Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 24SMCV02307, Date: 2024-12-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV02307, Date: 2024-12-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV02307 Hearing Date: December 18, 2024 Dept: M

CASE NO.: 24SMCV02307

MOTION: Motion for Leave to Amend to File a First Amended Complaint

HEARING DATE: 12/18/2024

Legal Standard

If a party wishes to amend a pleading after an answer has been filed, or after a demurrer has been filed and after the hearing on the demurrer, or if he or if the pleadings has already been amended as a matter of course, the party must obtain permission from the court before amendment. (CCP §§ 473(a)(1), 576.)

Motions for leave to amend the pleadings are directed to the sound discretion of the court. “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading . . ..” (CCP § 473(a)(1); see CCP § 576.) Policy favors liberally granting leave to amend so that all disputed matters between the parties may be resolved. (See Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Absent prejudice to the adverse party, the court may permit amendments to the complaint “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 [internal quotes omitted].) Where leave is sought to add entirely new claims, the court may grant leave to amend if the new claims are based on the same general set of facts, and the amendment will not prejudice the opposing party. (Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600-602; Glaser v. Meyers (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 770, 777 [holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting amendment of complaint, which originally alleged constructive eviction, to allege retaliatory eviction where the new claim was based on the same general set of facts].)

Although denial is rarely justified, a judge has discretion to deny leave to amend if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490). An opposing party is prejudiced where the amendment would necessitate a trial delay along with a loss of critical evidence, added preparation expense, increased burden of discovery, etc. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488 [leave properly denied where plaintiff sought leave on the eve of trial, nearly two years after the complaint was originally filed and gave no explanation for the delay which prejudiced defendant who did not discover or depose many of the witnesses who would support the new allegations and had not marshaled evidence in opposition of the new allegations].)

Procedurally, a motion for leave to amend must state with particularity what allegations are to be amended. Namely, it must state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted and/or added, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(a)(2)-(3).) The motion must be accompanied by a declaration specifying: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(b).) The motion must also be accompanied by the proposed amended pleading, numbered to differentiate it from the prior pleadings or amendments. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(a)(1).) It is within the court’s discretion to require compliance with Rule 3.1324 before granting leave to amend. (Hataishi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469.)

Analysis

Plaintiff Benjamin Mullis moves for leave to file a proposed First Amended Complaint (FAC). Plaintiff substantially complies with the rules concerning leave to amend. Plaintiff provides a proposed copy of the pleading. (Ex. 1.) Plaintiff explains that the purpose of the proposed amendments is to clarify certain allegations, add claims for restitution previously omitted, add claims based on subsequent, wrongful actions committed by the landlord, and add causes of action for malicious prosecution.

Plaintiff claims that providing a deletion and addition by page and paragraph would be impractical given the nature of the changes. In general, the changes include allegations of: a) additional wrongful acts on the part of the Landlord designed to interrupt and prevent Plaintiff’s right to occupy and use the leased premises; b) the actual removal of the septic tank on June 23, 2024, from the premises, cutting off all sewage service; c) the forcible ejectment of Plaintiff from the premises due to a continuing pattern of bad faith actions on the part of the Defendant Landlord; d) the dismissal on October 9, 2024, of the frivolous unlawful detainer (“UD”) action; e) a claim for attorney’s fees and damages by Plaintiff against both the Defendant Landlord and its attorneys based on malicious prosecution; f) forceful ejection of Plaintiff from the leased premises by the Defendant Landlord due to the progressively wrongful actions on the part of the Defendant Landlord; g) the dismissal the City of Malibu as a party Defendant; and h) a cause of action for quantum meruit for the substantial labor and services performed by Plaintiff to renovate the tennis court and otherwise prepare the leased premises for his occupancy. Plaintiff also seeks to remove the City of Malibu as a defendant and the ninth cause of action against the City, add attorneys Gary D. Fidler and Fred M Szkolnik as Defendants, and claim three new causes of action for malicious prosecution and quantum meruit.

Counsel provides that following the filing of the UD action, Defendants forced Plaintiff to abandon the premises. On August 20, 2024, Ebudo arrived at the property with the Sheriff and changed the locks to prevent Mullis from accessing the property. (Sutz Decl., ¶ 17.) Further, on October 9, 2024, the landlord put a padlock on the tennis court and removed the net. (Id.) The landlord also removed Mullis’ personal property from the premises, placed it on the driveway, and urinated on it. (Id.) On October 13, 2024, the landlord cut off the net posts to the tennis court and destroyed the security cameras Mulllis purchased and installed on the property. (Id.)

Counsel became aware of the facts giving rise to the additional claims when they occurred on August 20, 2024, and September 23, 2024. (Sutz Decl., ¶ 19.) Plaintiff’s claims against the landlord and his attorney became viable when they filed a voluntary dismissal of the UD on October 9, 2024. As such, the court observes no delay in bringing these claims. Moreover, there is no prejudice stemming from any insubstantial delay.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.