Judge: Mark E. Windham, Case: 22STLC08286, Date: 2023-05-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STLC08286    Hearing Date: October 11, 2023    Dept: 26

  

Nissanoff v. Blue Cross of California, et al.

DEMURRER

(CCP §§ 430.31, et seq.)

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

DEFENDANT BLUE CROSS OF CALIFORNIA DBA ANTHEM BLUE CROSS’ DEMURRER TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT IS SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND.

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

Plaintiff Jonathan Nissanoff (“Plaintiff”) brought this action for quantum meruit and breach of contract against Defendant Blue Cross of California dba Anthem Blue Cross (“Defendant”) on December 14, 2022. Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint on February 14, 2023, adding six more causes of action. On May 22, 2023, the Court sustained Defendant’s Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend. (Minute Order, 05/22/23.) Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint on June 8, 2023.

 

Defendant filed the instant Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint on August 9, 2023. Plaintiff filed an opposition on August 24, 2023 and Defendant replied on October 4, 2023.

 

Discussion

 

The Second Amended Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) quantum meruit; and (2) breach of implied-in-law contract. Defendant demurs to each cause of action for failure to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Citing Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) The demurrer is accompanied by a meet and confer declaration in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. (Motion, Kozaczuk Decl., ¶¶2-3.)

 

Allegations in the Second Amended Complaint

 

The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a surgeon who, as an assignee of his medical corporation, Advanced Orthopedic Center (“AOC”), purchased and acquired its accounts receivable. (SAC, ¶¶1-3 and Exh. 1.) Plaintiff and AOC are in the business of providing emergent medical care to members, subscribers, and insureds of Defendant and their physicians became entitled to reimbursement, payment, or indemnification from Defendant for those services and supplies. (Id. at ¶¶1-5.) Defendant is licensed to and do business as a health care plan insurer and/or medical health plan administrator. (Id. at ¶6.) Defendants are regulated by the Department of Managed Health Care (“DMHC”) DMHC and/or the California Department of Insurance (“CDI”). (Ibid.)

 

Defendant withheld reimbursement and has been unjustly enriched. (Id. at ¶7.) Plaintiff’s patients bargain for and expect that payment will be made at the medical service provider’s usual and customary rates. (Id. at ¶10.) By authorizing Plaintiff to provide services to Defendant’s insured members, Defendant entered into implied contracts agreeing to pay Plaintiff at his usual, customary, and reasonable billed rates. (Id. at ¶11.) Defendant failed to pay these claims correctly by paying the claims at rates far below usual, reasonable, and customary charges submitted by Plaintiff. (Ibid.) Defendant determines the payment amount using a flawed database that it manipulates to underpay out-of-network providers. (Id. at ¶12.) Plaintiff’s claims are based on state law that regulates insurance and not on ERISA or FEHBA statutes, nor on the terms of the patients’ plans. (Id. at ¶13.)

 

This action arises from fees owed to Plaintiff’s physicians for emergent medical care provided to Defendant’s insured, members, policyholders, certificate-holders, or patients who were otherwise covered by policies or certificates issued and underwritten by Defendant. (Id. at ¶7.)

 

Each of the patients to whom this care was provided was insured by Defendant under a policy or certificate of insurance issued and underwritten by Defendant for the specific purpose of ensuring they would have access to necessary medical care by practitioners like Plaintiff and ensuring Defendant would pay for the medical expenses they incurred. (Id. at ¶8.) Defendant received valuable premium payments or other consideration from the patients under the policies. (Id. at ¶9.) The physicians provided emergent and necessary medical care to patients covered under valid insurance policies issued by Defendant. (Id. at ¶10.) The physicians provided high-quality care and charge for services on par with other physicians in the same general area for the same services; the physicians’ billed charges are usual, customary, and reasonable. (Id. at ¶11.)

 

The physicians were “out-of-network providers” who did not have contracts with Defendants at the time the emergent care was provided. (Id. at ¶12.) Unlike in-network providers who are reimbursed at a discounted rate by the health plan, out-of-network providers are entitled to receive payment based on their total charges for the services. (Id. at ¶¶13-14.) The medical services provided by the physicians was for emergent or post-stabilization care that they were legally required to provide to the patients. (Id. at ¶15.) The physicians either requested and were provided authorization for the services, or requested authorization and received no response within the 30-minute timeframe such that authorization was provided by operation of law. (Ibid.) At no time did Defendant request that the patients be transferred to an in-network facility. (Ibid.) Based on these factors, Defendant was required by law and/or its own contract to compensate the physicians at usual, customary, and reasonable rates. (Ibid.)

 

Defendant paid for these services in amounts that were less than the physicians’ usual, customary, or reasonable rate and were less than the physicians’ billed charges. (Id. at ¶16.) Physicians fully documented and supported the charges sought and expected to be reimbursed at their usual, customary, or reasonable rate. (Id. at ¶¶17-18.) The rates at which Defendant reimbursed Plaintiff were arbitrary, capricious, and inexplicable and Defendant never explained how the rates were calculated. (Id. at ¶21.) The physicians were often paid different rates for the exact same procedure or service at different times of the same year, or paid at rates less than they would have received had they been in at an in-network provider. (Id. at ¶22.) The DMHC’s regulations provide a methodology to define the amount health care service plans like Defendant are to pay out-of-network providers. (Id. at ¶23.) These criteria demonstrates that the physician’s charges are reasonable and customary. (Id. at ¶24.)

 

Defendant determined the payment amount using flawed databases that it manipulated to underpay out-of-network providers. (Id. at ¶¶25-27.) Therefore, Defendant breached its obligation to reimburse the physicians for the out-of-network services at usual, customary, and reasonable rates. (Id. at ¶¶28-29.) This underpayment also harms the physicians’ relationship with their patients when the patients discover they will not be fully reimbursed. (Id. at ¶31.)

 

Demurrer to Entire Second Amended Complaint

 

Defendant first demurs to the entire Second Amended Complaint on the grounds Plaintiff has not alleged a valid assignment from AOC. Like the First Amended Complaint, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff acquired accounts receivable from AOC but does not allege that the scope of the assignment relates to causes of action with respect to those accounts. (See FAC, ¶¶1-3.) The Court previously noted that an assignment of the right to property does not necessarily effectuate an assignment of a cause of action with respect to that property. (See Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 980, 995; Schauer v. Mandarin Gems of Cal., Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 949, 956-57.) The Second Amended Complaint now attaches an assignment agreement that purports to assign all of AOC “rights, remedies, titles, and interest in and to any and all Outstanding Bills that the Assignor provides to the Assignee during the term of the Agreement.” (SAC, Exh. 1 at Exh F, ¶1.) The assigned claims, however, are not attached to Exhibit F as intended. (Id. at Exh. F, ¶5.) Plaintiff apparently realized this error and filed a “Notice of Errata Pursuant to its Complaint of Omission of Attachment to ‘Exhibit F’ of Assignment Agreement” on August 24, 2023 with the opposition to the Demurrer.

 

The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff cannot correct his failure to attach the list of assigned claims to the Second Amended Complaint by filing a Notice of Errata concurrently with the opposition to the Demurrer. Correction should be made by amending the Second Amended Complaint. Therefore, the Court declines to sustain the Demurrer to the entire Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend when there is a possibility Plaintiff can correct the allegations regarding assignment of the claims.

 

The Court will further consider the specific arguments raised in the Demurrer to each cause of action.

 

2nd Cause of Action for Breach of Implied-in-Law Contract

 

The Court will address the second cause of action first due to Defendant’s contention that the first cause of action is duplicative of the second cause of action.

 

“[A]n implied-in-law contract or quasi-contract is not based on the intention of the parties, but arises from a legal obligation that is imposed on the defendant.” (Unilab Corp. v. Angeles-IPA (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 622, 639.) The elements are: (1) defendant used for its benefit property of plaintiff; (2) in such manner and under circumstances that the law will impose a duty of compensation therefore. (Weitzenkorn v. Lesser (1953) 40 Cal.2d 778, 794.) The cases to which Defendant cites do not hold that mutual assent is required for a valid implied-in-law contract but rather, pertain to implied-in-fact contracts. (See Unilab Corp. v. Angels-IPA (2016) 244 Cal. App. 4th 622, 637; Pacific Bay Recovery, Inc. v. California Physicians' Services, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 200, 215-216.) Nor do implied-in-law contacts require the pleading of the usual elements of contract formation, as Defendant contends. (Weitzenkorn v. Lesser (1953) 40 Cal.2d 778, 794.) Indeed, one of the main cases to which Defendant cites, Allied Anesthesia Med. Grp., Inc. v. Inland Empire Health Plan (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 794, is cited for the holding regarding the claim for breach of implied-in-fact contract. (See Allied Anesthesia Med. Grp., Inc. v. Inland Empire Health Plan (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 794, 808-813.)

 

Despite the first cause of action being named “Breach of Implied In Law Contract” on the face page of the Second Amended Complaint, Defendant does not address what allegations are necessary to allege an implied-in-law contract until the Reply. (Reply, p. 4:8-10.) The Reply broadly argues that the Second Amended Complaint does not assert a legal obligation imposed on Defendant. (Id. at p. 5:8-9.) The Second Amended Complaint, however, does make such allegations: “The Department of Managed Health Care has adopted regulations that define the amount that health care service plans such as Defendant  . . . are obligated to pay non-contracted providers such as the Physicians.” (SAC, ¶23.) Plaintiff also earlier alleged that Defendant’s obligation to pay the physicians’ usual, customary, or reasonable rates arises under state law. (Id. at ¶¶13, 15.) The Second Amended Complaint also sufficiently alleges that by failing to pay the physicians’ usual, customary, or reasonable rates, Defendant was unjustly enriched in order to maximize its profits. (Id. at ¶¶7-11.)

 

Plaintiff also points to the recent case, County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1034, in which out-of-network hospitals brought suit against a health care service plan operated by a public entity on a theory of breach of implied-in-law contract. (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1034, 1038.) The Supreme Court of California ruled that such a claim was not barred by the Government Tort Claims Act. (Id. at 1056.) Defendant does not address this case and the law to which Plaintiff cites regarding the right to reimbursement.

 

Finally, Defendant demurs on the grounds that this cause of action is duplicative of the first cause of action for quantum meruit. Quantum meruit is a type of implied-in-law contract. (Long Beach Memorial Medical Center v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 323, 338 [citing Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370.) However, Defendant cites no authority that a duplicative cause of action is subject to demurrer. (Demurrer, p. 9:16-10:14.)

Therefore, Defendant has not demonstrated that the second cause of action for breach of implied-in-law contract is insufficiently alleged. 

 

1st Cause of Action for Quantum Meruit

 

Other than its contention that the cause of action for quantum meruit is duplicative, Defendant does not provide a basis to sustain the Demurrer to the first cause of action. Defendant improperly seeks to raise arguments against the quantum meruit cause of action for the first time in its reply. (See Reply, p. 4;11-17.) 

 

Conclusion

 

DEFENDANT BLUE CROSS OF CALIFORNIA DBA ANTHEM BLUE CROSS’ DEMURRER TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT IS SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND.

 

 

Moving party to give notice.