Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV02979, Date: 2024-09-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV02979 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Halco
Management Inc. v. Kokabi, et al.
CASE NO.: 24SMCV02979
MOTION: Motion
for Summary Judgment
HEARING DATE: 9/3/2024
Legal
Standard
A party may move for summary judgment in any action or
proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no
defense to the action or proceeding. (CCP, § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law
of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the
parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations,
trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)
“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or
more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one
or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party
contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative
defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative
defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for
damages, as specified in¿Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more
defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or
plaintiffs.”¿(CCP,¿§ 437c(f)(1).)¿If a party seeks summary adjudication as an
alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made
in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court¿(1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)¿ “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a
legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not
completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of
duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (CCP,¿§ 437c(t).)¿
To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.¿(CCP, §¿437c(c).)¿The motion cannot succeed unless
the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts;
the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other
evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th
833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of
material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of
fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…”
(Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other
words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment
and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson
v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if
adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of
credibility,” except when¿a material fact is the witness’s¿state of mind and
“that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation
thereof.” (CCP, § 437c(e).)¿
Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden
shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP §
437c(p)(1).) “[T]here¿is no
obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless
and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every
element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.”¿(Consumer Cause,
Inc. v.¿SmileCare¿(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿
¿
“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment
motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to
delimit the scope of the issues and to¿frame¿the outer measure of materiality
in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co.¿(2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the
burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she
negate plaintiff's theories of liability¿as alleged in the complaint;
that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical
possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Ibid.)¿
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.
Analysis
Plaintiff Halco Management Inc. (“Plaintiff’)
moves for summary judgment for possession on its unlawful detainer cause of
action against Defendants, Sina Kokabi and Sina Motors Corp. (“Defendants”).
Unlawful detainer is a summary
proceeding to determine the right of possession of real property. (Culver
Center Partners East #1, L.P. v. Baja Fresh Westlake Village, Inc. (2010)
185 Cal. App. 4th 744, 749.) In order to take advantage of this summary remedy,
the landlord must demonstrate “strict compliance” with the statutory notice
requirements. (Id.) Proper service on lessees of a valid three-day
notice to pay or quit is essential to declaring lessor’s judgment for
possession under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161. (Palm Property
Investments, LLC v. Yadegar (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425.) Code of
Civil Procedure section 1161(2) provides that a tenant is guilty of unlawful
detainer:
When he or she continues in
possession, in person or by subtenant, without the permission of his or her
landlord, or the successor in estate of his or her landlord, if applicable,
after default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, and three days’ notice, in writing, requiring its
payment, stating the amount which is due, the name, telephone number, and
address of the person to whom the rent payment shall be made, and, if payment
may be made personally, the usual days and hours that person will be available
to receive the payment. . .
Accordingly, the basic elements of
unlawful detainer for nonpayment of rent are “(1) the tenant is in possession
of the premises; (2) that possession is without permission; (3) the tenant is
in default for nonpayment of rent; (4) the tenant has been properly served with
a written three-day notice; and (5) the default continues after the three-day
notice period has elapsed.” (Kruger v. Reyes (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th
Supp. 10, 16.)
Plaintiff presents the following
evidence in support of its unlawful detainer claim against Defendants. The
subject premises is located at 1781-1783 Westwood Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA
90024 (the “Premises”). (Halavi Decl., ¶¶ 2, 16; Ex. C; RJN Ex. 1.) On June 1, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendants
entered into a written lease for an initial term of five years for the
Premises. (Halavi Decl., ¶ 16; Ex. C [Lease].) Plaintiff is the landlord under
the Lease. (Halavi Decl., ¶ 17.) The Lease provides for rent of $14,000.00 per
month on the first of each month, and an annual rent increase of 3.5% or LA CPI,
which is greater. (Id., ¶¶ 18-19.)
In June 2024, Tenant owed an outstanding
balance of rent for the months of March 2024 through May 2024, totaling $43,554.00
($14,518.00 per month). (Halavi Decl., ¶ 20.) On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff’s
counsel served on Tenant’s counsel a Demand for Payment of Rent (the “Demand
Notice”) pursuant to the Lease. The Demand Notice advised that Tenant had
failed to pay Rent between the months of March 2024 and May 2024 in the amount
of $43,554.00, and that if Tenant did not pay the amount due within three (3)
days of the Demand Notice, Tenant would be in default of the Lease, and
Plaintiff would be entitled to proceed against Tenant. (Goodkin Decl., ¶ 2; Ex.
D.) Tenant did not remit payment pursuant to the Demand Notice. (Halavi Decl.,
¶ 24.) On June 4, 2024, Plaintiff served a Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit
for then-current amount of rent due, $43,554.00 (the “3-Day Notice”) on
Defendant. (Id.; Lauve Decl., ¶¶ 3-5, Exs. E-F.) Tenant failed to pay the full
amount of the $43,554.00 estimated balance set forth in the 3-Day Notice, and
Defendant is presently in possession of the Premises. (Halavi Decl., ¶ 28;
Lauve Decl., ¶ 6.) The daily damages are $477.30 per day. (Halavi Decl., ¶ 31.)
Plaintiff also shows entitlement to attorneys’ fees. (Id., ¶ 22.)
With the above evidence, Plaintiff
demonstrates a prima facie case for unlawful detainer under section 1161(2). Plaintiff
shows that Defendants have defaulted for nonpayment of rent, the default
continues after the three-day notice period has elapsed following a valid written
three-day notice, and that Defendants remain in possession of the Premises.
This showing shifts the burden of production to Defendants to present a dispute
of material fact concerning possession. If Defendants fail to show a dispute of
material fact, the motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED.