Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: 19SMCV01008, Date: 2023-09-07 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19SMCV01008 Hearing Date: April 19, 2024 Dept: I
The court is setting forth some of its thoughts from
yesterday’s hearing for the parties’ benefit.
Yesterday, the court held a 402 hearing as to plaintiff’s expert Jon
Albert. He is opining as to two
methodologies to calculate the damages to which plaintiff believes he is
entitled. Albert described his work
roughly as follows (this is more a thumbnail than a detailed recitation of the
testimony). He is like a broker in a
way. Usually an advertiser will approach
him with an idea to use talent in an ad campaign. Albert will find out the scope of what the
advertiser seeks and will then contact the talent’s agent or manager. If there is interest by the talent, then
Albert will work to conclude the contract by which the talent will participate
in the ad. Albert testified that his
work has been extensive over a long period of time, and the list of talent
which whom Albert interacts is quite extensive and impressive. However, in almost all cases, the talent is a
celebrity of greater or lesser stature.
What the court understands that to mean is that the talent is recognizable
either by the public as a whole or at least by niche segments of the
public. For example, Albert might work
with the world champion Frisbee thrower for dogs (that was an example he gave
during testimony). Probably fair to say
that such a person is not a household name, but perhaps among super-dedicated
dog/Frisbee throwers, that person is known.
Sometimes the name will not be known, but the job title will be
known. Albert has worked with models,
but the court’s sense is that generally those models are more super-models than
regular models. Albert has worked with
models similar to plaintiff here, but the court believes that he testified it
was rare and generally done only as a favor to an advertiser who is a major
client. That is important because one of
the major aspects of what Albert does is deal with what are in essence
celebrity endorsements—tacit or explicit.
In other words, it is the celebrity herself or himself and the notoriety
surrounding the celebrity that is being bought, not just a picture of someone
that is not recognized. An extreme
example might be Tom Selleck selling reverse mortgages to seniors or Beyonce
selling Verizon’s services. It is the
celebrity’s notoriety or expertise that sells the product, not just a more
generic picture.
One criticism defendant has raised is that Albert’s work is
not really with people like plaintiff.
Without meaning any disrespect, the court has no evidence that Jaeschke
has achieved celebrity status (or had at the relevant time) such that he was
known by name or likeness as a particular individual. Rather, he was a model—a good one and
relatively higher end, but a model nonetheless and not a celebrity. That leads to some disconnect between
Albert’s actual practice and the case at hand.
Albert testified that the amount of money that a licensor
would demand in a contract would depend on the scope and duration. Scope is the type of product and the general
places where the ad will be placed—narrow, broad, limited, product, and other
parameters. Duration is obvious—how long
will the advertiser be allowed to use the image. The broader the scope and the longer the
duration, generally speaking the larger the fee. Albert opined that if the contract is
breached and the image is used for wider scope or longer duration, then the
amount of the contract does not reflect the actual usage or agreement. That much seems plain to the court.
What the court needs to know specifically from plaintiff is
what the precise methodology is that Albert used in “Albert I” and “Albert
II.” The court did not hear any
methodology with any specific heft to it.
Rather, Albert seemed to opine that he would just know what a licensor
would demand to agree to a contract so broad that it was essentially
career-ending. The court is far from
convinced that Jaeschke’s career is over, but even beyond that, the court is at
a loss to know what objective factors Albert used to arrive at the number to be
used. If the theory is nothing more than
the broader the scope and duration the bigger the fee, that is one thing, but
not particularly helpful to a jury. If
it is that a career-ending contract would command a much larger fee, there is a
problem as to whether this was career-ending, but beyond that, it seems right
but not particularly helpful. If it is
different from that (and the court believes it is), plaintiff needs to
articulate exactly what the methodology is to which Albert will opine. The court is also troubled that Albert
testified that it was highly improbably that the Albert II methodology would
actually be used by anyone.
There are other issues, but the court will not go into them
in this piece. One last item. Although not relevant to the 402 hearing, the
court found Albert to be quite candid in his testimony—indeed, refreshingly
so. Of course, credibility and candor is
for the jury, not the court, which is why it is not relevant to the 402
hearing. But the court did want to note
that this was the court’s takeaway.