Judge Mark C. Kim, Case 22LBCV00120 2023-02-21 Tentative Ruling

On March 22, 2022, Plaintiff Ziming He (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Shawn Khan (“Defendant”). The operative pleading was the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which asserted causes of action for (1) breach of contract and (2) foreclosure of mechanics lien. The crux of the FAC is that Defendant failed to pay for work completed on his property.

Defendant filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff asserting causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) negligent construction defects with resulting damages, (3) money had and received, (4) unjust enrichment, and (6) strict liability. The Cross-Complaint alleges in relevant part that Plaintiff, who was doing business as Tiger Construction, failed to complete work done at Defendant’s property, and that Defendant overpaid for the work Plaintiff did complete. Defendant also asserted the fifth cause of action for claim on contractor’s license bond against Hudson Insurance Company (“Hudson”).

Hudson filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff and Defendant. Hudson’s cross-complaint contains a sole cause of action for declaratory relief, and seeks a declaration concerning its rights and duties under Plaintiff’s contractor’s bond. Specifically, Hudson alleges Defendant has made a claim on the bond, Plaintiff opposes payment on the claim, and Hudson has been unable to determine whether it should pay on the claim.

On December 7, 2022, after a bench trial, the Court found in favor of Defendant as to the Complaint. Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiff breached the subject contract and that Plaintiff’s mechanic lien was invalid. In addition, the Court found in favor of Defendant as to his Cross-Complaint and awarded Defendant $108,000.

On December 12, 2022, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. The Motion is unopposed.

With respect to attorney fees and costs, unless they are specifically provided for by statute (e.g., CCP §§ 1032, et seq.), the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.¿ (CCP § 1021.)¿ The prevailing party on a contract, which specifically provides for attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿ (Civ. Code § 1717(a); CCP §§ 1032, 1033.5(a)(10)(A).)¿

California Civil Code 1717(a) provides, “[i]n any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.”¿

“[T]he party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(1).) “The court may also determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section.” (Ibid.)¿

The determination of the prevailing party is made upon final resolution of the contract claims and by comparing the extent to which each party has succeeded or failed to succeed in its contentions. (DisputeSuite.com, LLC v. Scoreinc.com (2017) 2 Cal.5th 968, 974.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.)¿

¿ In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿ (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿ General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Ibid.)

Defendant moves the Court for $36,595.16 in attorneys’ fees and $1,747.50 in costs for a total of $38,342.66.

As a preliminary matter, Defendant may recover attorneys’ fees under the subject contract because the contract provides that in the “event of a dispute arising out of this Contract” and if “legal action ensues, the successful party will be entitled to its legal fees, including, but not limited to its attorneys’ fees.” (Def. Cross-Compl., Exh. A.)[1]

In addition, the Court finds that Defendant is the prevailing party because Defendant realized his litigation objective. Here, the Court found in favor of Defendant as to the Complaint, and in favor of Defendant as to his Cross-Complaint and awarded him damages.

Furthermore, the Court finds that the requested rates of $450/hour for attorneys and $125/hour for paralegals are¿reasonable and¿commensurate with or lower than rates charged by attorneys and paralegals with comparable skills and expertise.

Moreover, the Court’s review of Ashley Baron’s Declaration (in support of the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), its description of the attorneys’ experience, the accompanying exhibits, the total time billed, staffing on this case, and the arguments and evidence brought forth by Defendant leads to the conclusion that the attorneys’ fees as requested are reasonable because they are supported by substantial evidence under the present circumstances.

There is no opposition to the Motion, and Plaintiff has failed to offer any argument that the requested rates, fees, or time spent on the case are unreasonable.

Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion and awards Defendant $36,595.16 in attorneys’ fees and $1,747.50 in costs for a total of $38,342.66.

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion and awards Defendant $36,595.16 in attorneys’ fees and $1,747.50 in costs for a total of $38,342.66.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.

[1] The Court notes that Defendant did not file the subject contract with his Motion. Since the contract was filed with Defendant’s Cross-Complaint, the Court takes judicial notice of the contract.