Judge Mark E. Windham, Case Number: 24STLC03676, Date: 2024-09-25 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mark E. Windham, Case: 24STLC03676, Date: 2024-09-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STLC03676 Hearing Date: September 25, 2024 Dept: 26

State Farm v. Richardson, et al.

DEMURRER

(CCP § 430.10, et seq.)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Cross-Defendant Janae Nelson’s Demurrer to the Cross-Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AS TO THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION, AND SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND AS TO THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION.

ANALYSIS:

On May 22, 2024, Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) filed the Complaint in this action against Defendant Jayelan Richardson (“Cross-Complainant Richardson”). On June 26, 2024, Cross-Complainant Richardson filed an answer to the Complaint, and with Aspire General Insurance Company (“Cross-Complainant Aspire), filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendant Janae Nelson (“Cross-Defendant”).

Cross-Defendant filed the instant Demurrer to the Cross-Complaint on September 3, 2024. Cross-Complainants filed an opposition on September 11, 2024.

Discussion

Allegations in the Pleadings

The Complaint alleges that Cross-Complainant Richardson negligently caused Plaintiff’s insured, Janae Nelson (“Cross-Defendant”), and the driver and/or passengers in the vehicle, to incur damages in a motor vehicle accident. (Compl., ¶¶10-13.) Plaintiff allegedly paid Cross-Defendant damages in the amount of $25,473.14 and now seeks subrogation of those damages from Cross-Complainant Richardson. (Id. at ¶¶7-9.)

In the Cross-Complaint, Cross-Complainants bring causes of action for (1) declaratory relief and comparative indemnity; (2) apportionment of fault; and (3) subrogation. The Cross-Complaint confusingly refers only to “Cross-Complainant” without specifying whether it is referring to Cross-Complainant Richardson or Cross-Complainant Aspire. Only the third cause of action for subrogation is brought by “Cross-Complainants.” The allegations are as follows. If Cross-Complainant is held liable, then Cross-Defendant was negligent or liable in some manner for the damages alleged by Plaintiff. (Cross-Compl., ¶6.) Specifically, that on November 14, 2023 at 235 West 60th Street, Los Angeles, California, Cross-Defendant “negligently owned, entrusted, maintained, operated and controlled their motor vehicle in such a fashion that they proximately caused a collision with Cross-Complainant’s vehicle.” (Id. at ¶¶8, 18.) Cross-Complainant has not been negligent and is not liable for Plaintiff’s alleged damages. (Id. at ¶10.) However, if Cross-Complainant is held liable, then Cross-Defendant was contributorily negligent in causing any damages alleged by Plaintiff and Cross-Complainant is entitled to be indemnified by Cross-Defendant for the full amount of any judgment entered against Cross-Complainant, reduced to the extent Plaintiff’s damages are attributable to any negligence or liability of Cross-Complainant. (Ibid.) Cross-Complainant Aspire seeks subrogation of damages it paid to Cross-Complainant Richardson due to the accident in the amount of $5,978.00. (Id. at ¶¶15-20.)

Demurrer

The Demurrer is accompanied by a meet and confer declaration as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. (Demurrer, Shapiro Decl., ¶¶6-8 and Exh. D.) Cross-Defendant demurs to the Cross-Complaint for failure to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Citing Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

The Demurrer is brought on the grounds that the causes of action are comprised almost entirely of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law, and fail to actually identify the tortious conduct by which Cross-Defendant contributed to Cross-Complainants’ harm. The first cause of action does not include any facts that support the elements for declaratory relief or comparative indemnity. It simply alleges that “each Cross Defendant was negligent or liable in some manner for the damages alleged by Plaintiff.” (Cross-Compl., ¶6.) The second and third causes of action also simply makes the generic allegation that Cross-Defendant “negligently owned, entrusted, maintained, operated and controlled their motor vehicle” such that they caused a collision with Cross-Complainants’ vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶8, 18.) These conclusory statements of negligence by Cross-Defendant are not sufficient to allege facts in support of the causes of action in the Cross-Complaint. In fact, Cross-Complainants’ opposition does not cite to any line, paragraph, or other portion of the Cross-Complaint wherein facts are alleged that sufficiently state the aforementioned causes of action, or any cause of action.

Cross-Defendant also argues that these causes of action are unnecessary and duplicative because they seek relief that is already sought in Cross-Complainant Richardson’s Answer to the Complaint. In support, the Demurrer cites Jaffe v. Huxley Architecture (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1188, which considered whether “the parties responsible for the construction defects [may] seek equitable indemnification from individual members of the association’s board of directors based on the board’s acts and omissions which contributed to the damage caused by the original defects.” (Jaffe v. Huxley Architecture (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1188, 1190.) The Court of Appeals held that the cross-complainants could not seek such equitable indemnification because of the nature of the relationship between the parties. (Ibid.) Specifically, because the individual members of the association were the representatives of the association, the parties responsible for the construction defects could not go after the individual members of the association on a theory of indemnity after having already settled with the association. (Id. at 1192.)

The relationship between the parties here also makes the cross-claim for indemnity improper.

Quite simply, equitable indemnification is a matter of fairness. “ ‘(I)n the great majority of cases ... equity and fairness call for an apportionment of loss between the wrongdoers in proportion to their relative culpability, rather than imposition of the entire loss upon one or the other tortfeasor.’ ” (Tech–Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward–Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 495, 213 Cal.Rptr. 256, 698 P.2d 159.) There seems no logical reason why the application of this doctrine should turn on the relationship of the tortfeasors to each other. What is important is the relationship of the tortfeasors to the plaintiff and the interrelated nature of the harm done. (See Cahill Bros., Inc. v. Clementina Co. (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 367, 376, 25 Cal.Rptr. 301.) It would be unfair to require one tortfeasor to bear a loss disproportionate to his relative culpability simply because a tortfeasor who contributed to the loss owed a duty to the plaintiff but not to the defendant.

(Id. at 1191-1192.) As Cross-Defendant points out, the apportionment of loss sought by Cross-Complainants via the first and second causes of action have already been sought in their Answer to the Complaint in the fourth through seven affirmative defenses. (See Answer, ¶¶5-8.)

Based on the foregoing, the Demurrer to the Cross-Complaint is sustained. Cross-Complainants seek leave to amend in the event the Demurrer is sustained. Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.) As discussed above, the relief sought in the first and second causes of action has already been accounted for in Cross-Complainant Richardson’s Answer to the Complaint. Leave to amend those causes of action is denied. However, Cross-Complainants are permitted to amend the third cause of action for subrogation.

Conclusion

Moving party to give notice.