel even considering the contingent nature of the case. Conversely, the speedy resolution of the action does not warrant a negative multiplier.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. Fees are awarded in the total, reasonable amount of $13,176.00, plus allowable costs of $1,150.66.