Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV04028, Date: 2025-05-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV04028    Hearing Date: May 14, 2025    Dept: M

CASE NAME:             Rindner v. Sarigianides

CASE NO.:                   24SMCV04028

MOTION:                     Demurrer and Motion to Strike the First Amended Complaint

HEARING DATE:   5/14/2025

LEGAL STANDARD 

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations omitted.) 

A special demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (CCP § 430.10(f); Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)  

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) 

“Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿in what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿how¿that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.) 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

Defendant Aris Sarigianides requests judicial notice of the following supplied documents:

1. Exhibit 1 - Preliminary Report for 961 Enchanted Way, Pacific Palisades;

2. Exhibit 2 - Preliminary Report for 943 Enchanted Way, Pacific Palisades; and

3. Exhibit 3 - CC&R’s for Tract no. 22433.

In reply, Defendant also requests judicial notice of the following documents:

4. Exhibit 4 - Response of Plaintiff Karen C. Rindner to Request for Admissions (Set No. 1) Propounded by Defendant Aris Sarigianides; and

5. Exhibit 5 - Court Order - Dept. M, Hon. Mark A. Young dated February 21, 2023, in case titled, Chan v. Tourtellotte, et al., LASC case no. 21SMCV01785.

Defendant’s request is GRANTED as to no. 3 only. The Preliminary Reports are not official records or judicially noticeable under any other subsection. (Evid. Code § 452(c).) Such “preliminary reports” of title are reasonably subject to dispute and are not capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (Evid. Code §452(h).) The reports themselves state that they are “preliminary” and “not a written representation as to the condition of title and may not list all liens, defects and encumbrances affecting title to the land.” (RJN Exs. 1-2.) Furthermore, the request for judicial notice in reply is improper. Plaintiff was not given a reasonable opportunity to respond to this request. The request for admissions (RFAs) pertain to factual issues outside of the four corners of the complaint. Moreover, the Court’s prior decision case 21SMCV01785 is not relevant to the case at hand, and therefore not subject to notice.

Finally, Plaintiff attaches a “White Paper” to its opposition. Plaintiff does not request judicial notice of this document. Notice would not be given, as this document is not an official act, court record, or other appropriately noticed document under section 452. The Court will therefore not consider this attachment.

ANALYSIS 

Defendant Aris Sarigianides demurs to each of Plaintiff Karen C. Rindner’s causes of action and moves to strike her entire First Amended Complaint (FAC). The motion to strike is duplicative of the demurrer. Thus, the Court will discuss the motions together.

Indispensable Party

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s co-trustee is indispensable to this action.

“A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if  

(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or  

(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may  

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or  

(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.  

If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.” 

(CCP § 389(a).) 

Defendant does not show that the relief sought in this action cannot be accorded without the co-trustee. Plaintiff’s co-trustee is not a person who claims an interest relating to the subject of the action. (See FAC ¶4.) Defendant does not explain how, as a practical matter, the co-trustee’s rights would be impaired or impeded, or how Defendant would be subject to a risk of inconsistent obligations or multiple liability. Therefore, the demurrer based upon a failure to join an indispensable party is denied.

CC&Rs Violation

The FAC seeks injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendant to prevent a proposed construction of a two-story home at 943 Enchanted Way, Pacific Palisades. Each of Plaintiff’s claims arise from allegations that the construction threatens to obstruct Plaintiff's ocean view from her property at 961 Enchanted Way, which violates the Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions ("CC&Rs") applicable to the parties’ properties.

Plaintiff owns real property located at 961 Enchanted Way, Pacific Palisades. (FAC ¶¶ 3, 7.) Co-Trustee Steven Rindner has expressly delegated his authority and consented to the action being prosecuted solely by Plaintiff. (FAC ¶ 4.) Defendant owns a nearby property located at 943 Enchanted Way. (¶ 5.) Both properties are allegedly subject to CC&Rs recorded on December 19, 1956, for Tract 22433. (¶¶ 7-8, 10.) The CC&Rs prohibit the construction of any structure that exceeds one story in height unless such construction does not detract from the view of any other lot in the tract and is approved by the Architectural Committee (or the affected homeowners as successors to such committee). (¶ 9.) In 1962, Plaintiff's property was subdivided and redesignated as part of Tract 25473. (¶11.) The FAC alleges that, despite this subdivision, the CC&Rs continue to impose a servitude on Defendant's property in favor of Plaintiff's property. (Id.)

The FAC alleges that Defendant's proposed construction of a two-story home violates the CC&Rs by obstructing Plaintiffs' ocean view, detracting from the value and enjoyment of their property. (FAC ¶19.) Defendant has breached the CC&Rs by proceeding with construction without obtaining the necessary approvals and without ensuring that his construction will not detract from Plaintiffs' view. (¶20.) Plaintiff therefore claims that the construction breaches the CC&Rs, constitutes a nuisance, and should be halted through declaratory/injunctive relief. (¶¶ 20-30.)

In their motion, Defendant argues that the provisions of the CC&Rs for Tract No. 22433 on which Plaintiff relies are no longer enforceable because any of the powers and duties of the Architectural Committee, including any pre-construction approval process for construction, terminated as of December 31, 1960. Defendant points to the following language found in the CC&Rs, which states in relevant part:

(1) All lots in said Tract shall be known and described as residential lots, no

structure shall be erected, altered, place or permitted to remain on any building plot

other than one detached single-family dwelling not to exceed one story in height

and a private garage, for not more than three cars: except; where, in the judgment of

the Declarant and approved by the Architectural Committee, one two story single-family

dwelling may be erected where said dwelling will not detract from the view

of any other lot in said tract.

(2) No building shall be erected, placed or altered on any building plot in this subdivision

until the building plans, specifications, and plot plan showing the location of such

building have been approved in writing as to the conformity and harmony of exterior

design with existing structures in the subdivision, and as to location of the building with

respect to topography and finished ground elevation by the architectural committee… 

In the event the said committee fails to approve or disapprove a design and location

within thirty (30) days after said plans and specifications have been submitted to it, or in

any event, if no suit to enjoin the erection of said such building or making of any

alterations has been commenced prior to the completion thereof, such approval will not

be required and this covenant will be deemed to have been fully complied with. …The

power and duties of such committee shall cease on or after December 31, 1960.

Thereafter, the approval described in this covenant shall not be required unless,

prior to said date and effective thereon a written instrument shall be executed by the

then record owners of a majority of the lots in this subdivision and duly recorded

appointing a representative, or representatives, who shall thereafter exercise the

same powers previously exercised by said committee.

(Emphasis added)

The CC&Rs only provided the Architectural Committee with authority until December 31, 1960. Thereafter, approval by the Architectural Committee required by “this covenant” “shall not be required unless,” prior to December 31, 1960, “a written instrument” is “executed by the then record owners of a majority of the lots in this subdivision and duly recorded appointing a representative, or representatives, who shall thereafter exercise the same powers previously exercised by” the Architectural Committee. The FAC does not allege that such assignment was recorded on Defendant’s title by December 31, 1960, or any time thereafter. Plaintiff only cites a 1996 Assignment. Plaintiff does not allege this assignment or provide a copy of this assignment for the Court’s consideration. In any event, this 1996 Assignment was not a written instrument executed by the record owners of a majority of the lots in the subdivision and duly recorded appointing a representative prior to December 31, 1960. Plaintiff offers no authority holding that the later assignment could have revived the expired Architectural Committee approval process.

With the expiration of the Architectural Committee powers, Plaintiff lacks a basis for the requested relief under the CC&Rs. Moreover, without the CC&Rs, Plaintiff lacks a claim for nuisance. Generally, a landowner has no right to an unobstructed view over adjoining property, and “ ‘the law is reluctant to imply such a right.’ ” (Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1219.) CC&Rs may provide for such a right (White v. Dorfman (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 892), but no such right is stated here. Therefore, each cause of action fails to state a claim.

Plaintiff alleges that a subdivision occurred in 1962 which gives Plaintiff standing to bring this action. (FAC ¶11.) Of course, this is facially after the expiration of the Architectural Committee powers. Plaintiff cites no terms within the subdivision instrument which would create a new architectural committee over tract no. 22433. Thus, even assuming that Plaintiff has standing because the CC&Rs still run with Plaintiff’s property after the 1962 subdivision, the Architectural Committee powers still expired by the express terms of the CC&Rs.

Plaintiff does not otherwise allege any facts showing a violation of the other CC&R terms which have not expired. (RJN Ex. 3, paras. (3)-(13).)

Accordingly, the demurrer is SUSTAINED. The Court is not inclined to grant leave to amend unless Plaintiff demonstrates a reasonable probability of successful amendment at the hearing.