Judge: Mark E. Windham, Case: 23STLC03477, Date: 2023-11-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STLC03477    Hearing Date: November 21, 2023    Dept: 26

Lopez v. Tevanian, et al.

MOTION TO STRIKE

(CCP § 435, et seq.)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Joshua Tevanian and Alfred Tevanian’s Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint is DENIED.

ANALYSIS:

On May 30, 2023, Plaintiff Hector Goody Lopez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action for motor vehicle negligence and intentional tort against Defendants Joshua Tevanian and Alfred Tevanian (“Defendants”). Defendants filed an answer to the Complaint and the instant Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint on August 31, 2023. Plaintiff filed an opposition with objections on November 6, 2023 and Defendants replied on November 9, 2023.

Discussion

As an initial matter, Plaintiff's objections to the declaration of defense counsel, Laura Matteis, Esq. regarding evidence in support of the claim for punitive damages are sustained.

Defendants bring the instant Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436. The Motion is accompanied by a meet and confer declaration as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5. (Motion, Matteis Decl., ¶¶3-4 and Exh. A-B.) Plaintiff disputes the adequacy of the meet and confer effort on the grounds that an offer was made to amend the Complaint to include further allegations to support the request for punitive damages but was refused by defense counsel. (Opp., Hakim Decl., Exhs. 2-3.) The Court finds the meet and confer effort was sufficient. The attorneys disagreed on what allegations were sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages, with defense counsel pointing to the lack of evidence to support Plaintiff’s proposed amendment. The meet and confer requirement has been satisfied and Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is denied. (Ibid.)

Defendants move to strike the allegations and prayer for punitive damages on the grounds that they do not meet the statutory requirements. The Complaint alleges that the motor vehicle accident occurred at Paxton Street in Pacoima, California. (Compl., ¶GN-1.) Plaintiff was allegedly driving on Paxton and going to make a left turn onto Herrick. (Ibid.) While Plaintiff was stopped inside the intersection, he observed a black vehicle and a red vehicle driving from the opposite direction on Paxton racing at over 60 mph. (Ibid.) When the black vehicle crossed Herrick, the red vehicle (defendant Joshua Tevanian) was about 4 car lengths behind the intersection. (Ibid.) The light turned red and Plaintiff began making the left turn onto Herrick, expecting the red vehicle to stop because it was four car lengths behind the intersection. (Ibid.) Instead of stopping, Defendant Joshua crossed Herrick on the red light to catch the black car, causing the subject accident. (Ibid.) Defendant Joshua is liable for gross negligence and reckless disregard for the safety of others.

Punitive damages are authorized by Civil Code section 3294 in non-contract cases “where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied . . . .”  (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) Malice means conduct that is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct that is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Fraud means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the party of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

Defendants argue that the Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to show despicable conduct, which “implies an act conceived in a spirit of mischief or with criminal indifference towards the obligations owed to others.” (Citing Ebaugh v. Rabkin (1972), 22 Cal.App.3d 891, 894-895.) Defendants, however, characterize the allegations in the Complaint as describing their conduct only as “speeding.” (Motion, p. 7:2-3.) Nor is any part of the Complaint actually cited or analyzed in the Motion to Strike. (See id. at pp. 5:4-7, 7:2-3, 8:9-17.)

The Complaint does more than allege speeding by Defendant Joshua. It alleges that Defendant Joshua was “racing at over 60 mph” and “instead of stopping for the red light, crossed Herrick on red to catch up with the black car.” (Compl., ¶GN-1.) These alleged facts describe Defendant Joshua as racing at a high speed with the intent to catch up with the black car, regardless of the traffic signals and other vehicles. Defendants do not accurately set forth the allegations in the Complaint in their Motion to Strike, and therefore, have not shown whether the actual allegations sufficiently support the request for punitive damages. Defendants’ argument that a mere allegation of speeding is insufficient —which is not what the Complaint alleges—does not inform whether Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages fails to meet the statutory standard.

Although Plaintiff was willing to amend the Complaint to include additional supporting facts, the opposition also provides an analysis as to why the allegations in the Complaint of street racing support the request for punitive damages. (Opp., pp. 6:13-8:12.) In reply, Defendants again fail to provide an argument based on the allegations in the Complaint and contend that Plaintiff lacks evidence of street racing. (Reply, pp. 3:20-4:2.) Lack of supporting evidence, however, is not grounds for a Motion to Strike. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)  

Conclusion

Therefore, Defendants Joshua Tevanian and Alfred Tevanian’s Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint is DENIED.

Plaintiff to give notice.