Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV05429, Date: 2025-06-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV05429 Hearing Date: June 12, 2025 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Primarket LLC,
v. Crivera Partners Corp., et al.
CASE NO.: 24SMCV05429
MOTION: Motion
to Quash Service of Summons
HEARING DATE: 6/12/2025
Legal
Standard
“A defendant . . . may serve
and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .” (CCP § 418.10(a).) A court lacks jurisdiction
over a party if there has not been proper service of process. (Ruttenberg v.
Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) “When a motion to quash is
properly brought, the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff to establish
the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Aquila, Inc.
v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568.)
“[C]ompliance with the
statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal
jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) “[T]he filing of a proof of service creates a
rebuttable presumption that the service was proper” but only if it “complies
with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.” (Id. at
1441-1442.)
Personal Jurisdiction
Due process permits state courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents who have “minimum contacts” with the forum
state. “Minimum contacts” means the relationship between the nonresident and
the forum state is such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” under the U.S.
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. (International
Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.) The extent to which a California court can exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the nature and quality of
defendant's “contacts” with the state.
Where general jurisdiction
cannot be established, a court may assume specific jurisdiction over a nonresident,
if the nonresident purposefully directed its activities at forum residents, or
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of local law. (Hanson
v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235.) Specific jurisdiction involves a three-part
test: (1) the nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some
transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one
which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities;
and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.”¿¿(Jewish Defense
Organization, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles County (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th
1045, 1054 [purposeful¿availment¿exists where a defendant performed some type
of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business
within the forum state].)
Analysis
Defendant Santo Crivera moves to
quash the service of summons and set aside the default judgment entered on
March 4, 2025. Defendant argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
him.
Here, Plaintiff demonstrates
specific jurisdiction over Defendant. This action arises out of two alleged
partnership agreements between Plaintiffs and Defendants. First, on April 11,
2023, Plaintiff and Defendant Crivera Partners entered into a written
Partnership Agreement. (Shraga Decl., ¶ 2.) The Partnership Agreement notes
that Plaintiff is a California LLC with a principal place of business in
Beverly Hills. The Partnership Agreement also holds that it “shall be governed
under the laws located in the State of California (“Governing Law”).”
(Agreement § XIII.) Shraga also lives in Los Angeles. (Compl., ¶ 2.) Crivera
personally executed the Partnership Agreement on behalf of Crivera Partners.
(Shraga Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1; Crivera Decl., ¶ 11.) The purpose of the agreement
was for the funding of COVID-19 tests, which Defendants would then sell to
buyers. (Shraga Decl., ¶ 3.) On April 17, 2023, Plaintiffs $149,000 to
Defendants to buy pallets of COVID-19 tests. (Id., ¶ 4.) Defendants delivered
the 26 pallets to buyers. (¶ 5.) However, the 26 pallets did not cost $149,000,
and Defendants never returned the remaining balance of $5,230.40 to Plaintiffs.
(Id., ¶ 6.) Instead, Defendants used the remaining balance for an investment on
a car totally unrelated to the partnership. (Id., ¶ 7.) Defendants also agreed
to invest $11,000 into the partnership, which never happened. (Id., ¶ 8.) Money
remains due and owing on the partnership agreement. (Id., ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiffs
claim lost profits of $53,913.60. (Id., ¶ 11.)
Second, Plaintiffs and Defendants
entered into an oral partnership related to the sale of Lysol wipes. In July
2023, Crivera orally stated to Shraga that he had Lysol wipes to sell to Plaintiffs,
for Plaintiffs to sell to end-buyers that Plaintiffs had lined up. (Shraga
Decl., ¶¶ 12-13.) Plaintiffs would pay Defendants for the wipes, and Defendants
would keep any profits from that initial sale. (Id., ¶14.) Plaintiffs would
then sell the Lysol wipes to buyers Plaintiffs had located, and Plaintiffs
would keep any profits from this later sale to those buyers. (Id.) On July 26,
2023, Defendants issued a Purchase Order to Plaintiffs for the Lysol wipes.
(Id., ¶ 15.) On July 27, 2023, Plaintiffs paid Defendants $25,920 for delivery
of Lysol wipes to Plaintiffs. (Id., ¶ 16). Plaintiffs identified a buyer for
the Lysol wipes. (Id., ¶ 17.) On July 28, 2023, Defendants’ agents presented a
phony pick-up address to Shraga via text message, as well as on a written Bill
of Lading. (Id., ¶ 15, Exs. 3-4.) Unaware that the address was phony,
Plaintiffs rented a truck to pick up the goods at the address provided by
Defendants. (Id., ¶ 19.) However, when Shraga arrived to pick up the wipes,
individuals at the warehouse informed Shraga there were no such goods for
pick-up. (Id., ¶ 20.) Defendants failed to repay Plaintiffs for the $25,920
payment for the Lysol products. (Id., ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs had to refund the buyer
and use additional loan funding from a line of credit to pay back the buyer.
(Id.) Plaintiffs also claim $17,466 in lost profits from the Lysol wipes sale.
(Id., ¶ 22.)
The above facts demonstrate that
Defendant purposefully directed his business activities at Plaintiffs, California residents.
Defendant personally consummated two transactions directed at California. Defendant
personally made fraudulent misrepresentations aimed at California residents and
causing harm in California. (Compl., ¶¶ 83 – 102.) The written Partnership
Agreement signed by Defendant even has a valid forum selection clause. California courts
have repeatedly held that if a corporate officer may be held personally
responsible for causing the corporation to act, that act may be imputed to the
officer for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction over him or
her. (See Seagate Technology v.
A. J. Kogyo Co. (1990) 219 Cal. App. 3d 696, 703; Taylor-Rush v.
Multitech Corp. (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 103, 117; Anglo Irish Bank Corp.,
PLC v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 4th 969, 981.) Thus, the record
demonstrates that Defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege
of conducting business within California. The claims here arise directly from such business
activities in California. Therefore,
the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable.
Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.