Judge: Mark E. Windham, Case: 23STLC07184, Date: 2024-02-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STLC07184 Hearing Date: February 29, 2024 Dept: 26
PSG California, LLC v. Mintz, et al.
DEMURRER
(CCP §§ 430.31,
et seq.)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant Law Offices of David R.
Denis’ Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.
Defendant Law Offices of David R.
Denis’ Motion to Strike the Complaint is DENIED.
DEFENDANT LAW OFFICES OF DAVID R.
DENIS IS TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN 20 DAYS OF THIS ORDER.
ANALYSIS:
On November 8, 2023, Plaintiff PSG
California, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action for interpleader against Defendants Eric Mintz
(“Defendant Mintz”), Euro Spec Motoring, Inc. (“Defendant Euro”), and Law
Offices of David R. Denis, P.C. (“Defendant LODD”). On January 25, 2024, Defendant LODD filed the instant Demurrer to
the Complaint. Plaintiff filed an opposition on February 15, 2024 and Defendant
LODD replied on February 22, 2024.
Discussion
Allegations in the Complaint
The Complaint alleges a single cause of action for interpleader.
Specifically, that Plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement on September
15, 2023 in Lujan v. PSG California, LLC, LASC Case No. 20STCV09522
(“the Lujan settlement”) pursuant to which Plaintiff was to pay Defendant LODD
a certain amount of attorney’s fees. (Id. at ¶6.) On October 17, 2023,
Defendant Mintz informed Plaintiff of a judgment against Defendant LODD in Mintz
v. Denis, LASC Case No. BC704715 (“the Mintz judgment”). (Id. at ¶7
and Exh. A.) Defendant Mintz obtained an assignment and restraining order from
the Court ordering that all attorney’s fees payable to LODD be paid in
satisfaction of the Mintz judgment. (Id. at ¶7 and Exh. B.) The judgment
plus interest currently amounts to about $21,243.54. (Id. at ¶7.)
Defendant Mintz also informed Plaintiff of a third-party claim of ownership
filed by Defendant Euro claiming a right to possession of $21,243.54 in
Defendant LODD’s checking account. (Id. at ¶8.) Plaintiff is indifferent
as to which Defendant should obtain the funds and has been unable to determine
which of Defendants’ claims is valid. (Id. at ¶11.) Although the
Complaint refers to Exhibits A, B, and C, they are not attached to the
pleading. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Errata on February 9, 2024 with the
missing exhibits.
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant LODD asks the Court to
take judicial notice of the following documents: (1) Plaintiff’s November 8,
2023 Complaint in Interpleader; (2) Letter from Defendant Eric Mintz with all
Attachments to the email, sent to PSG counsel (referred to as Exhibit A in the
Complaint); (3) May 17, 2023 Order Granting Motion for Assignment and
Restraining Order in Eric Mintz v. Law Offices of David R. Denis, P.C. et
al., Case No. BC704715 (referred to as Exhibit B in the Complaint). The
request is granted with respect to the existence of these documents but not as
to the truth of their contents, as explained by the Court of Appeals:
“Judicial notice may not be taken of any
matter unless authorized or required by law.” (Evid.Code, § 450.) Matters that
are subject to judicial notice are listed in Evidence Code sections 451 and
452. A matter ordinarily is subject to judicial notice only if the matter is reasonably
beyond dispute. (Post v. Prati (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 626, 633, 153 Cal.Rptr.
511.) Although the existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the
truth of statements contained in the document and its proper interpretation are
not subject to judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable.
(StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9, 84
Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 976 P.2d 214.) StorMedia stated: “In ruling on a demurrer, a
court may consider facts of which it has taken judicial notice. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) This includes the existence of a document. When
judicial notice is taken of a document, however, the truthfulness and proper
interpretation of the document are disputable. (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage
(1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374 [228 Cal.Rptr. 878].)” (Ibid.)
Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage, supra, 184
Cal.App.3d at page 374, 228 Cal.Rptr. 878 stated: “Taking judicial notice of a
document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a
particular interpretation of its meaning. (See Middlebrook–Anderson Co. v.
Southwest Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1038 [96 Cal.Rptr.
338].) On a demurrer a court's function is limited to testing the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. (Marina Tenants Assn. v. Deauville Marina
Development Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 122, 127 [226 Cal.Rptr. 321].) ‘A
demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of
disputed facts.’ (Ramsden v. Western Union (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 873, 879 [138
Cal.Rptr. 426].) The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested
evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice
of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable. (See
Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 605
[176 Cal.Rptr. 824].)” Joslin, supra, at page 375, 228 Cal.Rptr. 878 stated
further, “ ‘judicial notice of matters upon demurrer will be dispositive only
in those instances where there is not or cannot be a factual dispute concerning
that which is sought to be judicially noticed.’ (Cruz v. County of Los Angeles
(1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1134 [219 Cal.Rptr. 661].)”
. . .
For a court
to take judicial notice of the meaning of a document submitted by a demurring
party based on the document alone, without allowing the parties an opportunity
to present extrinsic evidence of the meaning of the document, would be
improper. A court ruling on a demurrer therefore cannot take judicial notice of
the proper interpretation of a document submitted in support of the demurrer. (StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 457, fn. 9, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 976 P.2d 214; Joslin v. H.A.S.
Ins. Brokerage, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 374, 228 Cal.Rptr. 878.) In
short, a court cannot by means of judicial notice convert a demurrer into an
incomplete evidentiary hearing in which the demurring party can present
documentary evidence and the opposing party is bound by what that evidence
appears to show.
(Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 97, 113–115 [emphasis added].)
Demurrer to Interpleader Complaint
The Court finds that the Demurrer is accompanied by a meet and confer
declaration as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. (Demurrer,
Galvan Decl., ¶¶2-3 and Exh. A.) In demurring to the Complaint,
Defendant LODD contends that the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to
state a cause of action. (Citing Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e).)
First, in order to allege an
interpleader claim, Plaintiff must allege facts showing a reasonable
probability of double vexation, or a valid threat of double vexation. (Westamerica
Bank v. City of Berkeley (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 598, 607-608.) Plaintiff
must also allege that it has no interest in the funds. Here, the Complaint alleges
both. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mintz has an assignment order
from Mintz v. Denis, LASC Case No. BC704715 with respect
to the attorney’s fees Plaintiff is obligated to pay Plaintiff in the Lujan
settlement. (Compl., ¶7.) For the reasons explained above, the Court declines
to take judicial notice of the meaning of the assignment and restraining order
as advanced by Defendant LODD. Defendant LODD argues that the assignment and
restraining order is solely with respect to funds owed to Judgment Debtor David
R. Denis in an individual capacity. Plaintiff disputes that this is the meaning
of the assignment and retraining order, which restrains “Judgment Debtor Denis
and any servant, agent, employee, or attorney for the Judgment Debtor and any
person(s) in active concert and participating with the Judgment Debtor from
encumbering, assigning, disposing, or spending attorneys' fees payable to
Judgment Debtor Denis, and all rights to payment thereunder.” (Demurrer, RJN,
Exh. 3, p. 1.) Whether the language of the assignment and restraining order
applies to Defendant LODD is not a matter for determination by demurrer.
Therefore, Defendant LODD has not shown that the judicially noticeable facts
overcome the allegation of double vexation in the Complaint. The Complaint also
alleges that Plaintiff has no interest in the funds. Therefore, the Complaint
sufficiently alleges facts in support of a claim for interpleader.
The Court notes that the Notice
of demurrer also raises special demurrers for uncertainty and plea in
abatement. (Notice, p. 3:6012.) Special demurrers, however, are not permitted
in a court of limited jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92, subd. (c).) Therefore,
the demurrer to the Complaint is overruled.
Motion to Strike
As with demurrers, a meet and
confer effort is required for motions to strike by Code of Civil Procedure
section 435.5. “[T]he moving party shall meet and confer in person or by
telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion
to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that
resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) The Motion to Strike is also accompanied by a meet
and confer declaration. (Motion, Galvan Decl., ¶¶2-3 and Exh A.)
(a)
Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.
(b)
Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity
with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.
(Code Civ. Proc., §
436.) In the limited jurisdiction court, however, motions to strike may
only challenge pleadings on the basis that “the damages or relief sought are
not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 92,
subd. (d).) Motions to strike brought on the grounds that the pleadings are
false, irrelevant or otherwise improper will not be ruled upon by the Court.
Nor does a motion to strike lie for failure to allege facts sufficient to state
a cause of action; that is a ground for general demurrer. (Pierson v. Sharp
Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342.)
Although framed as if attacking irrelevant, improper, and
false allegations, the Motion to Strike is substantively brought on the same
grounds as the demurrer: that there is no dispute between Defendants regarding
the attorney’s fees owed by Plaintiff to Defendant LODD in the Lujan
settlement such that interpleader is not proper. (Motion, pp. 5:7-8:26.) For
the reasons discussed above, the interpleader claim is sufficiently alleged.
The Motion to Strike is denied.
Conclusion
Defendant Law Offices of David R.
Denis’ Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.
Defendant Law Offices of David R.
Denis’ Motion to Strike the Complaint is DENIED.
DEFENDANT LAW OFFICES OF DAVID R.
DENIS IS TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN 20 DAYS OF THIS ORDER.
Court clerk to give notice.