Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV03662, Date: 2024-11-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV03662 Hearing Date: November 20, 2024 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Dolphin Marina
Ltd., v. Wang, et al.
CASE NO.: 24SMCV03662
MOTION: Motion
to Quash Summons; Motion to Dismiss; Demurrer to Complaint; Motion to Quash SDT
HEARING DATE: 11/20/2024
BACKGROUND
This hearing regards four motions made by Defendants
Andrew Wang, Anastasia Demarco and Perlicka Navratilova, including a motion to
quash service of summons, a motion to dismiss, a demurer, and a motion to quash
a third party SDT. The Court will address each motion briefly in turn.
QUASH
SUMMONS ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that the court
lacks personal jurisdiction over them because they are outside the United
States, have no landlord tenant-relationship, and that Navratilova and Wang
were not properly served with the summons and complaint.
Service
“A defendant . . . may serve
and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .” (CCP § 418.10(a).) “When a motion to quash is
properly brought, the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff to establish
the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Aquila, Inc.
v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568.) “[C]ompliance with the
statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal
jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) “[T]he filing of a proof of service creates a
rebuttable presumption that the service was proper” but only if it “complies
with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.” (Id. at
1441-1442.)
Defendants have not brought any evidentiary
support for their challenge. Defendants contend, without explanation, that
Navratilova and Wang were not properly served with the summons and complaint.
To the contrary, the proofs of service on record show proper service of
Defendants by posting. (O’Brien Decl., ¶ 3.) As documented in the declarations
of diligence from registered process servers, Plaintiffs made extensive efforts
to serve Defendants by other means at various addresses over a period of
several weeks. (Id.) The record suggests that Defendants attempted to evade
service. On August 1, 2024, at 6:24 PM, process server Isaac Villarreal
reported hearing activity inside Capri #321, but when he knocked, “everything
went quiet and there was no answer at the door.” (App., Ex. 2.) On August 2, 2024,
Mr. Villarreal was informed by a security guard that the occupants of Unit 321
“will [be] evasive and that they know it’s coming.” (Id.) On August 4, 2024, process server
Alberto J. Gutierrez Rodriguez conducted a four-hour stakeout of Capri #321. He
noted a handwritten sign on the door reading “Smile?? You’re On Camera,”
suggesting the occupants were monitoring for service attempts. (Ex. 5.) This
provided sufficient grounds for the court to approve a posting order.
Defendants submit no authority that the posting service was otherwise invalid.
Personal Jurisdiction
Due process permits state courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents who have “minimum contacts” with the forum
state. “Minimum contacts” means the relationship between the nonresident and
the forum state is such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” under the U.S.
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. (International
Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.) The extent to which a California court can exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the nature and quality of
defendant's “contacts” with the state.
Under a
“general” jurisdiction analysis (also called “all-purpose” or “unlimited”
jurisdiction), nonresident defendants may be sued on causes of action unrelated
to their activities within the state. (Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437, 446-447.) General
jurisdiction exists when a defendant is domiciled in the forum state or his
activities there are substantial, continuous, and systematic. (F. Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 796.) “In such
circumstances, it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be
connected with the defendant’s business relationship to the forum.” (Id.)
“The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is ‘fairly high,’
[citation] and requires that the defendant’s contacts be of the sort that
approximate physical presence.” (Elkman, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at
1315.) “Factors to be taken into consideration are whether the defendant makes
sales, solicits or engages in business in the state, serves the state’s
markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, or is
incorporated there.” (Id.)
Where general jurisdiction
cannot be established, a court may assume specific jurisdiction over a
nonresident, if the nonresident purposefully directed its activities at forum
residents, or purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of local law. (Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235.) Specific
jurisdiction involves a three-part test: (1) the nonresident defendant must do
some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by
which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities
in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2)
the claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's
forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be
reasonable.”¿¿(Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles
County (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1054 [purposeful¿availment¿exists where
a defendant performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes
the transaction of business within the forum state].)
Defendants do not establish any
facts which would suggest that the court lacks general or specific
jurisdiction. Instead, a “Star DeMarc” declares that DeMarc is a tenant of
another unit at the subject premises, and was a tenant of the subject unit
R108, but that the landlord failed to provide keys for unit R108. (DeMarc
Decl., ¶ 2.) DeMarc states that Defendants are not tenants or occupants of the
subject premises. (¶¶3-5.) This does not contradict the complaint and proofs of
service on record.
Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.
MOTION TO DISMISS
ANALYSIS
Defendants Andrew Wang, “Anastasia,”
and Pearl Navratilova move to dismiss this action under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1164 and 1167. Code of Civil Procedure section 1164 states in full:
No person other
than the tenant of the premises and subtenant, if there be one, in the actual
occupation of the premises when the complaint is filed, need be made parties
defendant in the proceeding, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff
be nonsuited for the nonjoinder of any person who might have been made party
defendant, but when it appears that any of the parties served with process, or
appearing in the proceeding, are guilty of the offense charged, judgment must
be rendered against him or her. In case a defendant has become a subtenant of
the premises in controversy, after the service of the notice provided for by
subdivision 2 of Section 1161 of this code, upon the tenant of the premises,
the fact that such notice was not served on each subtenant shall constitute no
defense to the action. All persons who enter the premises under the tenant,
after the commencement of the suit, shall be bound by the judgment, the same as
if he or they had been made party to the action.
Code of Civil Procedure section
1167 states in full:
(a) The summons
shall be in the form specified in Section 412.20 except that when the defendant
is served, the defendant's response shall be filed within five days, excluding
Saturdays and Sundays and other judicial holidays, after the complaint is served
upon the defendant.
(b) If service
is completed by mail or in person through the Secretary of State's address
confidentiality program under Chapter 3.1 (commencing with Section 6205) of
Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code, the defendant shall have an
additional five court days to file a response.
(c) In all other
respects the summons shall be issued and served and returned in the same manner
as a summons in a civil action.
A cursory review of these sections shows
no procedural grounds for dismissal. Simply put, these sections do not pertain to
the standards for dismissing an action. As there is no authority cited to
support dismissal here, the motion is DENIED.
Plaintiff’s request for judicial
notice is GRANTED.
DEMURRER ANALYSIS
Defendant Star DeMarc demurs to the
complaint. A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether
the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be
apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the
pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it
lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are
judicially noticed. (CCP §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff
need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the
factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28
Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the
construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore
Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations
omitted.)
A special demurrer for uncertainty is
disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that
defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what
issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed
against him/her. (CCP § 430.10(f); Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc.
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat
vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)
“Liberality in permitting amendment is
the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie
M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of
discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable
possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿in
what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿how¿that
amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.)
DeMarc provides a bare-bones
challenge to the complaint. DeMarc argues that the complaint does not clearly
establish a landlord-tenant relationship between Plaintiffs and DeMarc. The
complaint unambiguously alleges that DeMarc was an additional occupant under
the subject Lease. On March 21, 2021, Defendant Andrew Wang submitted a rental
application to lease the Subject Premises. (Compl., ¶ 19.) Wang listed Star
DeMarc as an additional occupant and represented that she was “under the age of
18.” (Compl., ¶¶ 20-21.) The Complaint thus establishes for pleading purposes
that DeMarc is a tenant of the subject property.
DeMarc also argues that the lease
would be void ab initio based on Wang’s fraud, among other contentions. DeMarc
provides no substantive briefings on these contentions. As such, they are
rejected.
Accordingly, the demurrer is
OVERRULED. DeMarc is ordered to file an
answer only within 5 days.
QUASH SUBPOENAS
ANALYSIS
Defendant Wang moves to quash a
subpoena for production of business records served by Plaintiffs on the Los
Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk. Wang objects on the grounds
that the subpoenas seek private employment records. Wang also requests
sanctions in the amount of $4,500.00 against Plaintiffs.
Code of Civil Procedure section
1987.1 states that “[i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the
production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other
things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of
a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in
subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and
an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely,
modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as
the court shall declare, including protective orders.” (CCP §
1987.1(a).) “In addition, the court may make any other order as may be
appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands,
including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”
(Id.)
As a general rule, all unprivileged
information that is relevant to the subject matter of the action is
discoverable if it would itself be admissible evidence at trial or if it
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
(CCP § 2017.010; Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704,
711.) Information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in
evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez
v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)
The party asserting a privacy right
must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion
that is serious. (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7
Cal.4th 1, 35-37.) If there is a serious invasion of a constitutional right to
privacy, the party seeking the evidence must establish that the information
sought is not only essential and directly relevant, but also that this
information could not be discovered through less intrusive means. (Williams
v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.)
Wang raises
a valid privacy concern regarding his employment records. On October 28, 2024,
Plaintiffs served a subpoena for production of business records on the Los
Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, seeking Wang's private
employment records, including his 2020 W-2 form. (Winters Decl., Ex. A.)
Indeed, courts have found that “personnel records and employment history are
within the scope of the protection provided by the state and federal
Constitutions.” (San Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
1083, 1097.) Therefore, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the information is
directly relevant and cannot be discovered through less intrusive means.
Plaintiffs
show direct relevancy of Wang’s employment records, including his 2020 W-2, to
the instant unlawful detainer action. The complaint alleges material breaches
of the Lease by Wang, including a false representation on his rental application.
In March 2021, Wang applied to lease a unit at the Dolphin Marina Apartments.
(Compl., ¶¶ 19, 22.) To demonstrate he met the income requirements, Wang
submitted what appeared to be a W-2 form showing 2020 income of $96,600 from
employment with the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk. (¶¶ 39,
41.) In reality, County employment records reveal that the only Andrew Wang
employed by the County in 2020 earned just $27,749, which is less than the
annual rent. (Id.) The W-2 reveals tell-tale signs of alteration such as inconsistent
fonts, varying clarity of text within the same document, and other flaws. (Id.)
Under the Lease, Wang agreed to provide accurate information in the rental application
and other documents submitted to Dolphin Marina. (¶ 82.) Plaintiffs reason that
the original W-2 in the County’s possession will provide definitive proof of Wang’s
alleged fraud. No less intrusive means exist to obtain the original W-2.
Wang’s other contentions are
without merit. The sought employment records are relevant to prove a material
breach of the lease. As discussed above, the jurisdictional challenges were
without merit and thus pose no barrier to discovery here.
Accordingly, the motion to quash is
DENIED.
Plaintiffs request sanctions in the
amount of $6,900.00. Plaintiffs explain that counsel has an hourly rate of $575
and spent approximately hours spent opposing this motion. The Court finds the
requested sanctions to be unreasonable in amount in light of the opposition. The
Court will award reasonable sanctions in the amount of $2,875.00 against Wang
and counsel of record, jointly and severally. Sanctions are to be paid to
Plaintiffs’ counsel of record within 30 days.