Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: SC129264, Date: 2024-02-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: SC129264    Hearing Date: February 29, 2024    Dept: M

CASE NAME:           Marina City Club Condo. Owners Assoc., v. Cynergy Group Int’l LLC, et al.

CASE NO.:                SC129264

MOTION:                  Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

HEARING DATE:   2/29/2024

Legal Standard

With respect to attorney fees and costs, unless they are specifically provided for by statute (e.g., CCP §§ 1032, et seq.), the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.¿(CCP § 1021.) The prevailing party on a contract, which specifically provides for attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a); CCP §§ 1032, 1033.5(a)(10)(A).)¿The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine the prevailing party and shall fix, as an element of the costs of suit, the reasonable attorney fees.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a), (b).)¿Any notice of motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs under shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served and filed; if only attorney fees are claimed as costs, the notice of motion shall be served and filed within the time specified in CRC 3.1700 for filing a memorandum of costs.¿(CRC 3.1702; Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303, fn. 1.) 

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.) 

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿(Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.) 

Analysis

Plaintiff Marina City Club Condominium Owners Association moves for attorneys’ fees and costs against Defendants Cynergy Group Int’l LLC and Mark Farag. Plaintiff claims it is entitled to recover $23,035.46. Particularly, Plaintiff seeks fees in connection with Defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 664.6, which followed Plaintiff’s post-appeal fee motion.

There is no reasonable dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to fees. The settlement agreement provides an award of attorneys’ fees for fees arising from or relating to the settlement agreement, including proceedings brought pursuant to CCP section 664.6. The Court has already determined that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action generally, including the underlying motions to enforce the settlement agreement per CCP section 664.6. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to a fee award.

The Court is uncertain how Plaintiff calculated the requested fees of $23,035.46. Plaintiff provides verified time records of counsel, claiming 28.6 hours of work at $125.00 and $280.00 per hour. (Babikian Decl., Ex. 1.) Plaintiff also requests an increase to its counsel’s rates to $350.00 per hour based on their training and experience. However, using either rate would only result in a lodestar of $8,008.00 (at $280.00 per hour) or $10,010.00 (at $350/hr.)—not $23,035.46. Further, the individual amounts billed on verified time records do not add up to the requested fee. Using those figures, the total amount billed comes to $7,613.69, including costs. Even considering the anticipated fees for reply and appearance, Plaintiff does not come close to establishing the full amount of the requested fees. Thus, the Court will independently review the time records, determine the reasonable amount of time worked on the claimed tasks, and award a reasonable rate for that time considering counsel’s experience, education, and training.

The Court finds that the verified time records show counsel worked approximately 26.5 hours on this action since the initial fee award. The Court discounts the anticipated time spent on reply, since there was no opposition to this motion and thus no need to reply. Further, the Court finds that a reasonable rate for counsel’s work would be $280, which is consistent with the initial fee award. Using the lodestar method, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $7,220.00 in reasonable attorneys’ fees, plus costs of $86.19, for a total award of $7,306.19. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.