Judge: Mark E. Windham, Case: 19STCV27329, Date: 2024-01-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV27329 Hearing Date: March 26, 2024 Dept: 26
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
(Govt.
Code, § 12965)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff Pritpal Walia’s
successor in interest, Manmohan Walia’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is DENIED.
ANALYSIS:
This action arises
from the employment of Plaintiff Pritpal Walia (“Plaintiff”) as an afternoon
aid for Defendant Azusa Unified School District (“Defendant”). On August 5,
2019, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint for (1) FEHA discrimination, (2)
FEHA retaliation, (3) FEHA failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation,
(4) FEHA failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (5) FEHA failure to
engage in the interactive process, (6) declaratory relief, and (7) failure to
permit inspection of personnel and payroll records. The action was initially
filed as an unlimited civil case.
Plaintiff passed away during the pendency of
this action and a stipulation was filed allowing their successor-in-interest,
Manmohan Walia (“Plaintiff’s successor”), to substitute into the case. (Stip
and Order, 05/18/21.) On March 21, 2022, the action was reclassified to the
limited jurisdiction court.
On November 19, 2019, trial in this matter
was set for August 17, 2020. Trial was then continued multiple times until
October 25, 2022. On October 4, 2022, the Court held a hearing on Defendant’s
Motion to Quash Trial Subpoenas, at which time it set an Order to Show Cause
regarding Bench Trial v. Jury Trial for October 11, 2022. (Minute Order,
10/04/22.) On October 11, 2022, the OSC was continued to November 3, 2022.
(Minute Order, 10/11/22.)
On October 25, 2022, the Court did not call
the matter for trial and placed it off calendar. (Minute Order, 10/25/22.) On
November 3, 2022, the Court set a Motion to Determine Bench Trial vs Jury Trial
for January 10, 2023. On January 10, 2023, the Court set the matter for jury
trial. (Minute Order, 01/10/23.) On August 4, 2023, the parties filed a 998
offer to compromise and the Court entered judgment accordingly on August 28,
2023. (Offer to Compromise, filed 08/04/23.) Judgment was entered in the amount
of $7,999.99 in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant. (Judgment, 08/28/23.)
Notice of entry of judgment was filed on October 20, 2023.
Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs on
October 24, 2023. Defendant filed a Motion to Tax and/or Strike Costs on
November 8, 2023, which the Court denied on January 31, 2024. (Minute Order,
01/31/24.) On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees,
then a revised Motion for Attorney’s Fees on December 15, 2023. Defendant filed
an opposition on January 4, 2024 and Plaintiff replied on January 11, 2023. The
Motion for Attorney’s Fees initially came for hearing on January 18, 2024, at which
time the Court continued the matter for further briefing on the following
grounds:
Ultimately,
the Motion is brought pursuant to the statutory right to attorney’s fees under
Government Code section 12965. However, as neither party cites relevant legal
authority regarding the issue of the “prevailing party” under that statute, the
hearing is continued for further briefing. Plaintiff is to file and serve a
supplemental brief, not to exceed three pages, addressing the standard for
determining a prevailing party under Government Code section 12965 and
analyzing it with respect to this case. Defendant is to file and serve a brief
in response, also not exceeding three pages.
(Minute Order, 01/18/24, p. 6.) Plaintiff
filed a supplemental brief on February 29, 2024 and Defendant filed a
supplemental opposition on March 7, 2024.
Discussion
Timing of
Motion
The Court previously found good cause for
bringing the instant Motion after the 30-day deadline. (Id. at p. 3.)
Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees
Plaintiff
points to Government Code section 12965 for the statutory right to attorney’s
fees, which states in relevant part: “In civil actions brought under this
section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party . . . reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs . . . .” (Govt. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(6).)
In
the supplemental brief, Plaintiff first relies on case law that does not
involve FEHA, as ordered. Instead, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s
unambiguous acceptance of the section 998 offer, and its express terms allowing
for an award of attorneys’ fees, makes Plaintiff the prevailing party in the
action. In support, Plaintiff cites Martinez v. Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transp. Authority (2011) 195 Cal. App. 4th 1038, in which the
Court of Appeals ruled that there is a “rapport between [Code of Civil
Procedure] sections 998, 1032 and 1033.5. A party who accepts a monetary offer
of compromise under section 998 is the “prevailing party” for purposes of a
cost award under section 1032. (Martinez v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1041.)
The
Court does not find Martinez helpful to the facts of this case as it is
distinguishable in crucial ways. First, the Martinez parties’ 998 offer
stated that each side was to bear its own costs and was silent as to attorney’s
fees. (Id. at 1040.) In the 998 offer in this action, the parties agreed
that “Plaintiff will have the right to seek attorney’s fees and costs by filing
a motion with the Court.” (Offer to Compromise, 08/04/23, p. 1:27.) Second, the
Martinez plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees was brought under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act; the
instant Motion for attorney’s fees is brought pursuant to FEHA and Plaintiff
does not demonstrate that the statutory language is the same or even similar.
Nor
does the language of the parties’ 998 offer provide that Plaintiff’s successor
is entitled to attorney’s fees. Rather, it and the judgment entered
accordingly, state that “Plaintiff will have the right to seek attorney’s fees
and costs by filing a motion with the Court.” (Offer to Compromise, 08/04/23,
p. 1:27; Judgment, 08/28/23, pp. 1:26-2:2.) The offer and judgment, therefore,
only reserve to Plaintiff the right to move for attorney’s fees and costs.
Next,
Plaintiff’s successor argues that he is the prevailing party under FEHA’s
statutory language. He contends that the extent of the Court’s discretion to
make such a determination is “narrow” under Steele v. Jensen Instrument Co.
(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 326. However, the narrow scope only applies to the trial
court’s discretion to deny attorney’s fees to a prevailing party plaintiff. (Steele
v. Jensen Instrument Co. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 326, 331.) Here, no
determination has yet been made that Plaintiff is the prevailing party. The
correct legal standard for determining a prevailing party under Government Code
section 12965 is as follows:
Because FEHA does not define the term “prevailing party,”
prevailing party status is determined in this context “based on an evaluation
of whether a party prevailed ‘ “on a practical level,” ’ and the trial court's
decision should be affirmed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” (Donner
Management Co. v. Schaffer (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1310, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d
534 (Donner Management).) In applying this standard, the trial court must
identify the prevailing party “by analyzing the extent to which each party has
realized its litigation objectives.” (Castro v. Superior Court (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 1010, 1023, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 865 (Castro).)
(Bustos v. Global P.E.T., Inc. (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th
558, 562-563.) Plaintiff’s successor’s analysis of whether they realized their
litigation objectives, and therefore prevailed on a practical level, is
minimal. The supplemental motion simply states that Plaintiff’s successor’s
litigation objective was “to acquire compensation for his harms.” (Supp.
Motion, p. 4:8-9.) This generic and unsupported explanation provides no
analysis of the compensation sought in this litigation. The California Supreme
Court has explained that a party’s litigation objectives are defined by “the
pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources.” (Hsu v.
Abarra (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 877.) Yet neither the original nor
supplemental Motion papers discuss or cite these sources. For example, the
Complaint sets forth the following prayer for damages:
1.
For a money judgment representing compensatory
damages including lost wages, earnings, commissions, retirement benefits, and
other employee benefits, and all other sums of money, together with interest on
these amounts; for other special damages; and for general damages for mental
pain and anguish and emotional distress;
2.
For statutory penalties pursuant to Labor Code
§1198.5, for no less than $750.00;
3.
For statutory penalties pursuant to Labor Code
§226(c)(f), for no less than $750.00;
4.
For prejudgment interest on each of the
foregoing at the legal rate from the date the obligation became due through the
date of judgment in this matter;
5.
For a declaratory judgment reaffirming
Plaintiff’s equal standing under the law and condemning Defendants’
discriminatory practices;
6.
For injunctive relief barring Defendants’
discriminatory employment policies and practices in the future;
7.
For costs of suit, attorneys’ fees, and expert
witness fees pursuant to the FEHA, the Labor Code, the Civil Code, and/or any
other basis;
8.
For post-judgment interest; and
9.
For any other relief that is just and proper.
(Compl., pp. 15:18-16:9.) Nor does Plaintiff’s successor
discuss the impact of Plaintiff’s death and the subsequent stipulation to
transfer this action to the limited jurisdiction court on this prayer for
relief. Did Plaintiff’s successor’s litigation objectives change as a result?
How did the litigation objectives change, specifically? If they did, what is
the evidence to support how the litigation objectives changed? And ultimately,
how does the parties’ settlement reflect that Plaintiff’s successor achieved
those objectives on a practical level more so than Defendant? Without this
information, the Court cannot determine that Plaintiff’s successor is the
prevailing party in this action.
The Court finds the reasoning of the Court of Appeals as
derived from the state Supreme Court, in upholding a trial court’s
determination that attorney’s fees should not be awarded, highly applicable
here:
“An award of attorney's fees is discretionary under section
12965, subdivision (b). An award may take into account the scale of the
plaintiff’s success, and it must not encourage ‘unnecessary litigation of
claims that serve no public purpose either because they have no broad public
impact or because they are factually or legally weak.’ [Citation.] Like
Congress in enacting Title VII, our Legislature did not ‘ “enact[ ] legislation
whose benefit inures primarily to lawyers in the form of a substantial fee recovery,
even if relief to the plaintiff is otherwise trivial and the lawsuit promotes
few public goals.” ’ ” (Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 235, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d
392, 294 P.3d 49.)
(Bustos v. Global P.E.T., Inc. (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th
558, 564.) In an action where Plaintiff’s successor obtained a monetary
judgment of approximately one percent of the amount sought in attorney’s fees,
the lack of any specific analysis of the prevailing party standard is grounds
to deny the Motion.
Conclusion
Therefore,
Plaintiff Pritpal Walia’s successor in interest, Manmohan Walia’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees is DENIED.
Court clerk to give notice.