Judge: Mark C. Kim, Case: BC716805, Date: 2022-08-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC716805    Hearing Date: August 16, 2022    Dept: S27

1.     Background Facts

Plaintiffs, Sophia Sanchez, et al. filed this action against Defendants, Ultramar, Inc., et al. for wrongful death and related claims arising out of the death of Decedent, Jason Alexander Sanchez.  Plaintiffs alleges Defendants are responsible for Decedent’s death, which was caused by an electrocution while performing preventative maintenance at an oil refinery.

 

Plaintiffs’ operative complaint is their Third Amended Complaint, which was filed on 10/08/20.  It includes causes of action for negligence and negligence per se – wrongful death, survival, products liability (strict), and products liability (negligence). 

 

2.     Motion for Summary Judgment

a.     Parties’ Positions

Brinderson moves for summary judgment, contending it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (a) Plaintiffs have served factually devoid discovery responses as to it, and (b) it was not negligent. 

 

Ultramar opposes the motion.  It argues there are triable issues of material fact concerning whether Brinderson, through its employees, knew or should have known there was a missing neutral wire when Brinderson was performing its work.  It indicates it brings its opposition to rebut any purported argument that, should Brinderson be found to have a duty, that duty should somehow transfer to, or impute liability to, Ultramar, which it contends would be inappropriate under the Privette doctrine. 

 

Plaintiffs filed a brief in response to Ultramar’s opposition to the motion.  Plaintiffs indicate they do not oppose the motion, and they argue Ultramar’s liability to Plaintiffs, under Privette or otherwise, is not before the Court and should not be considered. 

 

b.     Burdens on Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c).)  Where a defendant seeks summary judgment or adjudication, he must show that either “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.”  (Id. at §437c(o)(2).)  A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim.  (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590.)  Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.”  (Ibid.) 

 

The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.  (Id. at §437c(p).)  A defendant may discharge this burden by furnishing either (1) affirmative evidence of the required facts or (2) discovery responses conceding that the plaintiff lacks evidence to establish an essential element of the plaintiff's case. 

[A] defendant may simply show the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action “by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.)  Thus, rather than affirmatively disproving or negating an element (e.g., causation), a defendant moving for summary judgment has the option of presenting evidence reflecting the plaintiff does not possess evidence to prove that element. “The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing” to support an essential element of his case. (Aguilar, supra, at p. 855.) Under the latter approach, a defendant's initial evidentiary showing may “consist of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses, or admissions by the plaintiff in deposition or in response to requests for admission that he or she has not discovered anything that supports an essential element of the cause of action.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.)  In other words, a defendant may show the plaintiff does not possess evidence to support an element of the cause of action by means of presenting the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence may be reasonably inferred. (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

 

Thus, a moving defendant has two means by which to shift the burden of proof under the summary judgment statute: “The defendant may rely upon factually insufficient discovery responses by the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action sued upon. [Citation.] [Or a]lternatively, the defendant may utilize the tried and true technique of negating (‘disproving’) an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” (Brantly v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1598.)

Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 231 Cal.Rptr.3d. 814, 819-820.

 

Until the moving defendant has discharged its burden of proof, the opposing plaintiff has no burden to come forward with any evidence. Once the moving defendant has discharged its burden as to a particular cause of action, however, the plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action.  (Id. at §437c(p)(2).)  On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party's supporting documents are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion.  (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21.)

 

c.     Moving Burden

Brinderson met its moving burden to show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, both under Union Bank (which permits a moving party to shift the burden through factually devoid discovery responses), and also because it provides direct evidence that it was not negligent. 

 

Plaintiffs expressly do not oppose the motion; only Ultramar does.  Notably, the motion is not directed at any cross-complaint between Brinderson and Ultramar; it is only directed at the complaint.  Thus, the issues on this motion run between Plaintiffs and Brinderson, not between Brinderson and Ultramar.  Ultramar is free to make any arguments it wishes in connection with its own defense of this action, and/or in connection with any cross-complaint it may have filed against Brinderson or anyone else.  Ultramar lacks standing, however, to oppose summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ complaint. 

 

The motion is therefore granted.  The Court declines to rule on Ultramar’s evidentiary objections, as doing so is not necessary to a resolution of the merits of the motion. 

 

Brinderson is ordered to give notice.

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.orgIf the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.