Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: 20SMCV00216, Date: 2023-11-13 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20SMCV00216 Hearing Date: April 12, 2024 Dept: I
This is a motion to compel further responses and
production. The matter is CONTINUED to
allow defendant to file the opposition that was apparently served on the moving
party. The court believes there is such
an opposition because there is a reply to it, and the reply refers to the
opposition papers. However, they were
not filed in court so the court has not reviewed them. Given that there has been a change in
counsel, the court believes that the better approach is to allow the opposition
to be filed—but ONLY the opposition as it was served and without amendment or
change—and then to reconvene the hearing.
A few preliminary thoughts.
First, while the court views it as a sharp-ish practice, defense
counsel’s suggestion that the objections would be withdrawn or not relied upon
and that actual responses would be given, only to have the privilege moved to
the response without any actual substance, is not sanctionable or per se
improper under the particular circumstances here, although, as stated, it was a
sharp practice. The more forthright
approach would have been for the defense to acknowledge that the invocation of
the right was going to be moved, not to suggest that it would provide
substantive and informative responses.
The court agrees that the right against self-incrimination is not a
proper objection; it is a potentially proper response. In other words, the request is not
“objectionable” by virtue of the privilege, to the contrary the request is
entirely proper. If the right attaches,
it should be raised not in an objection signed by counsel but rather in the
verified response, as it eventually was.
Thus, the court is not happy about the ploy, but the court will not
impose sanctions for it.
More problematic for the defense, though, is that enough
information must be given so as to establish that the privilege is properly
invoked. At least in a case like
this—where there is no active criminal investigation—it is not enough just to
say one invokes the right against self-incrimination. There has to be at least some logical showing
that the response would, in fact, potentially be incriminating. The hurdle is not an especially high one, but
it is not immaterial. There was no
attempt to make any such showing here unless it was in the opposition
papers. And to be clear, the privilege
is testimonial only. Document production
is not of necessity subject to the right against self-incrimination because the
documents themselves are not subject to the privilege; but the actual responses
might be. That is because the
responses—which are testimonial—could give rise to a problem, such as an
admission that records were destroyed or even an admission (express or implied)
that the documents being produced are authentic. But it is up to Rechnitz to provide some kind
of link to what the responses would be (not the underlying documents) and the
right against self-incrimination. That
could be in the form of a log or some other form, but there must be something
other than a blanket and unsupported statement.
To illustrate the point, a check is not itself testimonial. It is not privileged and it is not immune
from discovery. But a discovery response
in which the defendant must admit that the check is responsive to a particular
request might be testimonial in nature and thus subject to the right. There are some cases where the issue is
self-evident. Were this a criminal
proceeding, Rechnitz would need to do no more (or very little more) than assert
the right to invoke it. And similarly,
were there an active criminal investigation into the matters at issue in the
discovery, it could be that it is intuitively obvious that the verified
responses could be incriminating. That
is not the case here, however, The criminal
investigation is over—Rechnitz was convicted.
To the court’s knowledge, there are no ongoing criminal investigations
anywhere. Of course, an active criminal
investigation is not a prerequisite to invoking the right. Even if a defendant were not under
investigation if a discovery request called for a response that essentially
admitted guilt to a crime, the right against self-incrimination could be
invoked. But it would be inherent on the
person invoking the right to explain the link between the response and
potential self-incrimination.
Thus, the court agrees with plaintiff that Rechnitz cannot
simply assert the privilege and refuse to participate without more. But if Rechnitz can establish that responding
to the discovery could be testimonial self-incrimination, then the right would
attach. That is easier to do with a
lawyer, but given that Rechnitz no longer has one, he will have to do so
without. The court will need to see the
opposition to see whether Rechnitz (who the court believes had a lawyer when
the opposition was filed) has met his burden.
The court well understands that this could (depending on
whether Rechnitz can establish the privilege) hamper the plaintiff. But plaintiff is not without tools. Plaintiff can subpoena financial institutions
and other organizations for underlying documents, and the court would be
reluctant to limit such discovery given the potential invocation of the right
against self-incrimination. That is
cumbersome, but might be necessary; the right itself, once established, is
well-nigh inviolable.
The court will see the opposition and set a new hearing date
and go from there.
The standing objection is OVERRULED.