Judge: Mark E. Windham, Case: 18STLC13117, Date: 2023-11-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 18STLC13117 Hearing Date: December 11, 2023 Dept: 26
ACIC v. Rechevskiy, et al.
VACATE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT;
QUASH SERVICE; DISMISS
(CCP §§ 418.10, 473(d), 583.210)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant Dmitriy Rechevskiy’s Motion to Vacate Judgment,
Quash Service of Summons, and Dismiss Case is DENIED.
ANALYSIS:
On October 17, 2018, Plaintiff American Contractors Indemnity
Company (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against Defendant Dmitriy Rechevskiy
(“Defendant”). Plaintiff filed proof of substitute service of the Summons and
Complaint on December 19, 2018. When Defendant failed to file a responsive
pleading, Plaintiff obtained their default on January 7, 2019 and default
judgment on March 7, 2019.
On August 1, 2023, Defendant appeared at a hearing on a
claim of exemption and filed the claim of exemption on August 31, 2023, which
the Court granted in part. (Minute Order, 08/31/23.) Defendant filed a motion
to vacate judgment, quash service, and dismiss action on September 5, 2023, to
which Plaintiff filed an opposition on September 21, 2023. Defendant withdrew
the motion on September 26, 2023.
Defendant filed the instant Motion to Vacate Judgment, Quash
Service of Summons, and Dismiss Case on September 28, 2023. Plaintiff filed an
amended proof of substitute service on the same date and an opposition on
October 24, 2023. Defendant filed a reply on October 31, 2023. The Motion was
initially set for hearing on November 7, 2023 and continued to November 29,
2023. (Minute Order, 11/07/23.) The hearing was again continued to December 11,
2023. (Minute Order, 11/29/23.)
Discussion
Defendant moves to quash service of the Summons
and Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10. Defendant
moves to vacate the entry of default pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (d) or on equitable grounds. Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (d) states that “[t]he court may, .... on motion of
either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or
order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) The Motion points to County of San
Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal. App.4th 1215, which holds that where there
is a lack of jurisdiction over the person, which is fundamental, “an ensuing
judgment is void, and ‘thus vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at any
time.’” (County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal. App.4th 1215,
1225.) In Gorham, the Court of Appeals found that there were exceptional
circumstances: the plaintiff allowed evidence to be considered that
demonstrated the proof of service of the summons was false. (Id. at
1231.) In particular, the record had “evidence of an intentional false act that
was used to obtain fundamental jurisdiction over Gorham.” (Id. at
1231-1232.)
Although Defendant contends there is no time limit to bring
a motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d),
this is not correct. In City of Los Angeles v. Morgan (1951) 105
Cal.App.2d 726, the Court of Appeals ruled: “if the invalidity of the judgment
is apparent by an inspection of the judgment or the judgment roll it may be
vacated upon motion at any time after its entry. People v. Greene, 74 Cal. 400,
16 P. 197. If, however, the invalidity is not thus apparent, it may be set
aside by motion, if such motion is filed within a reasonable time, i. e., not
longer than the time set forth in Code Civ. Proc., sec. 473.” (City of Los
Angeles v. Morgan (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 726, 730.) Although Code of Civil
Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) contains no express time limit, it has
been held to be subject to the two-year limit set forth in Code of Civil
Procedure section 473.5. (Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 175,
180 [“Where a party moves under section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside “a
judgment that, though valid on its face, is void for lack of proper service,
the courts have adopted by analogy the statutory period for relief from a
default judgment” provided by section 473.5, that is, the two-year outer
limit.”].)
Now that more than two years have passed since entry of
default judgment, the judgment can only be vacated if shown to be facially
void, or on equitable grounds where there has been extrinsic fraud or mistake.
(Id. at 181.) Defendant contends that the address at which substitute
service was made—533 Balboa Street, San Francisco, California—was not his
residence nor work address at the time of service. (Motion, Rechevskiy Decl.,
¶¶5-8.) Plaintiff agrees that the 533 Balboa Street address listed on the proof
of service was not proper but contends that sub-service was actually
accomplished at Defendant’s residence at 430 7th Avenue, San Francisco,
California. (Opp., Murray Decl., ¶¶3-5 and Exhs. 5-7.) According to Plaintiff,
the proof of service filed on December 19, 2018 inadvertently listed 533 Balboa
Street as the service address but the documentation from its attorney service
in 2018 demonstrates that service was actually made at 430 7th Avenue. (Ibid.)
While the proof of service filed with the Court on December 19, 2018 listed 533
Balboa Street as a clerical error, Plaintiff argues this error had no effect on
the validity of the substitute service upon Defendant.
Defendant’s moving declaration disputes that he was never
served with the summons and complaint, and claims he only learned of this
action when funds from his bank account were levied on July 6, 2023. (Motion,
Rechevskiy Decl., ¶¶2-4.) Defendant also contends in reply that the Court
cannot consider Plaintiff’s evidence of service to 430 7th Avenue because it is
inadmissible hearsay and because the Court is limited to the face of the record
in ruling on this Motion. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff filed an amended proof
of service on September 28, 2023 that is part of the face of the record. “A
judgment is ... void on its face when the invalidity is apparent upon an
inspection of the judgment-roll.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co.
(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441. When a default judgment has been entered, the
judgment roll consists of “the summons, with the affidavit or proof of service;
the complaint; the request for entry of default ..., and a copy of the
judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 670, subd. (a). It has long been the law that
the Court can allow the filing of an amended proof of service because “it is
now well settled that it is the fact of service and not the proof of service
which determines the validity or invalidity of a judgment.” (City of Salinas
v. Luke Kow Lee (1933) 217 Cal. 252, 254 [citing Herman v. Santee
(1894) 103 Cal. 519, 523-25].)
Defendant’s reply does not address the amended proof of
service, which is attested to by the process server under penalty of perjury.
(Amended Proof of Service, filed 09/28/23.) Defendant admitted under penalty of
perjury that the 430 7th Avenue address was his residence on the date of
service. (Motion, Rechevskiy Decl., ¶8.) Accordingly, Defendant has not shown
that the judgment is facially void or that there are grounds to vacate the
judgment due to extrinsic mistake or fraud.
Conclusion
Therefore, Defendant Dmitriy Rechevskiy’s Motion to Vacate
Judgment, Quash Service of Summons, and Dismiss Case is DENIED.
Plaintiff to give notice.