Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV04179, Date: 2025-04-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV04179 Hearing Date: April 15, 2025 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Semenyushkin v.
Villa, et al.
CASE NO.: 24SMCV04179
MOTION: Motion
for Summary Judgment
HEARING DATE: 4/15/2025
Legal
Standard
A party may move for summary judgment in any action or
proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no
defense to the action or proceeding. (CCP, § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law
of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the
parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations,
trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)
“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or
more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one
or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party
contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative
defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative
defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for
damages, as specified in¿Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more
defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or
plaintiffs.”¿(CCP,¿§ 437c(f)(1).)¿If a party seeks summary adjudication as an
alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made
in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court¿(1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)¿ “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a
legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not
completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of
duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (CCP,¿§ 437c(t).)¿
To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.¿(CCP, §¿437c(c).)¿The motion cannot succeed unless
the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts;
the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other
evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th
833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of
material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of
fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…”
(Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other
words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment
and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson
v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if
adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of
credibility,” except when¿a material fact is the witness’s¿state of mind and
“that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation
thereof.” (CCP, § 437c(e).)¿
Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden
shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP §
437c(p)(1).) “[T]here¿is no
obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless
and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every
element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.”¿(Consumer Cause,
Inc. v.¿SmileCare¿(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿
¿
“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment
motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to
delimit the scope of the issues and to¿frame¿the outer measure of materiality
in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co.¿(2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the
burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she
negate plaintiff's theories of liability¿as alleged in the complaint;
that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical
possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Ibid.)¿
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Plaintiff’s objection is SUSTAINED. Declarant Joseph
failed to authenticate Exhibit B. Joseph asserts that Exhibit B is a copy of a June
27, 2024, email wherein Plaintiff’s counsel “confirmed” acceptance of the
$11,000 settlement offer. However, the attached email chain shows emails from
July 23, 2024, and August 21, 2024. Moreover, the emails only show Plaintiff’s
counsel disputing acceptance.
Defendants’ objections are immaterial, as the court does
not reach Plaintiff’s responsive burden. Alternatively, the objections are
OVERRULED.
Defendants Anrea Villa and Villa Jones
Inc. move for summary judgment against Plaintiff’s complaint for negligence and
statutory liability. Defendants contend that this case is settled.
A settlement agreement is a contract,
and the legal principles that apply to contracts generally apply to settlements.
(Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc., (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1586.) To
establish that a contract exists, a party must prove mutual assent, that is, there
has been a “meeting of the [parties'] minds on all material points.” (Banner
Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 359; see Bustamante
v. Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 208 [a particular term of a
contract is “material” or “essential” if it is necessary (1) in order to
“provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach” of that contract,
and (2) “for giving an appropriate remedy”].) Whether the parties' minds have
met is judged “objective[ly]” by looking to “the outward manifestations or
expressions of the parties, ... and not their unexpressed intentions or
understandings.” (Alexander v. Codemasters Group Limited (2002) 104
Cal.App.4th 129, 141, disapproved on another ground in Reid v. Google
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 512.)
The Undisputed Material Facts (UMFs) submitted
assert that United Financial Casualty Co. offered to settle Plaintiff’s bodily
injury claim for $11,000.00 on June 26, 2024 (UMF 4) and Plaintiff accepted the
settlement offer on June 27, 2024, as confirmed in an email by counsel (UMF 5).
However, the Court sustained the objection to the evidence underlying these
UMFs. Therefore, Defendants necessarily fail to meet their burden of production.
Moreover, even if the Court were to consider the substance of the evidence, the
cited email is not a June 27, 2024, email wherein Plaintiff’s counsel
“confirmed” acceptance of any settlement offer. Instead, counsel expressly
disputed acceptance of any settlement. Thus, Defendants’ argument is
unsupported by the moving papers.
Defendants submit an amended
declaration in reply. Even if the court were to consider this late submitted
evidence, which it cannot, the Court would still not be inclined to grant
summary judgment. Strictly construed, the evidence does not meet the initial
burden of proof to show that the parties mutually agreed to settlement. Counsel’s June 26, 2024, email states “He
agreed to $11,000. Please send the release for his signature.” (Supp. Johnson Decl., Ex. B, emphasis added.)
The parties apparently contemplated further material terms related to the
release, and that the release would be signed. A reasonable interpretation of
these emails therefore suggests a lack of mutual assent to settle absent a
signed release. Defendants do not submit any evidence that a release was
signed.
Additionally, Plaintiff submits a
dispute of material fact over whether the parties mutually agreed to settle
this action on June 26, 2024. Plaintiff shows that the parties continued negotiating the
material terms of the settlement well after the supposed settlement. Plaintiff
presents evidence that on September 23, 2024, Defendants’ insurance adjuster
extended a new and increased counteroffer of $30,275. (AMF 2.) This evidence
reasonably undermines the conclusion that the action was settled in June 2024. Plaintiff
thus presents a dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment.
Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.