Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV03211, Date: 2024-09-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV03211    Hearing Date: September 6, 2024    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Bel-Air Assoc. v. Balakhani, et al.

CASE NO.:                24SMCV03211

MOTION:                  OSC Re: Preliminary Injunction

HEARING DATE:   9/6/2024

Legal Standard

            Under Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 526(a), a preliminary injunction may be issued in the following cases:

1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.

2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action.

3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

            4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief. 

5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief.

6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.

            7) Where the obligation arises from a trust.

            In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the trial court considers two factors: 1) the reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial (CCP §526(a)(1)); and 2) a balancing of the “irreparable harm” that the moving party is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied compared to the harm that the non-moving party is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. (CCP §526(a)(2); 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402.) “A preliminary injunction is an interim remedy designed to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the merits.” (MaJor v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623.) “[A] cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be granted.” (Id. (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Richter (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168).)   

            The court’s ruling on a preliminary injunction is not an adjudication of the merits, is not a trial, and does not require a statement of decision. (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286.) The judge is not required to state her reasons for granting or denying a preliminary injunction; a cursory statement is sufficient. (City of Los Altos v. Barnes, (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1198.) A proposed order must be presented to the judge for signature, with any required undertaking, within one day after the preliminary injunction is granted. (CRC 3.1150(f).)

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

            Plaintiff’s objection to the sur-reply declaration is SUSTAINED.

Analysis

Plaintiff Bel-Air Association moves for a preliminary injunction pending trial of this action against Defendants Shahram Balakhani and Monroe Investment Group, LLC, prohibiting Defendants, and each of them, and their agents, representatives, assigns, and all those acting in concert or participating with them, from engaging in the following activities:

A. From having any amplified sound (whether music or otherwise) at the property located at 1859 Bel Air Road, Los Angeles, California (a) at any time between the hours of 7:00 p.m. until 9:00 a.m. of the following day; (b) with a Noise Level (dBA) that exceeds 55 decibels at any other time; or (c) that is audible or discernable outside the boundary lines of the 10979 Chalon Road property;

B. From having the source of any music, amplified or otherwise, or the source of any amplified sound, originate or emanate from any location at the 1859 Bel Air Road property other than inside the house itself, with doors and windows closed, between the hours of 7:00 p.m. until 9:00 a.m. of the following day;

C. From using, allowing the use of, or renting/leasing the 1859 Bel Air Road property in violation of any applicable noise, use, or zoning codes, laws, or ordinances;  

D. From failing to obtain any necessary permit(s) required for any event held at the 1859 Bel Air Road property;

E. From allowing residents, guests, suppliers, and/or vendors (or people transporting residents or guests to or from the 1859 Bel Air Road property) to park or stop in no-parking areas while at, or while arriving at or departing from the property, or to otherwise block or impede traffic;

F. From allowing residents, guests, suppliers, and/or vendors at, or going to or from the 1859 Bel Air Road property, to throw anything that is lit, burning, or on fire (including but not limited to cigarettes or cigarette butts) in or near brush, shrubs, or anything else that is combustible the vicinity of the 1859 Bel Air Road property while at, or while arriving at or departing from, the property;

G. From allowing residents, guests, suppliers, and/or vendors at the 1859 Bel Air Road property to litter in the vicinity of the property while at, or while arriving at or departing from, the property;

H. From advertising, promoting, and/or using the 1859 Bel Air Road property as an event center, party house, and/or a music, nightlife, or entertainment venue, and from using or offering to rent/lease it for such purposes, or with the knowledge that it might reasonably be used for such purposes; and

I. From having or using commercial or industrial sound or other audio-visual equipment at the 1859 Bel Air Road property in a manner that may be heard and/or seen outside the boundary lines of the property.

For the purpose of this analysis, the Court notes that requests E-G are mandatory in nature. “[A] mandatory injunction ‘is an order compelling affirmative action on the part of the defendants.’” (Feinberg v. Doe¿(1939) 14 Cal.2d 24, 27.) Requests E-G mandate that Defendants affirmatively control or prevent the conduct of third parties.  Generally, mandatory¿preliminary¿injunctions,¿which alter the status quo pending trial are rarely¿granted and subject to a stricter review on appeal. (Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Davis¿(1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 827, 839.) 

Plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable probability of success on the merits. The complaint states two causes of action for public and private nuisance. “Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.) Virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of property may amount to a nuisance, so long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable. (Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 263, 302.) “As stated by Prosser: ‘There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word “nuisance.” It has meant all things to all men, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie.’ ” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 919.)

To prove a private nuisance, a plaintiff must establish a non-trespassory interference with the private use and enjoyment of property. (Civ. Code, §§ 3479 – 3481; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 938.) Liability for private nuisance also requires two additional elements: (i) substantial, actual damage, which is (ii) unreasonable as to its nature, duration, frequency or amount. (Id. at 937-939.) Substantial, actual damage requires proof that the invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the use and enjoyment of land, which causes plaintiff to suffer a harm of “importance” with a “real and appreciable invasion of the plaintiff's interests”, “definitely offensive, seriously annoying or intolerable” which a reasonable person living the same community would be “substantially annoyed or disturbed by the situation”. (Id. at 937-938.) Whether an invasion is unreasonable depends on whether the gravity of the harm outweighs the social utility of the defendant's conduct, taking the totality of the circumstances into account. (Ibid.) Thus, whether the interference is substantial and unreasonable is a question of fact requiring determination of all the circumstances of the case. (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 263-64.)   

“A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance of damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” (Civ. Code, § 3480; see Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1548 [resident’s aggravation of asthma and chronic allergies from secondhand tobacco smoke could be considered a special injury, which was different in type from the harm suffered the general public].) Generally, “[a] private person may maintain an action for a public nuisance [unless] it is specially injurious to himself[.]” (Civ. Code, § 3493.) A plaintiff need not prove a special, different-in-kind injury if the nuisance interferes with a known property right constituting a private nuisance. (Birke, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 1550-1551 [no special injury need be alleged where the secondhand smoke interfered with the use and enjoyment of the outdoor facilities, a known property right].)

Plaintiff cites municipal codes pertaining to acceptable noise levels, littering, unruly gatherings, and fire safety, which would form a basis for a nuisance claim. Table 3.10-5 of Chapter 12.08 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) establishes an Exterior Noise Level (dBA) at no more than 55 decibels for residential properties. The Los Angeles “Noise Regulation” provides, at Section 115.02(b) of Article 5 of Chapter XI, that even for non- commercial purposes, no amplified sound is permissible between the hours of 4:30 p.m. until 9:00 a.m. of the following day, and even then, pursuant to Section 115.02(f)(1), the sound may not be audible at any distance in excess of 200 feet from the equipment. Section 115.02(b) makes illegal any “loud and raucous or unreasonably jarring, disturbing, annoying” sound, as well as any “nuisance to reasonable persons of normal sensitivities within the area of audibility.” Section 116.01 of Article 6 of Chapter XI provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person to willfully make or continue, or cause to be made or continued, any loud, unnecessary, and unusual noise which disturbs the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or which causes discomfort or annoyance to any reasonable person of normal sensitivities.”

LAMC Section 41.58.1 provides, “ ‘Loud or Unruly Gathering’ means a gathering of persons at any Residence where Loud or Unruly Conduct occurs at the Residence or within 500 feet of the Residence, and which threatens or interferes with the public health, safety or welfare, or the comfortable enjoyment of life and property.” (§ 41.58.1(a)(4). “Loud or Unruly Conduct,” in turn, includes “loud noise;” “obstruction of a street or public right-of-way;” “public intoxication or drinking in public;” “litter;” “and other “disturbances of the peace.” (§ 41.58.1(a)(3).)

Los Angeles City Ordinance No. 156,363 (LAMC section 111.04) provides, “the operation or maintenance of any device, instrument, vehicle, or machinery in violation of any provision of this chapter, which operation or maintenance causes discomfort of annoyance to reasonable persons or which endangers the comfort, repose, health, or peace of residents of the area, shall be deemed and is declared to be a public nuisance.”

Los Angeles City Ordinance No. 156,363 (LAMC section 112.01(a)) provides, “It shall be unlawful for any person within any zone of the City to use or operate any radio, musical instrument, phonograph, television receiver, or other machine or device for the producing, reproducing or amplification of the human voice, music, or any other sound, in such a manner, as to disturb the peace, quiet, and comfort of neighbor occupants or any reasonable person residing or working in the area.” Subsection (b) of this section further provides, “Any noise level caused by such use or operation which is audible to the human ear at a distance in excess of 150 feet from the property line of the noise source, within any residential zone of the City or within 500 feet thereof, shall be a violation of the provisions of this section.”

Los Angeles City Ordinance No. 156,363 (LAMC section 116.01) provides, “it shall be unlawful for any person to willfully make or continue, or cause to be made or continued, any loud, unnecessary, or unusual noise which disturbs the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or which causes discomfort of annoyance to any reasonable person of normal sensitivities residing in the area.” Finally, LAMC section 57.4908.6 prohibits smoking in the area because it is a “Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.”

Plaintiff’s evidence demonstrates a probability of success on the merits for a private or public nuisance. Plaintiff shows that Defendants’ hosting of events at the subject property in a residential neighborhood on a narrow street has caused substantial or actual damage to the use or enjoyment of its or its members’ property rights. The declarations of neighbors and those who are members of the association and live in “close proximity” to the 1859 Bel Air Road Property provide evidence of noise violations, littering of trash and cigarettes, numerous traffic jams and unpassable roads.  There is evidence that the subject 1859 Bel Air Road property is the site of numerous “loud,” “disruptive” commercial events that result in severe traffic jams and impassible roads. (Stupin Decl., ¶¶ 2, 4.) Stupin, who lives “on Bel Air Road” describes eventgoers as routinely parking in no-parking zones along the steep, curvy portion of Bel Air Road. (Id.) He describes the events and the late night noise violations. (Id.) He also has seen eventgoers and shuttle drivers speed up and down the roads at unsafe speeds. (Id.)

Thomas, who lives in the “Bel Air area,” explains that the events at the Property make “life quite difficult” for him. (Thomas Decl., ¶ 3.) He can hear music “even from his house” but the noise is “not the worst aspect.” (Id.) He states that traffic congestion is far worse, that he is “often” unable to drive out of the front gate due to traffic near 1859 Bel Air Road, which might increase a several-minute drive to almost half-an-hour. (Id.) Eventgoers have also been loud and under the influence outside his home, rung his bell and run over his shrubs. (¶¶ 4-5.)

            Iwasaki, who lives in “very close proximity” to the Subject Property, explains that events at the Property had “loud music” late into the night, caused eventgoers and crew to block/obstruct the road for unspecified amounts of time, caused eventgoers and/or crew to litter the ground “with glass, trash and smoldering cigarettes” after an event, and caused “severe” traffic congestion. (Iwasaki Decl., ¶¶ 3-15.)

Silverman, who lives “in the Bel Air area” but “not on Bel Air Road,” expresses that the events have affected his “life and mobility” because he “often” cannot drive up or down his own street because of the overflow parking by event attendees, and that there is “no way that a fire truck or other emergency vehicle could get through.” Silverman claims that this is “far from a theoretical concern” because a neighbor of his experienced “difficulty” when he recently required hospital care. (Id. ¶ 4.)  Similarly, his daughter stays with him on frequent occasions and has a medical condition that requires a quick trip to the hospital.  (Id.)

Submitted in reply, Suphamongkhon, a resident of the 1900 block of Bel Air, was blocked on the road for “five to ten minutes” due to event crew and trucks, a U-Haul parked on one side of the street, and a food truck on the other. (Suphamongkhon Decl., ¶ 2.)

The above declarations explain the real and appreciable invasion of an identifiable private property interest. As to the noise levels, Plaintiff has provided evidence that the noise violated time restrictions and affected the use and enjoyment of private property. While also describing the noise as “loud” or “blaring” which could be heard from other nearby houses, there is no evidence of a specific decibel level. Even without this information, the Court concludes that the complained-of noise violated the cited noise ordinances and thereby constituted a nuisance.

As to the traffic and littering concerns, Plaintiff posits a mandatory injunction for the court to order Defendants “allowing” guests to park in “no-parking” areas or “impeding traffic” and from littering. Defendants note that for their most recent event, they contractually required neighborhood accommodations such as: (1) a security guard at the front door, (2) a trash-removal clause, (3) a power-washing clause, (4) a guest limit, (5) parking to occur at the UCLA lots, (6) the event host/client to obtain all necessary state, city and county permits, (7) the event host/client to refrain from playing loud music and to comply with all noise ordinances, (8) a no smoking clause, (9) a no pets clause, and (10) the event host/client to obtain $3 million general liability policy for the event. (Balakhani Decl., Ex. A.) Thus, Defendants have already voluntarily complied with most of what was requested in requests E-G and there is no evidence that these requirements were either ineffective or violated during the event.  Thus, an injunction would be superfluous as to the majority of these issues. Plaintiff, however, presents persuasive evidence that Defendants’ hosting of events at the Property poses a safety risk of either blocking emergency vehicles if the narrow street is blocked during set up of the event, during the event, or the take down of the event.  Thus, the Court will mandate that Defendants do not allow vehicles to block the street during these times.    

            For the same reasons, the Court finds that the relative harms weigh in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff demonstrates irreparable harm, including the blockage of emergency vehicles, impediment to traffic, and unlawful noise violations. While Defendants’ business would be adversely affected, there are a series of steps that they have taken (with the most recent event) and can take with respect to blockage of the road that would allow events to continue, commercial or not. Thus, the injunction is issued as set forth herein.