Judge: Mark E. Windham, Case: 23STLC06581, Date: 2024-09-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STLC06581    Hearing Date: September 18, 2024    Dept: 26

Ambe v. Jaramillo, et al.

MOTION TO QUASH REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS OR PROTECTIVE ORDER

(CCP §§ 1985.3, 1987.1, 2017.020, 2025.410, and 2025.420)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff Siri Rose Ambe’s Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas is GRANTED.

ANALYSIS:

Plaintiff Siri Rose Ambe (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action for motor vehicle negligence against Patricia Macias Jaramillo (“Defendant”) on October 13, 2023. Defendant filed an answer on November 15, 2023.

Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Quash Subpoenas for Plaintiff’s Employment Records on July 18, 2024. Defendant filed an opposition on August 5, 2024.

Discussion

Plaintiff brings the instant Motion to Quash pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, which states “[a]ny consumer whose personal records are sought by a subpoena duces tecum and who is a party to the civil action in which this subpoena duces tecum is served may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1987.1 to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 gives the Court authority to issue an order:

[Q]uashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).) After serving an objection to a subpoena for production of documents at deposition/deposition, a party may move for an order quashing the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.410, subd. (c).) A motion under this statute must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.410, subd. (c).)

Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoena for production of documents served by Defendant on her current employers, You Can Health Services and Pitney Bowes, Inc. Defendant served two sets of subpoenas on Plaintiff’s employers: one set issued on June 4, 2024 and the second set issued on June 24, 2024. (Opp., Sandstorm Decl., Exhs. B-C.) The parties met and conferred after the first set of subpoenas was issued, as follows. On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff objected that the subpoenas were overbroad, harassing, burdensome and a violation of privacy because they sought ten years of records despite Plaintiff only working at the companies for up to seven years, and only claiming loss of future earnings with respect to Pitney Bowes. (Motion, Glassman-Jones Decl., Exh. 2.) Defense counsel responded that the employment records were directly relevant because Plaintiff is claiming the accident affected her ability to earn future income and testified that she reduced her work hours. (Ibid.) Plaintiff’s counsel then informed defense counsel that Plaintiff was withdrawing her loss of earnings and loss of earnings capacity claims. (Ibid.) Despite this, defense counsel continued to assert that whether Plaintiff missed any work or received modified work duty due to the accident is relevant as to whether and to what extent she was injured. (Ibid.) Defense counsel did agree to amend the subpoenas to not include check stubs and payments. (Ibid.) Although this Motion concerns the second set of subpoenas, given the similarity in the documents sought in the first set and the attorneys’ discussion, the Court finds the meet and confer requirement is satisfied.

Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoenas on three grounds. The subpoenas: (1) are impermissibly overbroad by seeking employment records for the past ten years; (2) seek documents and information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and (3) violate Plaintiff’s right of privacy. Case law that holds “personnel records and employment history are within the scope of the protection provided by the state and federal Constitutions.” (San Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1097.) Defendant, as the party seeking constitutionally protected material, bears the burden of showing a compelling public interest in obtaining the documents and that the same information cannot be reasonably obtained through any other alternative, non-confidential means. (Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1387; Allen v Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 447, 449.)

A compelling need is demonstrated where the information is “directly relevant” and “essential to the fair resolution” of the lawsuit. (Britt v. Sup.Ct. (San Diego Unified Port Dist.) (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859.) Defendant contends that the employment records are directly relevant “to the extent and veracity of Plaintiff’s claimed injuries.” However, it relies on the broader definition of relevant evidence under the Discovery Code, specifically Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010, to support this argument. That level of relevance is not sufficient when seeking constitutionally protected information. (Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854-1855 [“when the constitutional right of privacy is involved, the party seeking discovery of private matter must do more than satisfy the section 2017 standard.”].) Defendant has not demonstrated direct relevance between the employment records and Plaintiff’s claimed injuries. Whether Plaintiff missed work around the time of the accident may create an inference regarding the extent of her injuries but does not prove the existence of extent of the injuries directly. This is demonstrated by the permissive language used in Defendant’s own opposition: “Missed work before the accident may also show that any missed work following the accident was not in fact due to alleged injuries but an alternative cause.” (Opp., p. 4:8-9.)

Nor does Defendant address the second part of “compelling need,” which is that the information sought is “essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” Instead, the opposition attempts to tie the “essential” standard to the showing of direct relevance. (Id. at p. 6:17-19.) This fails for two reasons. First, because it incorrectly conflates the two requirements into one. If all directly relevant information was essential to fairly resolving lawsuits, the courts would not speak of them in separate terms. Second, even if the requirements could be combined into a single standard of directly relevant and therefore essential information, Defendant has not demonstrated that Plaintiff’s employment records are directly relevant, as discussed above.

Finally, Defendant must demonstrate that the subpoenas for Plaintiff’s employment records are the least intrusive methods for obtaining the information sought. As Plaintiff points out, the subpoenas are overbroad in time and scope by seeking information over a ten-year period from both of Plaintiff’s employers, despite the fact that she testified only working for You Can Health Services and Pitney Bowes, Inc. for five and seven years, respectively. (Motion, Glassman-Jones Decl., Exh. 2.) Defendant’s contention that it is entitled to ten years’ worth of records to account for a mistaken timeline by Plaintiff runs contrary to the requirement that the request for the records should be narrowly tailored. (Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1855.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash the deposition subpoenas directed to You Can Health Services and Pitney Bowes, Inc. is granted.

Conclusion

Plaintiff Siri Rose Ambe’s Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas is GRANTED.

Moving party to give notice.