Judge: Mark E. Windham, Case: 22STLC02466, Date: 2024-09-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STLC02466 Hearing Date: September 11, 2024 Dept: 26
Vera
v. Guerrero, et al.
RECLASSIFY
(CCP § 403.040)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff Maria
Vera’s Motion to Reclassify is GRANTED. THIS
CASE IS RECLASSIFIED AS AN UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE AND TRANSFERRED TO THE
RECLASSIFICATION/TRANSFER DESK FOR COLLECTION OF FEES AND REASSIGNMENT TO AN
UNLIMITED JURISDICTION COURT. PLAINTIFF IS TO PAY THE RECLASSIFICATION FEE
WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF THIS ORDER.
ANALYSIS:
On April 12, 2022, Plaintiff Maria Vera (“Plaintiffs”) filed
this action for motor vehicle negligence against Defendants Isabel Guerrero (“Defendant”)
and Patrick Uribio, who was later dismissed. Defendant answered the Complaint
on May 25, 2022. The parties twice stipulated to continue the trial date, to
July 22, 2024.
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Reclassify the Action
on May 29, 2024 and the following day sought to shorten time on the hearing.
The ex parte application was denied but the Court vacated the trial date and
set a trial setting conference for July 24, 2024. (Minute Order, 06/03/24.)
Defendant filed an opposition to the Motion on July 11, 2024 and Plaintiff
replied on July 17, 2024.
Discussion
The Motion to
Reclassify is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 403.040,
which allows a plaintiff to file a motion for reclassification of an action
within the time allowed for that party to amend the initial pleading. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 403.040, subd. (a).) If the motion is made after the time for the
plaintiff to amend the pleading, the motion may only be granted if (1) the case
is incorrectly classified; and (2) the plaintiff shows good cause for not
seeking reclassification earlier. (Code Civ. Proc., § 403.040, subd. (b).) In Walker
v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262, the California Supreme Court
held that a matter may be reclassified from unlimited to limited only if
it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff's damages will necessarily
be less than the jurisdictional limit. (Walker v. Superior Court (1991)
53 Cal.3d 257.) The jurisdictional limit, effective January 1, 2024, is
$35,000.00. (Code Civ. Proc., § 85, subd. (a).)
In Ytuarte v.
Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 278, the Court of Appeals
examined the principles it set forth in Walker and held that “the court should reject the plaintiff's effort to
reclassify the action as unlimited only when the lack of jurisdiction as an
“unlimited” case is certain and clear.” (Id. at 279.) Plaintiffs’ burden is to present evidence to demonstrate
a possibility that the damages will exceed [the jurisdictional limit] and the
trial court must review the record to determine “whether a judgment in excess
of [the jurisdictional limit] is obtainable.” (Ibid.)
As the instant Motion was filed after the time to amend the
complaint, Plaintiff must show both that the case is incorrectly classified and
good cause for the timing of the Motion. Plaintiff’s Motion is supported by a
recommendation for future medical treatment that may amount to $263,680.00.
(Motion, Kielty Decl., ¶23 and Exh. K.) Defendant’s opposition argues that
Plaintiff’s damages in this case cannot amount to more than $35,000.00 because
it was a minor car accident with minimal damage and no injuries reported
on-scene. (Opp., Wenning Decl., ¶3 and Exh. A.) The opposition goes on to argue
that Plaintiff has had a long history of shoulder and back injuries that are
attributable to other causes, including a severe car accident in 2019. (Id.
at Exhs. C-D.) This history, however, does not demonstrate that Plaintiff’s
injuries might not have been exacerbated by the subject accident requiring
Plaintiff to obtain future medical treatment at the cost indicated. (See Ng
v. Hudson (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 250, 255 [ holding “Plaintiff may recover to
the full extent that his condition has worsened as a result of defendant's
tortious act.”].) The Court finds, therefore, that Plaintiff has shown a
possibility of damages that exceed the jurisdictional limit of the limited
jurisdiction court.
Regarding the timing of the Motion, Plaintiff must show good
cause for seeking reclassification two years after Defendant’s answer was
filed. Plaintiff has shown that she continued to seek treatment for her
injuries into late 2023. (Motion, Kielty Decl., ¶¶7-14 and Exhs. B-I.)
Unfortunately, after Plaintiff’s counsel received the recommendation for future
treatment in the amount of $263,680.00 in November 2023, they were swamped by
four major trials in the span of four months. (Id. at ¶¶20-32.) Once the
trials were completed, Plaintiff’s counsel realized reclassification had to be
sought in this action. This Court, therefore, is faced with the question of
whether Plaintiff’s attorney’s lack of attention to the subject case amounts to
good cause under the statute.
Statutes requiring good cause for a
court order rarely define the phrase and, then, only in terms of those reasons
that are insufficient. (See, e.g., Pen.Code, § 1050, subd. (e) [“Continuances
shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause. Neither the convenience of
the parties nor a stipulation of the parties is in and of itself good
cause.”].) It usually falls to the courts to establish the boundaries of good
cause. Although the courts have defined “good cause” in a variety of contexts,
the concept is relative and depends on all the circumstances. (Walker v. Blue Cross (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th
985, 994, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 184.) It may be based on any matter relevant to the
determination. As a general rule, however, “good cause” includes reasons that
are fair, honest, in good faith, not trivial, arbitrary, capricious, or
pretextual, and reasonably related to legitimate needs, goals, and purposes.
(See Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Internat., Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 93, 107–108,
69 Cal.Rptr.2d 900, 948 P.2d 412.) In determining the meaning of “good cause”
in a particular context, the courts utilize common sense based upon the
totality of the circumstances. Those circumstances include the purpose of the
underlying statutory scheme.
(Laraway v. Sutro & Co., Inc. (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 266, 274.) The Court finds that using common sense and under the
totality of the circumstances, good cause exists for the timing of this Motion.
Plaintiff’s counsel obtained information regarding her continued treatment at
the end of 2023. In the immediate four-month period, however, Plaintiff’s
counsel’s capacity as a solo practitioner with a small number of staff was
suddenly challenged by the unusual circumstance of four significant trials. (Motion,
Kielty Decl., ¶¶20-32.) Once those trials were concluded, Plaintiff’s counsel
realized a motion to reclassify should be brought in this action. (Id.
at ¶32.) This is not neglect of the case or an attempt to seek reclassification
in bad faith. Therefore, the Court finds that the good cause requirement is
also satisfied.
Conclusion
Plaintiff Maria
Vera’s Motion to Reclassify is GRANTED. THIS
CASE IS RECLASSIFIED AS AN UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE AND TRANSFERRED TO THE
RECLASSIFICATION/TRANSFER DESK FOR COLLECTION OF FEES AND REASSIGNMENT TO AN
UNLIMITED JURISDICTION COURT. PLAINTIFF IS TO PAY THE RECLASSIFICATION FEE
WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF THIS ORDER.
Moving party to give notice.