Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 24SMCV02478, Date: 2025-01-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV02478, Date: 2025-01-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV02478 Hearing Date: January 15, 2025 Dept: M

CASE NAME: Chiota v. Fedoris, et al.

CASE NO.: 24SMCV02478

MOTION: Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint

HEARING DATE: 1/15/2024

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations omitted.)

“Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿in what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿how¿that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.)

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Evid. Code §452(c), (d).)

ANALYSIS

Defendants demur on the grounds that the entire first amended complaint (FAC) is time-barred. Unless a complaint affirmatively discloses on its face that the statute of limitations has run, a demurrer must be overruled. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 881.) “Generally, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitation begins to run when a suit may be maintained. Ordinarily this is when the wrongful act is done and the obligation or the liability arises . . .. In other words, a cause of action accrues upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action. [Citation.]” (Cobb v. City of Stockton (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 65, 72-73, alterations and internal quotation marks omitted.)

Defendants rely on Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3, which provides for a one-year limitation period as follows:

(a) If a person has a claim that arises from a promise or agreement with a decedent to distribution from an estate or trust or under another instrument, whether the promise or agreement was made orally or in writing, an action to enforce the claim to distribution may be commenced within one year after the date of death, and the limitations period that would have been applicable does not apply.

(b) The limitations period provided in this section for commencement of an action shall not be tolled or extended for any reason except as provided in [the Probate Code].”

(CCP § 366.3.) The statute thus applies to actions seeking to enforce a promise of distribution from an estate or other testamentary instruments. (See Smith v. Myers (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 586 [amendment to trust did not constitute promise or agreement to distribute property within meaning of the statute where claimants did not allege that settlor promised to create testamentary documents that would provide them a distribution or that they would gain full title to a ranch when he died, but instead alleged a valid amendment to the trust instrument itself which required the distribution].)

This action arises from Decedent Byron Scott Minerd’s promise that he would transfer real property to Plaintiff via his will. Plaintiff alleges she owns real property located at 3009 Ocean Avenue, Venice, CA (“Property”) pursuant to an oral agreement entered into with Decedent in 2011 wherein he agreed to leave the Property to Plaintiff upon his death so long as she lived at the property and provided care for Mr. Minerd’s pets. (FAC, ¶¶ 6-7, 16-17.) The FAC alleges that as long as Plaintiff abided by these terms for the rest of Decedent’s life, Plaintiff would receive the title to the Property outright and free and clear of any debt. (¶¶ 16, 18, 24.) In addition, “Plaintiff claims a right to the Real Property based on an oral agreement to make a will and convey unencumbered title to the Real Property to Plaintiff in the Decedent’s will in consideration of Plaintiff’s completed performance under the terms of the oral agreement.” (¶ 34.) Decedent passed away on December 21, 2022. (¶¶ 3, 11, 19.) In his will, Minerd did not leave Plaintiff with the property. (¶ 22.) Fedoris was named in the will to serve as the executor of Mr. Minerd’s estate. (¶¶ 3, 20.) From these facts, Plaintiff seeks the following relief: 1) quiet title to the Property in her favor (¶ 26); 2) enjoin Defendant from interfering with her property rights (¶28); 3) impose a constructive trust on the property for her benefit (¶ 43); 4) compel specific performance of the oral contract by transferring the interest in the LLC or property to Plaintiff (¶ 49); and 5) quantum meruit for the reasonable value of her services and lost earning capacity (¶ 53).

CCP section 366.3 applies to the first four causes of action. Facially, these claims seek to enforce a promise by Decedent for a distribution from his estate or other testamentary instrument. Decedent allegedly promised that Plaintiff would receive the Property pursuant to Decedent’s will. (FAC ¶¶ 16-17.) The fact that an LLC currently holds title would not affect the nature of the instant claims as “arising from” the pled promise to make a distribution. Plaintiff further pleads no facts to establishing equitable estoppel, as there are no facts showing how Defendants induced Plaintiff to forbear from filing suit, a required element of equitable estoppel. (McMackin v. Ehrheart (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 128.) Plaintiff’s proffered explanation, the concealment of the Nevada probate, does not show how Plaintiff was precluded from filing the instant lawsuit within a year after Decedent’s death. Plaintiff fails to submit any authority that Nevada Probate law would apply in this California civil action. Moreover, each of Plaintiff’s arguments ignores the express language of the statute forbidding tolling or the application of other statute of limitations. Thus, the statute of limitations described in section 366.3 bars the first four causes of action.

Section 366.3, however, does not bar the fifth cause of action because it is incidental to any pled promise of a testamentary transfer. Quantum meruit is a quasi-contract, implied in law, designed to restore the aggrieved party to their former position. (McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 388, fn. 6.) “Quantum meruit refers to the well-established principle that ‘the law implies a promise to pay for services performed under circumstances disclosing that they were not gratuitously rendered.’” (Chodos v. Borman (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 76, 96.) A party “need not prove the existence of a contract”, but only that there was some understanding or expectation by both parties of compensation. (Id.) The elements of quantum meruit are: 1) performance of services, work or labor; 2) at defendant’s request; and 3) circumstances inferring defendant’s promise to pay a reasonable value. (Maglica v. Maglica (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 442, 449-450.) The instant cause expressly seeks the reasonable value of Plaintiff’s services during Decedent’s lifetime, without reliance on any promise to make a testamentary instrument. (FAC ¶ 53.) The cause simply compensates Plaintiff for her labor performed at Decedent’s direction during his lifetime. As noted, section 366.3 only applies to claims which seek to enforce a promise or agreement from a decedent make a testamentary distribution. Plaintiff’s equitable action recovering the value of her labor is not an action to enforce a promise of distribution. As such, the section does not bar this cause of action.

Therefore, the demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the first four causes of action without leave to amend. As to the fifth cause of action, the demurrer is OVERRULED.