Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV03195, Date: 2025-02-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV03195    Hearing Date: February 5, 2025    Dept: M

CASE NAME:             Doe, v. Los Angeles Unified School District, et al. 

CASE NO.:                   24SMCV03195

MOTION:                  Motion to Strike LACMTA’s Cross-Complaint

HEARING DATE:   2/5/2025

LEGAL STANDARD 

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) 

“Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿in what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿how¿that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.) 

ANALYSIS 

Defendant/Cross-Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) moves to strike the request for attorneys’ fees in Defendant/Cross-Complainant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s (LACMTA) Cross-Complaint.

LACMTA seeks its attorneys’ fees incurred and spent in the defense of the underlying action against LAUSD. The underlying lawsuit arises out of Plaintiff Doe’s claim that she was injured on LAUSD’s property and was not rendered appropriate aid by LAUSD and LACMTA when they allowed Plaintiff to leave the property on an MTA bus. (See Compl., ¶¶ 14-30.) LACMTA’s Cross-Complaint alleges three causes of action against LAUSD for implied indemnity, comparative fault and declaratory relief related to the underlying complaint. In both the second and third causes of action, LACMTA alleges entitlement to recover attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in defending against the Complaint against LAUSD.

Generally, each party bears his or her own attorneys’ fees unless otherwise provided for by statute or an agreement between the parties. (CCP §1021.) LACMTA does not identify a contract or statutory basis for fees. LACMTA therefore must plead another factual basis for fees. In opposition, LACMTA argues that its attorneys’ fees and investigation expenses are recoverable as damages on its first cause of action for implied indemnity, citing the “tort of another” doctrine. The tort of another doctrine holds that “[a] person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney's fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred.” (Prentice v. N. Am. Title Guar. Corp., Alameda Div. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620.)

The tort of another doctrine is not an exception to the American rule, but simply a logical application of the usual measure of tort damages.¿(Mega RV Corporation v. HWH Corporation (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1337–38.)¿Theoretically, attorney fees are recoverable as damages resulting from a tort in the same way that medical fees would be part of the damages in a personal injury action.¿(Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1310.)  Therefore, damages may not be awarded under the doctrine if no tort duty existed between the tortfeasor and the party claiming attorneys’ fees as damages. (Mega RV, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at 1339-42.)¿Damages also may not be awarded under the doctrine if no tort duty existed between the parties. (Id. at 1339.) “[N]early all of the cases which have applied the [tort of another] doctrine involve a clear violation of a traditional tort duty between the tortfeasor who is required to pay the attorney fees and the person seeking compensation for those fees.” (Id. at 1339.)

LACMTA fails to allege a tort duty owed by LAUSD. LACMTA only identifies general joint tortfeasor principles as the basis of liability. The doctrine does not apply where a plaintiff has been damaged by the negligence of joint tortfeasors. (Gorman¿v.¿Tassajara Development Corp. (2009)¿178¿Cal.App.4th¿44, 80.)¿The doctrine “was not intended to apply to one of several joint tortfeasors in order to justify additional attorney fee damages.¿If that were the rule there is no reason why it could not be applied in every multiple tortfeasor case with the plaintiff simply choosing the one with the deepest pocket as the ‘Prentice¿target.’ Such a result would be a total emasculation of¿Code of Civil Procedure section 1021¿in tort cases.” (Id.) Since LACMTA claims joint tortfeasor liability as the basis for fees, the tort of another doctrine does not apply. Therefore, LACMTA fails to allege a basis for the requested attorneys’ fees.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED without leave to amend.