Judge Mark E. Windham, Case 19STCV27329 2023-01-10 Tentative Ruling

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Walia v. Azusa Unified School District, et al.
MOTION TO DETERMINE BENCH TRIAL OR JURY TRIAL

Motion of Plaintiff Pritpal Walia’s successor-in-interest, Manmohan Walia, to Determine Bench Trial or Jury Trial is GRANTED AS TO JURY TRIAL.

This action arises from the employment of Plaintiff Pritpal Walia (“Plaintiff”) as an afternoon aid for Defendant Azusa Unified School District (“Defendant”). On August 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint for (1) FEHA discrimination, (2) FEHA retaliation, (3) FEHA failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, (4) FEHA failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (5) FEHA failure to engage in the interactive process, (6) declaratory relief, and (7) failure to permit inspection of personnel and payroll records. The action was initially filed as an unlimited civil case. Plaintiff passed away during the pendency of this action and a stipulation was filed allowing their successor-in-interest, Manmohan Walia (“Plaintiff’s successor”), to substitute into the case. (Stip and Order, 05/18/21.) On March 21, 2022, the action was reclassified to the limited jurisdiction court.

On November 19, 2019, trial in this matter was set for hearing on August 17, 2020. Trial was then continued multiple times until October 25, 2022. On October 4, 2022, the Court held a hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Quash Trial Subpoenas, at which time it set an Order to Show Cause regarding Bench Trial v. Jury Trial for October 11, 2022. (Minute Order, 10/04/22.) On October 11, 2022, the OSC was continued to November 3, 2022. (Minute Order, 10/11/22.)

On October 25, 2022, the Court did not call the matter for trial and placed it off calendar. (Minute Order, 10/25/22.) On November 3, 2022, the Court set a Motion to Determine Bench Trial vs Jury Trial for January 10, 2023. Papers with respect to the instant OSC/Motion Re Bench Trial vs. Jury Trial are as follows. Plaintiff’s counsel filed a declaration on October 7, 2022. On October 10, 2022, Defendant filed a memorandum and supporting declaration. Plaintiff’s successor filed a reply on October 17, 2022, with four supporting declarations. Some of these declarations were re-filed on October 18, 2022. On October 27, 2022, Defendant filed a sur-reply with a supporting declaration.

(4) By failing to announce that a jury is required, at the time the cause is first set for trial, if it is set upon notice or stipulation, or within five days after notice of setting if it is set without notice or stipulation.

(5) By failing to timely pay the fee described in subdivision (b), unless another party on the same side of the case has paid that fee.

(6) By failing to deposit with the clerk or judge, at the beginning of the second and each succeeding day's session, the sum provided in subdivision (e).

(Code Civ. Proc., § 631, subd. (f).) Plaintiff timely filed the demand for jury trial and paid jury fees on October 29, 2019. (Motion, Friedman Decl., ¶4). However, as the statute makes clear, there are other ways a party might waive the right to a jury trial even after the fees have been paid and the demand for jury trial made.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s successor waived the right to a jury trial at the trial setting conference held on May 18, 2022, by orally stipulating to a non-jury trial. (Citing Code Civ. Proc., § 631, subd. (f)(3).) The Minute Order from the trial setting conference states “Pursuant to oral stipulation of the Parties, Non-Jury Trial is scheduled for 10/05/22 at 08:30 AM in Department 26 at Spring Street Courthouse.” (Minute Order, 05/18/22.) Plaintiff’s successor argues that there was never a stipulation to change the trial from a jury trial to a bench trial, and even if such a stipulation was made by Plaintiff’s counsel, it was ineffective because Plaintiff’s successor did not consent to such a waiver. Plaintiff’s successor expressly declares that they did not provide authorization to counsel to waive the right to a jury trial. (Reply, Walia Decl., ¶3.)

Plaintiff’s successor cites to a number of cases for the proposition that an attorney cannot waive the client’s essential right without the client’s consent. (Friedman Decl., filed 10/07/22, ¶6.) These cases hold that stipulations that impair a client’s substantial rights are valid only with the client’s express authorization or agreement. (See Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1582; Sanker v. Brown (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1144, 1147.) The right to a trial by jury is indisputably an essential or sacred right in California. (Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1, 12.) Indeed, the right to trial by jury is expressly enumerated as fundamental in the California Constitution: “Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all, but in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict. . . . In a civil cause a jury may be waived by the consent of the parties expressed as prescribed by statute.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that the cases cited by Plaintiff’s successor do not involve the right to a jury trial. While this is true, Defendant does not dispute the principles for which the cases stand regarding the extent of Plaintiff’s counsel’s authority to stipulate with respect to a client’s essential rights. In its sur-Reply, Defendant cites to a single case that holds an attorney can waive the right to a jury trial without the client’s consent because it is a strategic litigation decision, as opposed to an essential right. (Citing Cadle Co. v. World Wide Hospitality Furniture, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 504, 510.) However, the Court does not find Cadle to be controlling authority because the California Supreme Court case on which it relies, expressly holds that the right to a jury trial is reserved solely to the client:

By choosing professional representation, the accused surrenders all but a handful of ‘fundamental’ personal rights to counsel's complete control of defense strategies and tactics.” (People v. Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1163, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730; see also Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774, 781, 126 Cal.Rptr. 251, 543 P.2d 619; 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, std. 4–5.2 (2d ed. 1980) pp. 4.65–4.68.) It is for the defendant to decide such fundamental matters as whether to plead guilty (Brookhart v. Janis (1966) 384 U.S. 1, 7–8, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1248–1249, 16 L.Ed.2d 314), whether to waive the right to trial by jury (People v. Holmes (1960) 54 Cal.2d 442, 443–444, 5 Cal.Rptr. 871, 353 P.2d 583), whether to waive the right to counsel (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2540, 45 L.Ed.2d 562), and whether to waive the right to be free from self-incrimination (In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122, 132, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449). As to these rights, the criminal defendant must be admonished and the court must secure an express waiver; as to other fundamental rights of a less personal nature, courts may assume that counsel’s waiver reflects the defendant's consent in the absence of an express conflict.

(In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95 (in bank), emphasis added.) Cadle also goes on to hold that if the client disagrees with their attorney’s decision, they are “obligated to repudiate the decision or alert the court.” (Cadle, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at 510.) In Cadle, the client did not do so until long after the bench trial was held. (Id. at 511.) Here, Plaintiff’s successor made clear objection prior to the trial date of any purported waiver of the jury trial by Plaintiff’s counsel. Nor does Defendant point to any conduct that would suggest Plaintiff’s successor, as the client, stipulated to waive the right to a jury trial. Therefore, any purported stipulation to a non-jury trial on May 18, 2022 did not waive Plaintiff’s successor’s right to a trial by jury.

Defendant alternatively argues that the right to jury trial was waived under Code of Civil Procedure section 631, subdivision (f)(4) because Plaintiff did not announce that a jury was required at the time the cause was first set for trial, if it was set upon notice or stipulation. Defendant again points to the May 18, 2022 trial setting conference and argues that Plaintiff’s successor failed to announce a jury trial was required at the time. This argument, however, disregards the fact that this action was filed on August 5, 2019 in the unlimited jurisdiction court and first set for trial on November 12, 2019. (Minute Order, 11/12/19, p. 4.) Both Plaintiff and Defendant had, prior to the matter being first set for trial, deposited jury fees with the Court. In fact, the Court noted that the case was set for jury trial when trial was first scheduled. (Ibid.) Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s successor should again have announced that a jury was required after the case was reclassified and came for trial setting conference in the limited jurisdiction court finds no support in the waiver statute or other law. (Memorandum, filed 10/10/22, p. 5:20-26.) Admittedly, it is an unusual set of circumstances regarding reclassification of the action, but Defendant fails to show Plaintiff must have announced a jury was required at the May 18, 2022 conference in order to avoid waiver of the right to a jury trial.

Motion of Plaintiff Pritpal Walia’s successor-in-interest, Manmohan Walia, to Determine Bench Trial or Jury Trial is GRANTED AS TO JURY TRIAL.