Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: 20STCV16954, Date: 2022-12-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV16954 Hearing Date: December 16, 2022 Dept: R
At a minimum, the trial conflict seems like it is
enough. The court moved the trial date sua
sponte. Had the court set the trial
date at a hearing, the court could hold counsel to it—object when the trial is
set, not shortly before trial. But here,
it was done recently and it was done without consultation with counsel.
But moving the trial is not the same as extending the cut
off or moving the MSJ. As to that, the
court is aware of Amazon’s argument that this information goes to people who
contacted Amazon with concerns after plaintiff’s injury. If that is the case, the court cannot see how
it is relevant to anything currently before the court. They cannot provide evidence that Amazon was
aware of anything at the time plaintiff purchased the wand, and it is not
appropriate to impose punitive damages based on conduct that post-dates the
tort. On the other hand, if that is not
correct and these people did make complaints before plaintiff bought the wand,
the court might need to consider the question.
It could in theory go to ratification, but that may be hard.
In addition, even if the witnesses post-dated the purchase,
their information might still be pertinent to the claim against Onyx. There, it is partially knowledge, but the
issue might also go to the cause of the problem—was it a design problem,
for example. Same regarding
ratification.
All of that said, the court notes that plaintiff opposed a
lengthy continuance last Spring saying that it was ready to go to trial on the
earlier date. Now, however, plaintiff
needs to conduct more discovery. The
court will inquire as to that apparent inconsistency.
Overall, given that the court has to continue the trial
anyway (most likely), the court is more likely to move the MSJ dates as
well. (The court is not convinced they
have to be heard at the same time, but the court is not convinced that they
don’t.) Whether the MSJ will be
continued to allow for additional discovery is an issue that will be decided at
the MSJ hearing. The court is not at
present convinced that such will be required, but the court has not come to a
firm conclusion.
On the broader discovery issue, the court’s view would be
that at most the cut-off should be continued for discovery already “on
the table,” meaning discovery that has already been propounded. That would include the PMK deposition. Of course, the discovery window has not fully
closed; expert discovery can still go forward assuming that the exchanges were
made, and there is still a smidge of room for written discovery. There is also some room for depositions. But what the court does not want to do is to
continue the case for some period and have one side or the other view it as
open season to propound a broadside of new discovery.
The court is sorry that Onyx is of the view that the court
has been too lax with plaintiff. The
court sees it differently. The court
believes that until now the dispositive motions have been pleading
motions. Defendants can still bring the
motions, but they must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true. The court was willing to assume the truth of
the allegations for pleading purposes—as it must. As to discovery, the court was inclined to
allow plaintiff to conduct discovery to adduce the evidence needed to make the
case. On summary judgment, if plaintiff
has no evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact, then plaintiff
will lose the motion. If plaintiff does
have that evidence, then the question is for the jury. That is just how the rules work. (Whether this is really like the Grimshaw
case remains to be seen. The court drew
the analogy not to say that Onyx or Amazon were in Ford’s position there, but
rather to illustrate the difference from a legal perspective between a freak
one-time accident and a defect about which the defendant becomes aware and does
nothing. Which one this is will be
tested precisely by discovery.