Judge Mark A. Young, Case SC129346 2022-08-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark A. Young, Case: SC129346, Date: 2022-08-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: SC129346 Hearing Date: August 5, 2022 Dept: M

CASE NO.: SC129346

MOTION: Motion to Enter Judgment Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6

HEARING DATE: 8/5/2022

Legal Standard

(a) If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.

(b) For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any of the following: [¶] (1) The party. [¶] (2) An attorney who represents the party.

(CCP, § 664.6(a), (b)(1)-(2).)

“Because of its summary nature, strict compliance with the requirements of section 664.6 is prerequisite to invoking the power of the court to impose a settlement agreement.” (Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37; Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1262.) In ruling on a motion under § 664.6, the trial judge may receive oral testimony, or may determine the motion upon declarations alone. (Corkland v. Boscoe (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 989, 994.) Where the agreement was reached at a court hearing, the court can resolve the dispute on the basis of its own notes or recollection of what was agreed to (as well as any transcripts of the proceedings). (Richardson v. Richardson (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 91, 97.)

Analysis

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the parties stipulated to a settlement “in a writing signed by the parties[.]” (CCP § 664.6(a).) The parties, individually or through counsel, never signed the same version of any of the proposed settlement agreements. (See Booth Decl. ¶¶ 2-7.) Therefore, there was never an enforceable settlement agreement through section 664.6.

Plaintiff contends that the electronic “signatures” from counsel’s email somehow is a writing “signed” by counsel. (Escano Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff refers to the signature block, an automated message at the end of an email that provides the sender’s contact information and, commonly for attorneys, a confidentiality notice. Signature blocks are akin to business cards, which do not indicate an intention to authenticate any written settlement agreement. Rather, a signature must be a “symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing.” (UCC § 1201(37); Rest.2d Contracts § 134 (1981) [“signature to a memorandum may be any symbol made or adopted with an intention, actual or apparent, to authenticate the writing as that of the signer”]; see Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 261, 277 [following UCC and Rest.2d, court found that it was apparent that the use of defendant’s name in an advertisement for a specific vehicle at a specific price could support the signature requirement under the statute of frauds]; see also Princeton Industrial, Products, Inc. v. Precision Metals Corp. (N.D. Ill. 2015) 120 F.Supp.3d 812, 820 [following restatement rule, court rejected argument that electronic-signature block in an email satisfied Illinois' requirement of a signed writing to modify a contract, reasoning that the intent to authenticate a writing was not actual or apparent].) Plaintiff offers no authority that counsel’s email “signature” block constitutes a binding signature in the sense intended by section 664.6. From the emails on the record, it is not reasonably apparent that counsel intended that their automatic signatures authenticate the parties’ settlement agreement.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

The Court’s analysis, however, is limited to the instant motion – whether this agreement is enforceable under section 664.6. While it is not enforceable under that provision, the parties may have entered into an oral settlement agreement that was confirmed through various emails on May 12, 2022. (See J.B.B. Investment Partners Ltd. v. Fair (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1, 5 [defendants' e-mails with LLC members constituted acceptance of binding settlement of members' tort claims despite not signing the draft of final settlement, as the terms of the offer were sufficiently certain].) Moreover, the parties’ correspondence appears to confirm the two material terms to the settlement agreement: (1) payment of $100,000 by Grace to Arfa; and (2) a mutual waiver of all claims and a section 1542 waiver. The parties further agreed to a mutual waiver of all fees and costs. The Court’s ruling today would not prevent Plaintiff from bringing a new action or a supplemental pleading re: breach of an oral settlement agreement. (Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 586, fn. 5; see also Smith v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1374.)