Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV02247, Date: 2025-05-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV02247 Hearing Date: May 15, 2025 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Apel v. Visher, et al.
CASE NO.: 24SMCV02247
MOTION: Motion to Strike Punitive Damages
HEARING DATE: 5/15/2025
LEGAL STANDARD
Any party, within the time allowed to
respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole
or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).)
The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it
deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted
in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of
the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767,
782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage;
probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)
“In order
to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate
facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.
[Citations.] In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike,
judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole,
all parts in their context, and assume their truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a
motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Clauson
v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “The mere allegation
an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of
punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of
oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to
support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157
Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.)
These statutory elements for punitive damages include
allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.
(Civ. Code § 3294 (a).) “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended
by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which
is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others." (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Despicable
is a powerful term used to describe circumstances that are “base,” “vile,” or
“contemptible.” (Id. at 726.) The statute “plainly indicates that absent
an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and
conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of ‘despicable
conduct’ must be found.” (Ibid.)
“Liberality in
permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect
has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th
1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend
where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause
of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is
on plaintiff to show¿in what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint,
and¿how¿that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.)
ANALYSIS
Defendant Bobbie Johnson (Doe 1) moves to strike portions
of Plaintiff's Complaint seeking punitive damages and double/treble damages.
Punitive
Damages
Plaintiff claims punitive damages as to the First
Cause of Action for Willful Trespass, Third Cause of Action for Private
Nuisance, and Fifth Cause of Action for Intentional Interference with
Prospective Economic Relations.
“ ‘Trespass is an unlawful interference with
possession of property.’ [Citation.] The elements of trespass are: (1) the
plaintiff's ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant's
intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3) lack of
permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.” (Ralphs
Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 261–262.) Trespass
may be subject to punitive damages where defendant is guilty of oppression,
fraud or malice. (Hassoldt v. Patrick Media Group, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th
153, 168-169, fn. 13, abrogation on other grounds recognized by People v.
Rogers (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296, 330-331; see Donnell v. Bisso Bros., (1970)
10 Cal. App. 3d 38, 44 [punitive damages may be awarded where defendant removed
roadbed in areas over which plaintiff had the right to maintain the road, with an
intent to “vex and harass” plaintiff].)
“[T]he elements of an action for private nuisance
[are, f]irst, the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and
enjoyment of its property. Second, the invasion of the plaintiff's interest in
the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, i.e., it caused the
plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage. Third, the interference with the
protected interest must not only be substantial, it must also be unreasonable,
i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. [¶] Substantial damage and
unreasonableness are to be judged by an objective standard.” (Today's IV,
Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 1137, 1176.) “A nuisance can be either a negligent or an
intentional tort. If the latter, then exemplary damages are recoverable
[citations].” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck
(1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920.)
The elements of the tort of intentional interference
with prospective economic relationship include: (a) An economic relationship
between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future
economic benefit to the plaintiff; (b) The defendant's knowledge of the
relationship; (c) Intentional acts by the defendant designed to disrupt the
relationship; (d) Actual disruption of the relationship; (e) Economic harm to
the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant; and (f) Conduct
that was wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of interference
itself. (Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71.) “An act is not
independently wrongful merely because defendant acted with an improper
motive…We conclude, therefore, that an act is independently wrongful if it is
unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory,
regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.” (Korea Supply
Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1158–59,
internal citations omitted.) Punitive damages may be appropriately awarded
pursuant to an IIPER cause of action so long as the statutory elements for
punitive damages are met. (See Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp. v. Care
Enterprises (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1141-1142 [award proper where a commercial
tenant remained in property in conscious disregard of rights of incoming tenant].)
The Complaint alleges Defendants, including Johnson as
Doe 1, engaged in conduct intended to harm Plaintiff through damaging
Plaintiff’s Unit and personal property, justifying the request for punitive
damages as to each cause of action. The Complaint alleges that from January
2019 through Jully 2023, Plaintiff owned real property located at 28711 Pacific
Coast Highway, Unit 28, Malibu (the “Unit”). (Compl., ¶¶ 2, 10.) On July 1,
2022, Plaintiff obtained from the City of Malibu an Annual Short-Term Rental
permit. (¶ 11.) At the time, Plaintiff was unaware of any terms in the HOA’s
CC&Rs which would preclude the Unit’s use as a short-term rental. (¶¶
12-13.) On June 16, 2022, Defendants entered the fenced backyard of the Unit
and disposed of various construction debris, including multiple large boards
and discarded lumber. (¶ 15.) Defendants threw debris against one or more trees
and against the wall of the Unit, damaging plants in the backyard. (Id.) On
February 16, 2023, Defendants left a trash bag in front of the entrance door of
Plaintiff’s unit. (¶ 16.) On February 17, 2023, Defendants broke eggs in front
of the Unit’s entrance door, covering the door and entrance with eggs. (¶ 17.)
On February 18, 2023, Defendants smeared honey on the entrance door handle and
the entrance door of the Unit. (¶ 18.) On February 22, 2023, Defendants left
additional broken eggs at the right side of the entrance door of the Unit. (¶
19.) On February 22, 2023, Defendants put landscape debris in front of the
entrance door of the Unit. (¶ 20.) On February 23, 2023, Defendants left
additional broken eggs in front of the entrance door of the Unit. (¶ 21.) On February
23, 2023, Defendants put a red plastic bag containing animal excrement in front
of the entrance door to the Unit. (¶ 22.) On April 12, 2023, Defendants falsely
accused Plaintiff that his guest’s bicycle was left in front of Unit 27’s
parking spot, with the intent that Plaintiff be fined by Zumirez View HOA. (¶
23.) Due to the illegal, harassing, negligent, and reckless conduct of
Defendants, Plaintiff was unable to operate the Property as a short term rental
and decided to place the Unit for sale. (¶ 24.) Plaintiff sold the Unit on July
11, 2023. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendant intentionally trespassed
with the express purpose to harm Plaintiff’s property rights. As described
above, Defendant intentionally entered Plaintiff’s property without permission
and destroyed landscape plants, as well as left construction debris at
Plaintiff’s property. (Compl., ¶ 27.) As a result, Plaintiff was damaged. (¶
28.) These acts were committed with the “express intent” to damage or destroy Plaintiff’s
property and thereby cause damage to Plaintiff. (¶ 29.) Defendant’s alleged
trespass reasonably indicates an intent to annoy, harass and vex Plaintiff. Thus,
punitive damages may be recovered on the trespass cause of action.
Plaintiff alleges an intentionally created nuisance. Defendant
intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s use, enjoyment and ownership of the
Unit by knowingly and intentionally leaving trash, excrement, eggs, and honey
at the entrance door of the Unit. (Compl., ¶ 36.) Because the complaint
establishes facts that Defendant intentionally maintained the nuisance in order
to harm Plaintiff, Plaintiff may plead a claim for punitive damages.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant intentionally interfered
with the Unit’s use as short-term rental, disrupting the prospective
relationships with guests and third party rental listing agencies. Defendant
knew that Plaintiff used the Unit as a short-term rental through AirBnb, VRBO
and Booking.com. (Compl., ¶¶ 51-53.) Defendant intended to disrupt, and
actually disrupted, Plaintiff’s prospective economic relationships with guests
and the third-party rental listing agencies by engaging in the above independently
wrongful nuisance and trespass. (¶¶ 54-55.) Since Defendant allegedly knew of
the Unit’s use as a STR, and intended to disrupt the relationships with
prospective guests, the claim for punitive damages is well-stated as to the interference
with prospective economic relationship claim.
For these reasons, the claims for punitive damages are
well-pled as to the First, Third, and Fifth causes of action. Accordingly, the
motion to strike is DENIED.
Treble
Damages
Plaintiff claims double or treble damages pursuant to
the Second Cause of Action for Trespass to Timber. To establish a claim of
trespass to timber, plaintiff must prove that (1) plaintiff
owned/leased/occupied/controlled the property; (2) defendant intentionally
entered plaintiff’s property and cut down timber located on the property; (3)
plaintiff did not give permission; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5)
defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. (CACI 2002.)
An award of treble damages is authorized for the
“wrongful” cutting of, injury to, or removal of timber on another's land. (Civ.
Code § 3346(a); CCP § 733; Fulle v. Kanani (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1305,
1313-1317.) To warrant a treble damages award, the injury to the trees must
have been willful and malicious. (Caldwell v. Walker (1963) 211
Cal.App.2d 758, 762.) Where the trespass to trees was “casual or involuntary,”
or under a mistaken claim of ownership or permission, the court may award only
double damages. (Kallis v. Sones (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1281.) Malice
may be shown by facts such as a defendant knowing the boundary lines but
trespassing anyways. (See, e.g., Salazar v. Matejcek (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 634, 640 [defendant pulled landowner's property records before
trying to buy her land, showing he knew the boundary lines, he did not obtain a
survey, place boundary markers on the property or tell landowner of his plans
before destroying the trees].)
The Complaint establishes that Defendant intentionally
entered Plaintiff’s property, without permission, and intentionally destroyed
and/or damaged Plaintiff’s palm tree by striking the tree and leaving
construction debris, including multiple large pieces of discarded lumber
against the tree. (Compl., ¶ 31.) As a result of the willful and malicious
trespass to timber, Defendants caused the loss of one Palm tree. (¶¶ 32-34.) As
pled, the facts do not show that Defendant’s conduct was negligent, casual or
involuntary. Since Defendant’s trespass to Plaintiff’s Palm Tree was intended
to harm Plaintiff, treble damages are properly claimed.
Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED.