Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV04000, Date: 2025-01-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV04000    Hearing Date: January 22, 2025    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Gerard Butler v. AIG Property Casualty Company

CASE NO.:                24SMCV04000

MOTION:                  AIG Property Casualty Company’s Motion to Quash Deposition Notice for Deposition of Kristen Davis, or in the Alternative for a Protective Order in Pending Underinsured Motorist Arbitration Proceeding

HEARING DATE:   1/22/2025

 

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a car accident involving an underinsured motorist. On August 15, 2024, AIG Property Casualty Company (“AIG”) commenced this action by filing an Application to Commence Discovery in a Pending Underinsured Motorist Arbitration Matter (“Application”). 

The Application refers to AIG as the Respondent, Gerard Butler as the Claimant, and alleges the following:  Claimant is claiming underinsured motorist benefits under an AIG insurance policy.  (App. p. 1:26-27.)  The policy and relevant Insurance Code statute require the parties to resolve disputes through arbitration.  (App. pp. 1:27-2:1.)  As part of the arbitration proceeding, Claimant served AIG with a Notice of Deposition of Kristin Davis, a Senior Complex Claims Advisor at Sedgwick Claims, Inc. (“Sedgwick”), which provides claims handling services for AIG.  (App. p. 2:3-5.)  As explained in the concurrently filed motion to quash the deposition notice, a discovery dispute has arisen between the parties regarding that deposition.  (App. p. 2:11-13.)  Insurance Code section 11580.2(f) states that the discovery provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be utilized.  (App. p. 2:8-9.)  Therefore, “Respondent, through this Application, requests that the Superior Court resolve said discovery dispute pursuant to Insurance Code § 11580.2.”  (App. p. 2:13-14.)

On August 15, 2024, AIG filed the instant motion to quash the deposition notice or, in the alternative, issue a protective order. On January 8, 2025, Claimant filed his opposition to the motion. No reply has been filed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Insurance Code section 11580.2(a) requires “all automobile insurance policies delivered in California, and which cover bodily injury liability, to include insurance for amounts the insured is legally entitled to recover as damages for bodily injury or wrongful death from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.”  (Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 920 (“Miranda”).) “[T]he determination as to whether the insured shall be legally entitled to recover damages, … shall be made by agreement between the insured and the insurer or, in the event of disagreement, by arbitration.’  (§ 11580.2, subd. (f).)”  (Miranda, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 920.)

 

Insurance Code section 11580.2, “adopts the California Civil Discovery Act in its entirety.  (Miranda, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 920-921, citing Insurance Code § 11580.2, subd. (f); see also Briggs v. Resolution Remedies (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1401, fn. 6 [“Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (f) commits discovery disputes in uninsured motorist arbitrations to the superior court.”  [Citation]”].) “The Civil Discovery Act sets out six methods by which litigants can obtain pretrial disclosure of relevant information: (a) depositions; (b) interrogatories; (c) inspections of documents, things, and places; (d) physical and mental examinations; (e) requests for admissions; and (f) exchanges of expert trial witness information.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.010.)”  (City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46, 61.)

 

Under the Act, “a party may … move for an order staying the taking of the deposition and quashing the deposition notice.  [The] motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under [Code of Civil Procedure] Section 2016.040.  The taking of the deposition is stayed pending the determination of this motion.”  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.410, subd. (c); 2016.040 [“A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion”].)

 

In addition, “[b]efore, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order.  [That] motion shall [also] be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (a).)  “The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.  [The] protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions: (1) That the deposition not be taken at all.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) 

 

ANALYSIS

Meet and Confer

 

            The parties met and conferred prior to AIG filing this motion.  (Declaration of James P. Wagoner, ¶¶ 5, 7.)

 

Discussion

 

             AIG argues that quashing the deposition notice or issuing a protective order preventing the deposition of  Kristin Davis (“Davis”) from taking place is appropriate because the information Davis possesses came from her communications with counsel, and, therefore, that information is protected and non-discoverable under the attorney-client privilege.  (Motion, pp. 3:25-27, 5:17-28.)  AIG further argues that “[i]f Claimant seeks information regarding the claim, there are more convenient, less burdensome, less expensive, and certainly more fruitful discovery options available.  As such, the Court should grant this Motion to Quash the Notice of Deposition, or in the alternative, issue a Protective Order.”  (Motion, pp. 3:27-4:4.) In opposition, Claimant argues (among other things) that Davis verified AIG’s discovery responses (interrogatories and requests for admission) and, therefore, Claimant has a right to depose her.  (Opposition, p. 1:22-25.)

 

            Responses to interrogatories and requests for admission “must be signed by the responding party under oath.  ([Code Civ. Proc.] §§ 2030.250, subd. (a); § 2033.240, subd. (a).)  The applicable statutes provide, identically, ‘If that party is a public or private corporation, or a partnership, association, or governmental agency, one of its officers or agents shall sign the response under oath on behalf of that party.’  (§§ 2030.250, subd. (b); 2033.260, subd. (b).)”  (Melendrez, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.)

 

As Claimant argues, “when an individual verifies discovery responses, further discovery can be directed to that individual to determine the sources for the initial responses.”  (Melendrez v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1352 (“Melendrez”).)  This is true even if an attorney verifies a discovery response as an officer or agent of a party.  (See Ibid. [“An attorney cannot verify a response on behalf of an individual party.  [Citation.]  However, an attorney may verify a response as officer or agent of a corporate party”].)  “Doing so … will constitute a limited waiver of the attorney-client and work product privileges, ‘during any subsequent discovery from that attorney concerning the identity of the sources of the information contained in the response.’  [Citations.]”  (Ibid.)

 

Here, AIG has not filed a reply to Claimant’s opposition disputing that Davis verified all of AIG’s interrogatories and requests for admission. Therefore, the Court finds it proper to deny the motion and require AIG to assert its attorney-client privilege objections during the deposition.

 

For those reasons, the Motion to Quash Deposition Notice for Deposition of Kristen Davis, or in the Alternative for a Protective Order in Pending Underinsured Motorist Arbitration Proceeding is DENIED.  The Court awards $1,500 in sanctions against AIG and their counsel of record, jointly and severally. Sanctions are payable within 30 days.