Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: 21SMCV01794, Date: 2025-04-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21SMCV01794 Hearing Date: April 21, 2025 Dept: I
The fee motion is DENIED.
To understand why the plaintiff in a successful action cannot seek fees
under a contract with a prevailing party fee recovery clause still loses, one
must step back.
This case stems from a lease. Plaintiff owns certain property located at
(guess where) 7627 Sunset Boulevard.
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a lease by which defendant agreed
to lease the premises. As part of that
lease, plaintiff retained control over the exterior of the “northwest
wall.” Defendant could not obstruct the
view of that wall or otherwise interfere with plaintiff’s use of it in any
way. But oops. Plaintiff, who wrote the lease, meant to say
“southwest” wall. That is
significant. The premises are on the
north side of Sunset. The southwest wall
presents a large area that faces the street and can be readily seen by
motorists. It is great for advertising. Defendant suggested that it was relying on
using that wall to advertise its business.
It was perfectly happy to let the landlord use the northwest wall, which
could not be seen by anyone other than a stray pedestrian. That mistake became apparent pretty quickly
after the contract was signed. Plaintiff
had a contract with a third party that pre-existed the lease to use the wall
for advertising. Defendant, however,
wanted to use the wall for its own purposes, although the business was not yet
up and running. That led plaintiff to
seek a TRO and preliminary injunction to stop defendant from painting over the
advertising on the southwest wall. The
court granted the TRO and later the preliminary injunction, but largely on
status quo and balance of hardships grounds.
Before the dispute, the landlord had exclusive use of the wall and was
in fact using it. If the landlord had to
stop using it, the landlord would be in breach of contract. The tenant, on the other hand, was not yet
open and did not have any specific critically important use of the wall. The court recognized that the landlord had a
steep hill to climb on the merits, for the theory had to be unilateral
mistake—and it was the landlord’s mistake and the landlord wrote the offending
language. But the court was also aware
that the tenant knew which wall was which, and the tenant also likely knew that
this was a mistake because it would make no sense at all for the landlord to
retain control of the northwest facing wall—something the tenant knew from the
pre-lease inspection. So the court
allowed the PI to issue, but there were storm clouds on the horizon for
plaintiff as to the ultimate merits.
However, as it turns out, the PI was the case. The tenant abandoned the property and
abandoned the case. That led the
plaintiff to obtain a default and later a default judgment. While the court believes that both were
appropriate here, the fees are a bridge too far.
First, it just seems wrong that the landlord, who is the
cause of the mistaken term’s insertion into the contract, can recover fees for
its own error. To the extent that the
court has any discretion or any equitable powers at all in this case, the court
will not exercise them to reward the party that caused the problem in the first
place. Second, plaintiff only prevailed
because it was allowed—preliminarily—to rewrite the contract. And if plaintiff ever recovered at trial, it
would be for the same reason. Even on
default, the theory is that the contract contained an error. And the evidence is pretty plain that had the
contract been written properly, the defendant never would have signed it. The court believes that if the plaintiff is
going to rely on the theory that the contract was in material error, it cannot
then also rely on a fee clause to which the parties never would have agreed had
the contract been enforced according to its terms. One takes the contract as is, or one does
not. Plaintiff will not take the
contract as it is—that is its whole theory of the case and for the TRO and
PI. Accordingly, the court will not
allow it to add insult to injury and enforce the parts it likes while rewriting
the parts it does not.
The court stands by its TRO and PI decisions, and the
court’s hands were tied as to the default and default judgment. But the court will go no further. The motion is DENIED.