Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV02791, Date: 2024-12-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV02791 Hearing Date: December 20, 2024 Dept: M
CASE NAME: McLaughlin, et al., v. Hart Arboretum
LLC, et al.
CASE NO.: 24SMCV02791
MOTION: Demurrer and Motion to Strike
the Complaint
HEARING DATE: 12/20/2024
LEGAL STANDARD
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether
the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be
apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the
pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it
lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are
judicially noticed. (CCP §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff
need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the
factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28
Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the
construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore
Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations
omitted.)
A special demurrer for uncertainty is
disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that
defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what
issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed
against him/her. (CCP § 430.10(f); Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc.
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat
vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)
Any party, within the time allowed to
respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole
or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).)
The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it
deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted
in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of
the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767,
782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage;
probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)
“Liberality in permitting amendment is
the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie
M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of
discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable
possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿in
what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿how¿that
amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.)
ANALYSIS
Defendants Hart Arboretum LLC and
Bozzuto Management Co. demur and move to strike certain allegations of Plaintiffs
Mark McLaughlin, Suzanne Moriarty, Fiona McLaughlin, and Nora McLaughlin’s
complaint.
First Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Warranty of
Habitability
The elements for a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability cause of action are: (1) the existence of a material
defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability; (2) notice to the
landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery
of the condition; (3) the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the
deficiency; and (4) resulting damages. (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing,
LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)
The
warranty of habitability “is implied by law in residential leases in this
state.” (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d
616, 637.) This warranty “imposes upon the landlord the obligation to maintain
leased dwellings in a habitable condition throughout the term of the lease.” (Peterson
v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185, 1204 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 899.)
Further, the warranty “does not require that a landlord ensure that leased
premises are in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but it does mean
that ‘bare living requirements' must be maintained.” (Green, supra, 10
Cal.3d at 637.) For example, a landlord’s “failure to substantially comply with
applicable building and housing code standards which materially affect health
and safety would constitute a breach of the warranty of habitability.” (Smith
v. David (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 101, 109.) A tenant may bring suit against
the landlord for damages resulting from such breach. (Landeros v. Pankey
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1169; see Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101
Cal.App.3d 903, 914 [tenant remains liable for the reasonable rental
value for the period that the defective condition of the premises existed].) Whether
the defect is substantial or de minimis is decided on a case-by-case basis. (Hall
v. Municipal Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 641, 644.)
The Complaint alleges uninhabitable conditions at a rental
property located at 2200 Colorado Ave. #721, Santa Monica (Subject Property) leased
by Plaintiffs. (Compl., ¶¶ 1-3.) Defendant Greystar California, Inc. allegedly managed,
owned, or otherwise operated the Property. (Compl.,¶¶ 2-4.) Defendant allegedly
breached the warranty by failing to provide Plaintiffs with a habitable residence
due to damage caused by flooding in the fall and winter months of 2020-2024.
Plaintiffs allege that
they were subjected to water intrusions caused by rain throughout their entire
tenancy. (Compl., ¶ 13.) Specifically, in late 2020 through early 2021,
Plaintiffs experienced major flooding in their living room, as well as water
seeping into the Subject Property through the floorboards for over a week. (Id.)
Defendants sent vendors to the Subject Property, although there were numerous no-shows
or unannounced appearances. (¶14.) Due
to the parade of vendors and the fact that the Subject Property was unhabitable,
Plaintiffs relocated for roughly two months in 2021 at an out-of-pocket cost of
approximately $4,600.00. (Id.) Defendants failed to provide reimbursement to
Plaintiffs for this relocation. (Id.)
On March 22, 2021,
while Plaintiffs were staying outside of the unit, Defendants caused vendors to
enter the Subject Property without proper notice, where drywall was removed
from portions of the living room in preparation for replacing multiple windows
without proper permits. (¶ 15.) In April of 2021, a plastic enclosure collapsed
into the living room and dining area, which took vendors several days to remove
and repair, leaving the walls and windows of the living room exposed. (¶ 16.) The
Subject Property was left with torn out drywall and exposed interior walls for
multiple months. (Id.) In June 2021, Defendants performed a “patch job” to the affected area, amounting to nailing uneven
and broken pieces of drywall over the previously exposed areas of the Subject
Property. (Id.) In the middle of June of 2021, Bozzuto took over as manager of
the Subject Property. (¶17.) Defendants continued
repair efforts in August 2021, such as replacing drywall, flooring and
floorboards. (Id.)
In October 2021, rain flooded into the property and
caused damage to the living room floorboards. Plaintiffs requested a permanent
solution to the constant water intrusions in advance of the upcoming rainy
season but were ignored. (Compl., ¶ 18.) In
December 2021, following further water intrusions, Defendants did not clean up the
water intrusions. (Id.) Defendants began remediation efforts of the
affected area on January 24, 2022. (¶ 19.) By February 7, 2022, no work had
been done by Hart and/or Bozzuto aside from initial removal of drywall and
flooring. (¶20.) In March of 2022, Defendants applied temporary drywall
patching to the exposed walls. (¶ 21.) The City issued an order to stop work
and for Defendants to obtain a permit for said construction, which they
obtained. (Id.) In April 2022, after further flooding soaked the temporary
drywall, vendors removed the water-logged drywall, leaving the interior of the living
room exposed again. (Id.) In May of 2022, Plaintiffs were informed that the
roof above the Subject Property required major repairs prior to “building back”
the interior of the Subject Property. (¶22.) Defendants finally obtained
permits for the interior repairs, which were completed on July 27, 2022, a full
six months after the “two-to-three-week project” began. (Id.)
Similar flooding and repairs occurred through
the 2022-2023 rainy season. (Compl., ¶¶ 23-28.) On November 7, 2022, the living
room flooded again. (Id. ¶ 23.) Defendants placed a diverter in the ceiling but
failed to address the flooding occurring under the baseboards in the living
room. Bozzuto only provided used towels to help Plaintiffs combat the consistent
flooding through November 9. (Id.) On December 10, 2022, a water bubble
developed in the ceiling resulting in dripping water. (¶ 24.) The hole expanded,
causing cracking plaster and additional water to fall into the Subject Property.
(Id.) On December 28, 2022, rain resulted in further water intrusions under the
floorboards in the living room. (¶ 25.) On January 10, 2023, more flooding
occurred, but Defendants would only provide the ceiling diverter as assistance.
(Id.) On January 17, 2023, Plaintiffs discovered brown staining on the living
room floorboards, as well as a flood in one of the Subject Property’s bathrooms
due to a pipe leak. (Id.) On January 24, 2023, maintenance personnel ripped out
approximately half of the flooring in the living room, leaving the area damp
and exposed. (¶ 26.) On January 27, 2023, a vendor ripped out the drywall from
the living room walls, cut a large hole in the ceiling, and tented off over half
of the living room with a plastic enclosure, with blowers and dehumidifiers
running for twenty-four hours a day. (Id.) With the ceiling ripped out, rain caused
flooding on January 30, 2023. (Id.) On February 6, 2023, the City again inspected
the Property and found that Defendants failed to obtain permits prior to
starting on the remediation and remodel. (¶ 27.) On February 24, 2023, rain
caused water to flow directly on and past the electric, industrial machines.
(Id.) On March 19, 2023, the plastic enclosure in the living rooms again began
to fail and fall apart. (¶ 28.) Still, there was no movement toward any repairs
and no vendors were dispatched to the Subject Property. (Id.)
On April 18, 2023, Plaintiffs discussed with
Defendants their failure to provide updates as to the status of construction. (Compl.,
¶ 29.) Bozzuto threatened to charge Plaintiffs for the expenses to erect a new
plastic enclosure, despite the fact that said enclosure had been up for
approximately three months and collapsed due to winds from the exposed ceiling
and walls. (Id.) In late April, a roofing vendor began work that lasted approximately
two months. (Id.) On June 8, 2023, a water test vendor informed Defendants’
maintenance crew that the repair work “was a mess” and
needed to be fixed before final tests can be completed. (¶ 30.) On July 10,
2023, Defendants restore the drywall without addressing the cause of the water
intrusions. (¶ 31.) Predictably, a water intrusion occurs through the living
room floorboards in August of 2023. (Id.)
In December 2023, the property
experienced serious flooding from the baseboards, with water pooling in the
living room. (Compl., ¶ 32.) In January 2024, vendors demolish the living
room’s walls and ceilings due to the flooding and erected a plastic enclosure,
covering four of the six living room windows. (Id.) On February 5, 2024, after
nineteen days, the plastic enclosure fell down. (¶33.) Plaintiffs were emptying
approximately twenty-five quarts of water per day that was being caught in
rubber containers placed in the living room. (Id.) Throughout 2024, the
property flooded each time there was rain. (¶¶ 34-35.) Defendants threatened
and harassed Plaintiffs during this time, by accusing Plaintiffs of entering
the enclosure and tampering with the equipment. (Id.) Through April of 2024, no
progress was made concerning the repairs and the industrial equipment within
the plastic enclosure in the living room was left on at all times by Hart
and/or Bozzuto. (¶ 35.) In May 2024, Defendants completely abandoned the
project and did not provide any additional repairs to the Subject Property.
(Id.) The living room in the Subject Property is still in a state of disarray;
the walls and ceilings have holes and are missing drywall, the plastic
enclosure is still present but showing signs of collapse, and Defendants’
equipment is still present. (¶ 36.) In 2023, Plaintiffs
were without a living room for over 160 days. In 2022, Plaintiffs were without a living room for over 200 days. In 2021,
Plaintiffs were without a living room for over
150 days. As such, Plaintiffs have been without a habitable living room
for over 660 days in the last four years. (¶
37.) Despite this, Defendants refused to relocate Plaintiffs or accommodate
Plaintiffs in any way, including
a reduction in rent, during this entire time. (Id.)
Defendants argue that there are no facts stated as to when “actual notice was given” to
them. This argument fails to assume the truth of the facts pled above. Based on
the above facts, Defendants had actual notice of the flooding issues, at the
latest in late 2020 or early 2021. (Compl., ¶ 14.) Their alleged attempts to
repair the various water intrusions also show actual notice. Defendants assert
that the complaint is unclear what repairs were requested and when the requests
were made. Defendants cite no authority that such specificity is required in
pleading a habitability claim. The complaint details multiple years-worth of unhabitable
conditions which substantially interfered with Plaintiff’s’ lease. (Compl., ¶¶
45-46.)
Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED as
to the first cause of action.
Second
and Third Causes of Action
Defendants argue that the second and
third causes of action for a tortious breach of the implied warranty and
negligence are duplicative of the first cause of action. Such a demurrer is not
recognized. (CCP §430.10.) A demurrer may be sustained when a cause of
action is duplicative of another cause of action such that it “adds nothing to
the complaint by way of fact or theory of recovery.” (Rodrigues v. Campbell
Industries (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 494, 501; see Palm Springs Villas II
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268,
290.) Defendants do not show how these alternative theories fail to state
a claim aside from the above arguments. Therefore, the demurrer is OVERRULED
for the same reasons discussed above.
Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress
A cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) exists when there is: (1)
extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing,
or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2)
the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual
and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous
conduct. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.) A
defendant’s conduct is “outrageous” when it is so extreme as to exceed all
bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Ibid.)
The defendant must either intend his or her conduct to inflict injury or
engaged in it with the realization that injury will result. (Ibid.)
Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not extend to
mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other
trivialities. (Ibid.)
Generally, the question
of whether conduct is in fact “outrageous” is a question of fact to be
determined beyond the pleading stage. (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th
652; Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 1004.) Nonetheless, “[w]hile those cases say that it is ‘usually’ a
question of fact, several cases have dismissed intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims on demurrer, concluding that the facts alleged did
not amount to outrageous conduct as a matter of law.” (Barker v. Fox &
Associates (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 355-356; see, e.g., Mintz v. Blue
Cross of California (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1608–1609; Coleman v.
Republic Indemnity Ins. Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 403, 416–417; see also
CACI 1600, et seq.) Courts have held that a tenant's emotional distress
caused by landlord's alleged “knowing, intentional, and willful” failure to
correct defective conditions of the premises can form the basis of an IIED
claim. (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at 921.) The Stoiber court
held:
[I]t
is clear that the availability of a remedy for breach of implied warranty of
habitability does not preclude a tenant from suing his landlord for intentional
infliction of mental distress if the landlord's acts are extreme and outrageous
and result in severe mental distress. Whether this is so under the present
allegations, presents a factual question it cannot be said as a matter of law
that appellant has not stated a cause of action.
(Id. at 922; see also Erlach
v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC¿(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1299.)
Defendants argue that the complaint does
not allege a) extreme and outrageous conduct by Defendant with the alleged
intent of causing emotional distress, b) a reckless disregard of the
probability of severe emotional distress, or c) conduct that was "so
severe and outrageous as to
exceed all possible
bounds of decency.” There are sufficient allegations of “intent” or a “reckless
disregard.” The complaint alleges the ultimate fact of this requirement, that is,
Defendants “acted with reckless disregard of the probability of causing
Plaintiffs severe emotional distress.” (¶ 64.) However, the complaint fails to
allege “severe and outrageous” conduct as a matter of law.
The
above facts do not rise to the level of outrageous conduct as defined by caselaw.
For example, in Stoiber, the plaintiff complained of numerous persistent
uninhabitable conditions that she repeatedly notified the defendants. (Stoiber,
supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at 912-913.) These included: heavy cockroach
infestation, broken interior walls, broken deteriorated flooring on front
porch, falling ceiling, deteriorated, overfused electrical wiring, lack of
proper plumbing connection to sewage system in bathroom, sewage under bathroom
floor, leaking roof, broken windows, and fire hazard. (Ibid.) Despite
notice, the defendants knowingly, intentionally and willfully failed to correct
the defective conditions by not even attempting to repair the defects, except
on one occasion where they sent a plumber in response to a complaint regarding
the toilet. (Id. at 913.) In Erlach, a prior landlord
had turned off tenant's utilities and prevented the tenant from
returning to the property. (Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
1299.) The Court of Appeal held that there was a question of fact on whether
the defendant acted outrageously, and as such could not be resolved at the
pleading stage. (Ibid.) Here, on the other hand, Defendants
repeatedly offered repairs, albeit ineffective repairs. Further, Plaintiff has
only alleged a mere inability to use the living room. Even if this substantially
interfered with the lease, such an inability would not, by itself, show that
Defendants’ conduct exceeded “all possible bounds of decency”. Further facts
are required to establish this element.
Accordingly,
the demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to this cause of action.
UCL
Bus. & Prof. Code
section 17200 forbids any “unlawful”, “unfair”, or “fraudulent” business act or
practice. (State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Superior Court (1996) 45
Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102, criticized on different grounds by Cal-Tech
Communications, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Telephone (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163,
184.) Damages cannot be recovered; plaintiffs are generally limited to
injunctive relief and restitution. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144.)
Defendants contend that there are no
facts to support any actual unlawful business practice that has been shown to
have occurred either “on the public” or “on the Plaintiffs”. This ignores the
pled allegations concerning Defendants intentional failure to repair the
discussed water leaks in violation of the implied warranty of habitability. (Compl.,
¶¶13-36.) Defendants posit no authority that such conduct cannot be considered
“unfair” or “unlawful” business acts or practices.
Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED as
to the UCL cause of action.
Violation of City of
Santa Monica Code
Section
4.56.020 of the City of Santa Monica Code of Ordinances provides “No landlord
shall, with respect to property used as a rental housing unit under any rental
housing agreement or other tenancy or estate at will, however created, do any
of the following in bad faith: (a) [I]nterrupt, terminate, or fail to provide
housing services required by contract or by State, County or local housing,
health or safety laws…; (b) [F]ail to perform repairs and maintenance required
by contract or by State, County or local housing, health or safety laws…; [and]
(c) [F]ail to exercise due diligence in completing repairs and maintenance once
undertaken.” (See Compl., ¶ 74.) Bad faith is defined as “An intent to vex,
annoy, harass, provoke or injure another person. This includes, but is not
limited to, the intent of a property owner or manager to induce a tenant to
vacate a rental housing unit through unlawful conduct.” (SMCO § 4.56.010.)
The
complaint alleges facts which establish that Defendants acted with bad faith. “Defendants
intentionally failed to repair and maintain the Subject Property in an attempt
to save money, increase their cash flow, intimidate Plaintiffs into not
complaining, and/or to cause Plaintiffs to abandon the Subject Property.”
(Compl., ¶ 64.) This establishes an inference that Defendants, as property
owners, intended to vex, annoy, or harass Plaintiffs into abandoning the
subject property. Thus, the violation is well-stated. (Compl., ¶¶ 74-75.)
Accordingly,
the demurrer is OVERRULED.
Punitive Damages
The motion to strike punitive
damages is moot per the ruling on demurrer. Alternatively, it would be stricken
with leave to amend for the same reasons the demurrer was sustained as to the
IIED claim.
Att. Fees
The complaint alleges
entitlement to attorneys’ fees pursuant to City of Santa Monica Code of
Ordinances Section 4.56.040(d). This section provides:
Penalties
and Other Monetary Awards. Any person who violates or aids or incites another
person to violate the provisions of this Chapter is liable for each and every
such offense for the actual damages suffered by an aggrieved party or for
statutory damages in the sum of between one thousand dollars and twenty
thousand dollars, whichever is greater, and shall be liable for such attorneys'
fees and costs as may be determined by the court in addition thereto…
As the complaint
establishes a violation of SMCO section 4.56.020, Plaintiffs state a claim for
attorneys’ fees. (Compl., ¶¶ 74-75.)
Accordingly, the motion
to strike is DENIED.
Plaintiff to file an
amended complaint within 30 days.