Judge: Mark E. Windham, Case: 20STLC09464, Date: 2024-01-31 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STLC09464 Hearing Date: March 6, 2024 Dept: 26
State Farm v. Devries, et al.
MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT
(CCP § 473.5)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant Pilar Devries’ Motion to Vacate Default and
Default Judgment; and Request for Sanctions is DENIED.
ANALYSIS:
On November 10, 2020, Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action for automobile
subrogation against Defendant Pilar Devries (“Defendant”). The Court granted
Plaintiff’s application for service by publication on March 1, 2022 and proof
of service by publication was filed on May 20, 2022. Following Defendant’s
failure to file a responsive pleading, the Court entered default on October 12,
2022 and default judgment on December 12, 2022. Notice of entry of judgment was
filed on February 10, 2023.
Defendant filed the instant Motion to Vacate Default and
Default Judgment on December 28, 2023. Plaintiff filed an opposition on January
18, 2024 and Defendant replied on January 24, 2024. The Motion initially came
for hearing on January 31, 2024 and was continued for further briefing. (Minute
Order, 01/31/24.) On February 7, 2024, Defendant filed supplemental papers
addressing relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 and on
equitable grounds. Plaintiff filed a supplemental opposition on February 14,
2024.
Discussion
Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (a)
states in relevant part:
When service of a summons has not resulted
in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or
default judgment has been entered against him or
her in the action, he or she may serve and file a
notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for
leave to defend the action. The notice of
motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event
exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment
against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or
her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has
been entered.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subd. (a).)
Additionally, the motion “shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing under
oath that the party’s lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was
not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. The party
shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other
pleading proposed to be filed in the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subd.
(b).)
The supplemental papers argue that at the time of
service of the Summons and Complaint, Defendant was living at 822 Euclid
St., Santa Monica, California, and had been at that address since August 2021.
(Motion, Supp. Devires Decl., ¶5.) No other evidence is provided in support of
this address, such as utility bills or a lease agreement. As set forth in
Plaintiff’s March 2022 application for publication and its supplemental
opposition, however, the 822 Euclid Street address was not on file with the
United States Postal Service. The addresses where Defendant received mail—from
July 2021 to October 2022—were confirmed by the United States Postal Service to
be 14975 Yerba Buena Road, Malibu, California and 31805 Broad Beach Road,
Malibu, California. (Opp., Supp. Reese Decl., Exhs. D-H.) If Defendant lived at
822 Euclid Street starting in August 2021, it does not appear that the postal
service was informed. Although Defendant makes the conclusory statement in the
supplemental declaration that lack of actual notice was not caused by avoidance
of service or inexcusable neglect, the above facts tell a different story.
Defendant has not shown through the supplemental papers that lack of actual
notice was not caused by avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. Indeed,
Defendant has not credibly shown lack of actual notice of the lawsuit given
that the Summons and Complaint were mailed to both addresses on file with the
postal service.
Finally, the Motion cites equitable grounds to vacate the
default and default judgment, which must demonstrate that the judgment was
entered due to extrinsic fraud or excusable mistake. (Citing Slusher v.
Durrer (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 747, 754.) Defendant argues in the supplemental
papers that relief is warranted due to extrinsic fraud because she was served at
an old address and Plaintiff was aware that the address was no longer valid. As
discussed above, Defendant’s evidence that she resided at 822 Euclid Street at
the time of service, and lacked actual notice of the action despite the many
attempts at service at 14975 Yerba Buena Road and 31805 Broad Beach Road, is
too conclusory to support the claim. Nor is there any evidence that Plaintiff
was aware of this new address, as Defendant claims. (Supp. Motion, p. 8:13-16
[citing Supp. Devires Decl., ¶¶5-6].) For the foregoing reasons, the Court
finds Defendant is not entitled to relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 473.5 or on equitable grounds.
Conclusion
Defendant Pilar Devries’ Motion to Vacate Default and
Default Judgment; and Request for Sanctions is DENIED.
Court clerk to give notice.