Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV04673, Date: 2025-01-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV04673 Hearing Date: January 10, 2025 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Golshan v. Mazda
Motor Corp., et al.
CASE NO.: 24SMCV04673
MOTION: Motion
to Quash Service of Summons
HEARING DATE: 1/10/25
Legal
Standard
“A defendant . . . may serve
and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .” (CCP § 418.10(a).) A court lacks jurisdiction
over a party if there has not been proper service of process. (Ruttenberg v.
Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) “When a motion to quash is
properly brought, the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff to establish
the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Aquila, Inc.
v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568.)
Due process permits state courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents who have “minimum contacts” with the forum
state. “Minimum contacts” means the relationship between the nonresident and
the forum state is such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” under the U.S.
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. (International
Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.) The extent to which a California court can exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the nature and quality of
defendant's “contacts” with the state.
Where general jurisdiction
cannot be established, a court may assume specific jurisdiction over a nonresident,
if the nonresident purposefully directed its activities at forum residents, or
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of local law. (Hanson
v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235.) Specific jurisdiction involves a three-part
test: (1) the nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction
with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of
the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises
out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3)
exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.”¿¿(Jewish Defense Organization,
Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles County (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1054.)
As to fair play and substantial
justice, the “ ‘court “must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests
of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. It must
also weigh in its determination ‘the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘Where ... a defendant who purposefully has directed
[its] activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, [it] must
present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would
render jurisdiction unreasonable.’ [Citation.]” (Snowney v. Harrah’s
Entertainment, Inc., (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1070.) In the case of a
foreign company, “[t]he unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself
in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the
reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national
borders.” (Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 480 U.S.
102, 114.) However, “[w]hen minimum contacts have been established, often the
interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will
justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.” (Ibid.)
Analysis
Specially Appearing Defendant Mazda
Motor Corp. (“MC”) moves to quash service of the summons and complaint on the
grounds that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over MC, which is a
Japanese corporation with its principal place of business in Hiroshima, Japan.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s
request for judicial notice is GRANTED as to nos. 1-8 (court records) and 11-12
(public filings). (Evid. Code §§452(c), (d).) The existence and legal effect of
such documents are noticed. That said, the unpublished and uncitable trial
court rulings have no precedential value and Plaintiff is reminded of the prohibition
on relying on such opinion. (Santa Ana Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Belsh (1997)
56 Cal. App. 4th 819, 831; Cal. R. Ct., rule 8.1115(d).) The request is DENIED
as to nos. 9-10 (Exs. I-J). The existence and content of Defendants’ websites are
neither “acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute” nor
“capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of
reasonably indisputable accuracy”. (Evid. Code §452(h).) Thus, the websites are
not subject to notice under subsection (h).
Second, California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(d)
explicitly states that “Except in a summary judgment or summary adjudication
motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages. California
Rules of Court Rule 3.1113(e) required Plaintiff to “apply to the court ex
parte but with written notice of the application to the other parties, at least
24 hours before the memorandum is due, for permission to file a longer
memorandum.” Here, Plaintiff filed a brief over 15 pages. California Rules of Court Rule 3.1113(g)
requires that “A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these rules must be
filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper.” (emphasis
added). “A trial court has broad discretion under rule 3.1300(d) of the Rules
of Court to refuse to consider papers served and filed beyond the deadline
without a prior court order finding good cause for late submission.” (Bozzi
v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765.) The Court exercises its discretion and does
not consider the last page of the brief.
Purposeful Availment
Plaintiff contends that MC purposely
availed itself of the benefits of this State by (i) marketing and selling its
automobiles in California through its wholly-owned subsidiary; (ii) engaging in
direct sales of its automobiles to a California business for use in California;
(iii) creating and maintaining an ongoing relationship with a California
business; (iv) engaging in acts and omissions that led to harm in California;
and (v) acting through its agent in California. While Plaintiff lacks evidence
to demonstrate some of these points, the record shows that Defendant
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in California by
making continuous and systematic sales of the 2019 CX-5, including the subject
vehicle, to its California subsidiary for use in California.
Generally, a
foreign corporation that has an in-state subsidiary or affiliate does not
subject the corporate parent to general jurisdiction in that state. (Daimler
AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 US 117, 136;¿see also Young v. Daimler AG¿(2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 855, 866-867 [no general jurisdiction over parent corporation
even if plaintiffs reside in state, accident occurred there, the vehicle was
purchased there, and vehicle was manufactured by defendant's
subsidiary].) In the products liability context, mere placement of a
product into the stream of commerce by itself, even with knowledge that the
product might enter the forum state, is insufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. (Bombardier Recreational Products
Inc. v. Dow Chemical Canada ULC (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 591, 602; Jayone
Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Indus. Co. (2019) 31 Cal. App. 5th 543, 556-559 [Aekyung
purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business in California, and
did not merely place its products into the stream of commerce with an awareness
that they might end up in California, by repeatedly selling its products to
various California distributors over a seven-year period, generating almost $2
million in revenue from these California sales].)
In Daimler Trucks North America
LLC v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 946, Daimler was subject to
personal jurisdiction in California, even when they did not manufacture or
assemble vehicles in California, since they conducted considerable business there.
The Court concluded that:
“Daimler advertises Freightliner
trucks, including the Cascadia specifically, across multiple national and
regional media that is also directed to California. Daimler has 32 authorized
dealerships in California that sell Freightliners. Customers can order the
vehicles at these dealerships; Daimler then assembles the specified vehicles
and delivers them to the dealership. Between 4,000 to 5,000 trucks were
sold in California each year from 2014 to 2020. Authorized dealerships
advertise Freightliner trucks, and Daimler provides the dealerships with
information for display advertising purposes. Daimler also sells and
ships truck parts to 27 of these authorized California dealerships. The
dealerships offer a variety of specialized maintenance and repair
services. Twenty-three of the authorized California dealerships service
Freightliner trucks. There are 11 truck “Elite Support” locations in
California. These service centers offer customers the services of mechanics who
receive “continual training from the experts at Freightliner” and must
meet specific criteria. Nine “ServicePoint” locations in California offer 24/7
service, repairs, parts, inspections, and trailer maintenance. Seven “Body
Shop” locations in California provide Freightliner crash repair and other
repair services not often available in a typical dealership. Hundreds of these
service shops are located in the United States.
Daimler also provides telephone
and online support that is available in California—its website claims that
“no matter where you are, we've got you covered.” This support includes a 24/7
helpline that provides technological support, roadside assistance, towing, and
referral to service locations for Freightliners. The “Detroit Connect” service
can monitor Freightliner trucks’ driving performance. One feature of this
service is that it transmits fault codes to Daimler. Daimler is then able to
notify the truck's owner of the problem and refer them to an authorized service
location for service.”
(Id., at 958-959, emphasis added.) Daimler thus had
systematic contacts with California, subjecting it to personal jurisdiction when
it directly advertised in California, sold thousands of trucks through 32
dealerships located in California, sold and shipped truck parts to California
dealerships, furnished tech support, and directed customers to service
locations.
Plaintiff shows that MC marketed
the subject vehicle through its wholly owned subsidiary and American
distributor, MNAO. MNAO is a California corporation, with a principal place of
business in Irvine. (RJN, Ex. K.) The cited evidence shows that MC sells its
products to MNAO, a subsidiary and exclusive distributor of MC vehicles in the
US. (Ishikawa Decl., ¶¶18-19.) MC’s agent claims that MC does not directly
market/advertise in California, sell vehicles to California dealerships, or
service vehicles in California. (Id., ¶¶ 15, 17.) MC notes that it does not
maintain MNAO’s website which lists California dealerships. (Id. ¶ 19.) MC does
not maintain any contractual relationships with dealers or end-user customers
in California. (Id.) Instead, MNAO imports the vehicles into the US, then
determines which dealerships in the US to ship vehicles to for retail sale.
(Id.) According to MC, MC and MNAO are separate legal entities with separate
operations. (Id ¶¶ 25-27.) The two entities do not share offices, debt
structures, bank accounts, or assets. (Id.) MC does not instruct MNAO where to
distribute Mazda vehicles nor does it instruct MNAO to sell specific vehicles
only to California dealers. (Id.) MC thus disclaims control over where the
vehicles are ultimately sold or distributed.
Despite these facts, MC apparently does
substantial and direct business with California. MC admits that it knows that
MNAO is “located” in California. (Id. ¶ 18.) The record further reflects that
MC certified the engines in the 2019 Mazda CX-5 with the California Air
Resources Board. MC apparently designed the Subject Vehicle for the California
market since it complied with California emission standards. This fact evinces
MC’s knowledge and purpose of selling the 2019 Mazda CX-5 to its
California-based subsidiary for sale in California. Based on the totality of
the record, MC sale of vehicles to MNAO is not an isolated occurrence, but
involved systematic efforts of MC, as the manufacturer, to market its product
in California. A manufacturer in MC’s position should reasonable anticipate
being haled into a California court to defend an action arising from an alleged
defect in its product under such circumstances.
Relatedness
To carry its burden as to the
second prong, Plaintiff must demonstrate that “there is a substantial nexus or
connection between the defendant's forum activities and the plaintiff's claim.”
(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445.)
A claim need not arise directly from the defendant's forum contacts in order to
be sufficiently related to the contact to warrant the exercise of specific
jurisdiction, rather, as long as the claim bears a substantial connection to
the nonresident's forum contacts, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is
appropriate. (Id. at 452.) “[T]he defendant's forum activities need not
be directed at the plaintiff in order to give rise to specific
jurisdiction.” (Id. at 457.) “[T]he nexus required to establish specific
jurisdiction is between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation
[citations]—not between the plaintiff and the defendant.” (Id. at 458.) “
‘ “Only when the operative facts of the controversy are not related to the
defendant's contact with the state can it be said that the cause of action does
not arise from that [contact].” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at 455.)
Here, Plaintiff’s claim arises out
of Defendant’s forum activity. Plaintiff’s complaint claims strict products
liability and negligence. The Mazda defendants (including MC) designed,
manufactured, tested, marketed and/or distributed the subject vehicle, a 2019
CX-5. (Compl., ¶ 5.) The subject vehicle was defective, in that it lacked
sufficient warnings, a driver exit strategy, or other safeguards that would
prevent the vehicle from rolling away when a driver exited the vehicle without
placing the transmission in park. (¶ 13.) Such standard safety features would
include automatically placing the vehicle’s transmission into park when the
driver’s door is opened, and the driver exits the vehicle with the ignition on.
(¶ 14.) MC was aware of multiple complaints of rollaways, crashes and other
incidents attributable to the defects alleged herein. (¶15.) Nevertheless, MC
continued to recklessly exclude safety features required to prevent vehicle
rollaways and injuries when the driver’s door was opened and the transmission
was not placed in park. (Id.) On September 4, 2024, Plaintiff parked the
Subject Vehicle on an incline and exited the Vehicle. (¶ 18.) After remaining
stationary for some time, as a result of the defective design and/or
manufacture of the vehicle, the vehicle began rolling backwards at a speed that
pushed Plaintiff to the ground, causing serious injuries including broken ribs,
a punctured lung, broken shoulder, and a fractured vertebra. (Id.) Plaintiff’s
injuries thus arose from the alleged design defect in the subject vehicle. MC
admittedly designed the subject vehicle, produced it, and sold it to MNAO for
eventual resale in California. Thus, there is a substantial connection between
Plaintiff’s claim and MC’s forum contacts.
Fair Play
MC has purposefully directed its activities
at forum residents. MC therefore has the burden to show a compelling case that
exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable here. As noted, MC should
reasonable anticipated being haled into a California court to defend actions
arising from defect in its product which it sold to a California entity for
resale in California. MC presents no
unique or undue burdens in defending this action in California that could
overcome Plaintiff and the public’s interest in adjudicating this action here.
As such, Plaintiff meets all three
elements for specific jurisdiction over MC. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.