Judge: Mark E. Windham, Case: 22STLC05078, Date: 2024-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STLC05078    Hearing Date: February 15, 2024    Dept: 26

Group II Azusa Properties, Ltd. v. Zheng, et al.

VACATE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT; QUASH SERVICE

(CCP §§ 418.10, 473(b), 473.5, 473(d))

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Chatherine Zheng’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons of Complaint and Vacate Void Default Judgment is GRANTED.

ANALYSIS:

On August 3, 2022, Plaintiff Group II Azusa Properties, Ltd. (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against Defendants Catherine Zheng, individually and dba Lantastic Group, Inc. (“Defendant Zheng”), and Lantastic Group, Inc. (“Defendant Lantastic”). When Defendants failed to file a responsive pleading, Plaintiff obtained their default on May 11, 2023 and default judgment on May 25, 2023. On December 21, 2023, Defendant Zheng filed a declaration that appears to be a claim of exemption. The claim of exemption was denied by the Court on the same date.

On January 12, 2024, Defendant Zheng filed the instant Motion to Quash Service of Summons; Vacate Default and Default Judgment; and Quash Writs of Execution and Abstracts of Judgment. Plaintiff filed an opposition on January 31, 2024 and Defendant Zheng replied with objections on February 8, 2024.

Discussion

Defendant Zheng moves to quash service of the Summons and Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10. Defendant Zheng moves to vacate the entry of default and default judgment on equitable grounds. The Court must first address the request to vacate the default and default judgment before addressing the motion to quash. Also, Defendant Zheng’s evidentiary objection to paragraph 4 of the Long declaration in support of Plaintiff’s opposition is sustained.

Plaintiff first opposes the Motion on the grounds that Defendant Zheng’s claim of exemption filing constitutes a general appearance, which has the effect of deeming her personally served. None of the cases to which Plaintiff cites, however, involved cases factually similar to this one. (Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou SinoType Technology Co., Ltd. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 125, 132 [involving an agreement by the parties to waive formal service of process under California law in favor of an alternative form of notification]; In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 135 [general denial filed prior to hearing on termination of parental rights]; Carpenter v. Mohammed (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 584, 586 [motion to vacate judgment included a request to modify the judgment, which was granted]; Roy v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 337, 340 [by filing an answer and participating in the litigation, the defendants had submitted to California’s jurisdiction].

Case law holds that defective personal service is not retroactively cured by a post-judgment appearance. (In re Alyssa F. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 846, 851; Marriage of Smith (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 543, 545, 550-552.) Defendant’s filing of a post-judgment claim of exemption, therefore, would not cure defective service of the Summons and Complaint.

Defendant Zheng moves to vacate the default judgment pursuant to Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr. (1988) 485 U.S. 80, 84-85 and In Munoz v. Lopez (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 178. In Peralta, the United States Supreme Court held that a judgment entered without notice or service violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution and that the defendant was not required to demonstrate a meritorious defense for relief from the judgment. (Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr. (1988) 485 U.S. 80, 85-87.) In Munoz, the California Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling vacating default after a showing of extrinsic fraud in service of the summons after a reasonable time, not the one-year deadline prescribed by Code of Civil Procedure section 473a. (In Munoz v. Lopez (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 178, 183.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that a declaration executed by a registered California process server creates a presumption that service was effectuated as set forth in said declaration. (Citing Evid. Code, § 1271.) This places the burden of proof on Defendant Zheng to demonstrate that service did not take place as stated in the proof of service. Defendant Zheng has met this burden. She submits a declaration stating that the service address, 6163 Sunny Meadow Lane, Chino Hills, California, was neither her residence nor mailing address at the time of service. (Motion, Zheng Decl., ¶3.) Rather, that address was rented for Defendant Zheng’s former romantic partner, Jonathan Nguyen. (Id. at ¶4.) Nguyen likewise states in his declaration that he lived at the service address and it was not Defendant Zheng’s residence or usual mailing address. (Motion, Nguyen Decl., ¶2.) Nguyen admits receiving the documents from the process server but was not informed that they were legal documents and did not give them to Defendant Zheng, with whom he was no longer involved at the time of service. (Id. at ¶¶3-4.) Defendant Zheng lived at 18416 Nottingham Lane, Rowland Heights, California at the time of service and received no notice of the action. (Motion, Zheng Decl., ¶¶4-5 and Exh. A.) This demonstrates that service of the Summons and Complaint did not comply with the statutory requirements, nor provide actual notice to Defendant Zheng. Plaintiff’s opposition offers no evidence to contradict the evidence in support of the Motion. Based on the foregoing, Defendant Zheng’s request to vacate the entry of default and default service is granted.

Defendant Zhen also moves to quash service of the Summons and Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10. The grounds to quash exist based on the purportedly defective service. To the extent that Defendant Zheng has shown defective service of the Summons and Complaint, the Court also will grant the request to quash service. 

Conclusion

Defendant Chatherine Zheng’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons of Complaint and Vacate Void Default Judgment is GRANTED.

Court clerk to give notice.