Judge: Mark E. Windham, Case: LAM06CW1846, Date: 2023-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: LAM06CW1846    Hearing Date: February 15, 2023    Dept: 26

Miller v. Ortiz, et al.

MOTION VACATE RENEWAL OF JUDGMENT

(CCP § 683.130 et seq.)

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendant Noel Ortiz’s Motion to Vacate Renewal of Judgment is GRANTED. THE RENEWAL OF JUDGMENT ENTERED ON NOVEMBER 21, 2022 IS HEREBY VACATED.

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

Plaintiff Richard Miller (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against Defendant Noel Ortiz (“Defendant”) on July 14, 1999. Following Defendant’s failure to file a responsive pleading, default judgment was entered on December 5, 2000. The judgment was renewed on July 20, 2006, November 9, 2014 and November 21, 2022. Notice of the latest renewal of judgment was served on Defendant on November 28, 2022. (Proof of Service by Mail, 12/12/22.) Defendant filed the instant Motion to Vacate Renewal of Judgment on December 28, 2022. Plaintiff filed an opposition on January 31, 2023 and Defendant replied on February 8, 2023.

 

Legal Standard

 

A renewal of judgment can be vacated pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 683.170, which states in relevant part:

 

(a)   The renewal of a judgment pursuant to this article may be vacated on any ground that would be a defense to an action on the judgment, including the ground that the amount of the renewed judgment as entered pursuant to this article is incorrect, and shall be vacated if the application for renewal was filed within five years from the time the judgment was previously renewed under this article.

 

(b)   Not later than 30 days after service of the notice of renewal pursuant to Section 683.160, the judgment debtor may apply by noticed motion under this section for an order of the court vacating the renewal of the judgment. The notice of motion shall be served on the judgment creditor. Service shall be made personally or by mail.

 

(c)   Upon the hearing of the motion, the renewal may be ordered vacated upon any ground provided in subdivision (a), and another and different renewal may be entered, including, but not limited to, the renewal of the judgment in a different amount if the decision of the court is that the judgment creditor is entitled to renewal in a different amount.

 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 683.170 (emphasis added).)

 

Evidentiary Objections

 

Defendant’s evidentiary objections to the declaration of Richard Miller in support of the opposition are overruled.

 

Discussion

 

Defendant moves to vacate the renewal of judgment on the grounds that the judgment is void on its face and that she was never served with the Summons and Complaint in this action. That the judgment is void on its face is a ground that would be a defense to the action on the judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d); Traclonan v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal. App. 4th 175, 181.) Defendant presents evidence that the Proof of Personal Service of the Summons and Complaint on which the clerk’s office relied to enter default was not on the mandatory Judicial Council Form. The Mandatory Judicial Council Proof of Service of Summons specifically states that it was adopted for use in connection with Code of Civil Procedure section 417.10, subdivision (f), which mandates the use of the approved form. (Code Civ. Proc., § 417.10, subd. (f); Motion, Bunnett Decl., Exh. 16.) Instead, Plaintiff submitted a Proof of Service document pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1011, subdivision (a). (Id. at Exh. 1.) Cal. Government Code section 68511 expressly states that “When any such form has been so prescribed by the Judicial Council, no court may use a different form which has as its aim the same function as that for which the Judicial Council’s prescribed form is designed.” (Govt. Code, § 68511.) The clerk’s entry of default despite Plaintiff’s use of the incorrect proof of service form, therefore, was improper. Default, nor default judgment, should not have been entered without Plaintiff filing proof of service of the Summons and Complaint on the mandatory Judicial Council Proof of Service of Summons form. Defendant, therefore, has demonstrated that the entry of default and default judgment were void on their face. In opposition, Plaintiff does not address the fact that the incorrect form was used to demonstrate proof of service of the Summons and Complaint.

 

Defendant alternatively argues that the default judgment is void because she was never served with the Summons and Complaint.  “[T]he undisputed failure to have served the summons and complaint also provides a basis for a motion to vacate a renewed judgment.” (Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 202.) The Motion is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 683.170 on the grounds that the default judgment should be vacated pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which states that “[t]he court may, .... on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) “California is a jurisdiction where the original service of process, which confers jurisdiction, must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void.” (Honda Motor Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048.) Nor is there is any time limit on when a void judgment can be challenged. (Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pyle (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 513, 526 [citing Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 830; Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d)].)

 

Where service of the Summons is challenged, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the facts requisite to an effective service. “When a defendant challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process ‘the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.’” (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413; see also Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160.) However, a proof of service containing a declaration from a registered process server invokes a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated in the return. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 647; see American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390.)

 

The proof of personal service of the Summons and Complaint on the incorrect document, was filed by Plaintiff on December 5, 2000. (Motion, Bunnett Decl., Exh. 1, p.3.) It does not include the necessary information about the person serving the documents, namely, whether they are a registered process server. (Id. at p. 2, ¶5; p. 3.) The proof of service of the Summons and Complaint, therefore, does not invoke a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated therein. The burden falls to Plaintiff to demonstrate that service of the Summons and Complaint was accomplished as stated in the proof of service and that said service conformed to the statutory requirements.

 

Plaintiff’s opposition argues that the service address indicated by the proof of personal service—1227 S. El Camino Real #136, 9 Oceanside, CA 92054—was the address at which Defendant lived at the time of service on July 25, 2000. In support of this contention, Plaintiff presents evidence that they sent billing invoices to Defendant at the service address from late 1999 to 2021, and that payments were received on those invoices during that time. (Opp., Miller Decl., Exh. 3.) There was a specific payment dated July 6, 2000, which was the last payment Plaintiff received from Defendant. (Id. at Exh. 3, p. 27.) Plaintiff also points to a California Department of Motor Vehicle Driver Identification Report that indicates Defendant lived at the service address as of September 15, 1999. (Id. at Exh. 4.) The DMV Report is not relevant to where Defendant was living nine months after September 1999. Therefore, only the invoices suggests that Defendant lived at the service address in July 2000.

 

In the Motion, Defendant declares that she lived at the service address from approximately February 1999 to February 2000. (Motion, Hahn Decl., ¶6.) After that, Defendant declares that she moved to 7924 Friends Avenue, Whittier, California. (Ibid.) In support of this Defendant produces a copy of a tuition statement dated June 30, 2000, from St. Mary of the Assumption School, where her children attended school. (Id. at Exh. 8.) Plaintiff’s opposition does not dispute this invoice other than to point to the billing invoices and DMV Report. Defendant also points out that the billing invoices do not demonstrate her residence as of July 2000 because payments made by Defendant’s former spouse, pursuant to the family law judgment, were also applied to the attorney’s fees Plaintiff billed. (Id. at Exh. 7, p. 16:8-14.) The billing invoice does not indicate from where the July 6, 2000 payment came.

 

Therefore, Plaintiff has not carried their burden of proof demonstrating that the judgment is not void on its face or that Defendant was served with the Summons and Complaint as stated in the proof of personal service.

 

Conclusion

 

Defendant Noel Ortiz’s Motion to Vacate Renewal of Judgment is GRANTED. THE RENEWAL OF JUDGMENT ENTERED ON NOVEMBER 21, 2022 IS HEREBY VACATED.

 

 

Moving party to give notice.