Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: 24SMCV94483, Date: 2024-10-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV94483 Hearing Date: October 16, 2024 Dept: M
CASE NAME: Heller v. Bosilic,
et al.
CASE NO.: 24SMCV94483
MOTION: Motion
to Quash Service of Summons
HEARING DATE: 10/16/24
Legal
Standard
“A defendant . . . may serve
and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her . . ..” (CCP § 418.10(a).) A court lacks jurisdiction
over a party if there has not been proper service of process. (Ruttenberg v.
Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) “When a motion to quash is
properly brought, the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff to establish
the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Aquila, Inc.
v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568.)
“[C]ompliance with the
statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal
jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) “[T]he filing of a proof of service creates a
rebuttable presumption that the service was proper” but only if it “complies
with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.” (Id. at
1441-1442.)
Analysis
Defendant Andrea Bosilcic, as
Trustee of the B.A.D. Dynasty Trust, moves to quash the service of summons and
complaint in this unlawful detainer action.
Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20(b)
provides in relevant part:
“If a copy of the summons and
complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the
person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90,
a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the
person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or
usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office
box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person
apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing
address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18
years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter
mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage
prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and
complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on
the 10th day after the mailing.
Plaintiff submitted a proof of
service of process. The proof of service shows that Ryan Sallee, a registered
process server, served Defendant via substituted service at the subject
property, 351 18th Street Santa Monica, California 90402. The declaration of
diligence states three prior attempts to serve at the subject property before
resorting to substituted service at the residence.
To rebut this presumptively proper proof
of substitute service, Bosilic provides a perfunctory declaration, reporting that
she does not “reside in California” and is a “resident of the State of
Arizona.” (Bosilic Decl., ¶ 1.) Consistent with the registered process server’s
declaration, she claims never to have been personally served with a summons and
complaint. (Id. ¶ 2.) She claims to not be evading service, because she could
have been reached via personal service at her residence in Arizona. (Id., ¶3.) Bosilic
does not know and has never met Chase Osthoff, and he does not reside at the
property. (Id. ¶ 4.) She explains that a resident at the property told her
about the service. (Id.) This declaration fails to rebut the presumptively valid
substitute service. Bosilic does not provide sufficient evidence that the
subject property was not her “dwelling, usual abode, usual place of business or
her usual mailing address.” At best, Bosilic implies that it is not her usual
dwelling or abode but does not make any suggestion about her usual place of
business or mailing address. While Bosilic states that Osthoff does not reside
at the property, she does not show that he was not “a competent member of the
household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of
business, or usual mailing address” as required by the statute. Further, she
does not explain any facts which would show that the prior attempts to serve at
the Property were not reasonably diligent efforts.
Defendant raises an equally tepid
objection to personal jurisdiction. Defendant claims that she lives in Arizona,
and the court therefore lacks personal jurisdiction over her. Due process permits state courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents who have “minimum contacts” with the forum
state. “Minimum contacts” means the relationship between the nonresident and
the forum state is such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice” under the U.S. Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. (International Shoe Co. v.
Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.) A court may
assume specific jurisdiction over a nonresident, if the nonresident purposefully
directed its activities at forum residents, or purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of local law. (Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357
U.S. 235.) Specific jurisdiction involves a three-part test: (1) the
nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the
forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or
results from the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of
jurisdiction must be reasonable.”¿¿(Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v.
Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles County (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1054
[purposeful¿availment¿exists where a defendant performed some type of
affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business within
the forum state].)
The Court has specific jurisdiction over
Defendant. This action arises out of Defendant’s direct contacts with
California. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is the tenant of the Property. Indeed,
this is an unlawful detainer which seeks to evict Defendant and certain
unauthorized occupants from the Property for non-payment of rent. The exercise
of jurisdiction over Defendant, a tenant to a property in California, would be
reasonable in an unlawful detainer action.
Accordingly, the motion is DENIED. Defendant to file a responsive pleading
within 5 days.