Judge Mark A. Young, Case Number: 24SMCV02817, Date: 2024-09-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV02817, Date: 2024-09-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV02817 Hearing Date: September 17, 2024 Dept: M

CASE NAME: Ryan v. 1238 10th St. LLC, et al.

CASE NO.: 24SMCV02817

MOTION: Special Motion to Strike

HEARING DATE: 9/17/2024

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 425.16 permits the Court to strike causes of action arising from an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of free speech or petition, unless the plaintiff establishes that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. “The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendant’s constitutionally protected conduct from the undue burden of frivolous litigation.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393.) “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Id. at 384.)

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 384, citation omitted.) The California Supreme Court has “described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’” (Id. at 384-385 [citations omitted].)

A moving party must move to strike under this section within 60 days of service of the complaint. (CCP §425.16(f).)

ANALYSIS

Defendant 1238 10th Street LLC moves to strike the following allegations pertinent to Plaintiff Shawn Ryan’s seventh cause of action for Tenant Harassment:

• Paragraph 84, lines 14 through 15: “taking action to terminate a tenancy upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known to landlord”; and

• Paragraph 85, lines 20 through 21: “brought an action to terminate a tenancy upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known to landlord”.

Generally, bringing an action for unlawful detainer, and all acts necessary to prosecute such an action, would be protected under the anti-SLAPP provisions. (See Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Assocs. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1480 [finding that an unlawful detainer action, service of notice to quit and threats to evict tenants constitute protected activities].) CCP section 425.16(e) defines protected acts as the following: 1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law and 2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, among other things. Thus, all petition-related activities before the government, even if it does not involve a public issue, constitute protected activities under section 425.16. All that matters is that the First Amendment activity takes place in an official proceeding or be made in connection with an issue being reviewed by an official proceeding. (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1116.) Litigation-related activities, such as the filing of a lawsuit or unlawful detainer action, reflect the exercise of a person‘s constitutionally guaranteed right to petition the government for grievances. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 84, 90.)

The above-cited cases expressly refer to “taking action” or bringing “an action” to terminate a tenancy, i.e., an unlawful detainer action under CCP section 1161 et seq. Liability for Plaintiff’s wrongful eviction claim is therefore premised, in part, on Defendant’s litigation conduct. Defendant therefore meets its burden to show that challenged allegations arise from, in part, protected conduct. Plaintiff does not oppose the motion, and therefore fails to meet his second prong burden.

The “prevailing defendant” on the motion to strike “shall be entitled” to recover the defendant's attorney fees and costs. (CCP § 425.16(c).) Defendant requests $8,850.00 in sanctions, which reflects approximately 16 hours of attorney-time, and does not count any time anticipated for a reply. (See Supp. French Decl., ¶¶ 4-6.) Counsel presents verified billing records showing that counsel, Mr. French, spent 15.3 hours working on the moving papers at $540.00 per hour, and Mr. Odson spent 0.7 hours reviewing/revising the moving papers at $895.00 per hour. The Court finds the counsel’s rates and time spent to be reasonable. Accordingly, the request for sanctions is GRANTED. Sanctions are imposed against Plaintiff Shawn Ryan and his counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $8,850.00.