Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: 22SMCV01207, Date: 2024-02-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV01207 Hearing Date: March 21, 2024 Dept: I
The motion to strike is DENIED.
First, the court would like to discuss the relationship
between the moving party and Orange Team.
For a while, the court thought that this was essentially moot given the
Orange Team motion in that Orange Team was “dba” Green Planet. But upon a more careful reading, there is
both the dba Green Planet (which is not itself a jural entity but rather is
Orange Team) and a corporate entity Green Planet. What is does plaintiff assert is the role of
each? What does Green Planet (the
entity) say?
Assuming, though, that this motion remains live, the court
agrees (somewhat reluctantly) with Green Planet that the amended complaint had
the effect of vacating the default, and thus the answer is proper. A party in default cannot answer; rather,
what it can do is to move to vacate the default and, if the motion is granted,
then answer. (Forbes v. Cameron
Petroleums, Inc. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 257.)
However, the amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. As such, a default of one is not a default on
the other. The named defendants must be
served again and they have a right to answer once served. (Ostling v. Loring (1994) 27
Cal.App.4th 1731.) But there is an
exception to that rule. Where the
amended complaint makes no substantive change with regard to the defaulted
defendant, then the default remains. The
test to determine whether an amendment is one of form or substance is sometimes
a hard question. But it is substantive
and material when it changes the damages sought or adds or changes a cause of
action based on a different factual or legal theory. The focus is on whether the change gives rise
to a different amount of damages or form of liability, or indicates a different
defense or other ground for avoiding liability.
(Paterra v. Hansen (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 507.)
Green Planet contends that the amended complaint is
substantive because it changed the nature of Green Planet’s purported
liability. More specifically, Green
Planet asserts that in the original complaint, it was sued directly for not
remediating the mold problem (see Complaint, ¶¶23-24), but in the amended
complaint it was sued for not issuing (or at least recommending) a change order
to do so inasmuch as it appears that under the theory in the amended complaint
Green Planet was not hired to remediate mold, only water damages (see FAC,
¶¶31-35). Plaintiffs, on the other hand,
contend that the change is technical only as to Green Planet. The real thrust of the amendment, they assert,
is the addition of punitive damages alleged against other defendants. Thus, while plaintiffs agree that the amended
complaint made substantive changes as to some parties, they argue that there
were no substantive changes as to Green Planet and therefore the default
remains.
Green Planet also asserts that it was never served with the
amended complaint, or at least not served properly. Plaintiffs challenge that. Green Planet notes that its prior counsel,
Horn, withdrew from the case on November 11, 2022, and there is no proper
service reflecting the amended complaint.
Plaintiffs note that the amended complaint was served on Horn on
November 4, 2022—a week before he withdrew.
One problem, though, is that Horn’s participation is odd on this
record. Horn never appeared for Green
Planet—not ever. He may well have
written to plaintiffs, but there is nothing in the court’s file that shows Horn
filed any document or appeared at any hearing.
Given that, the court is unsure whether service on Horn is good service
(even if service was made before plaintiffs were told that Horn was no longer
counsel). As a general rule, had Horn
appeared, the court would view service on Horn as sufficient service (and in
that way the court disagrees with Green Planet’s apparent argument that amended
complaints must always be served like original complaints). On the other hand, if Green Planet had never
appeared in the case, then the court is not sure that service on Horn is
valid—at least unless there is some writing plaintiffs have that says to the
contrary. In any case, the court
believes that the motion turns on the question of substance, not service.
The substance question is a close one. Mold is mentioned throughout both the
original and amended complaints, and it is mentioned with regard to Green
Planet as well. But the court believes
that the balance tips in Green Planet’s favor on the question. Green Planet’s duty under the original
complaint was to remediate the mold. Its
duty under the amended complaint was to point out the issue and ask for
permission to remediate the mold. Those
are two different things. If Green
Planet was hired to remediate the mold, then it has no defense for failing to
do so (if it failed to do so). Of
course, there remains the question to whom the duty was owed, but a contractual
duty would exist somewhere. On the other
hand, if mold remediation is outside the contract’s scope of work, then Green
Planet had no direct contractual duty to remediate at all. It might or might not have some duty to ask
for an amendment to the contract or to point out the issue, but that is a
different duty. That seems to fit within
the test for substance. The court also
notes that California has a strong public policy favoring resolution on the
merits.
All of that said, though, the court will not allow this to
become an excuse to continue the trial.
Green Planet has answered and it has therefore been able—one presumes—to
participate in the case. Accordingly,
the trial dates remain, the discovery cut offs remain, and the FSC (and the
related filings) remain all as set forth in the court’s March 13, 2024
order. If Green Planet has a different
intent, it should say so now as it may effect certain equities.