Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: 22SMCV02373, Date: 2024-04-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMCV02373    Hearing Date: April 29, 2024    Dept: I

This is a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  The motion is DENIED.

Before addressing the merits, the court notes that plaintiff’s opposition was slightly late.  Defendant, as a professional courtesy, nonetheless filed a timely reply and does not press that issue.  The court appreciates the courtesy, although the court assumed as much without the need for the declaration to that effect.

Essentially, this is a case brought by a plaintiff asserting molestation by an employee at an LAUSD school.  The statute of limitations had run long ago but the Legislature passed a law essentially reviving the statute as it would apply in this case.  All parties agree (or seem to agree) that if the statute is good law, the case is timely brought.  An earlier demurrer was overruled.  It was brought on the theory that the retroactive extension of the statute of limitations constituted an unconstitutional gift of funds.  The theory here is different.

Defendant makes two arguments.  The second, and easier, is that the complaint lacks sufficient detail.  The court disagrees.  The court has read the complaint and believes that there are sufficient facts alleged, in particular paragraph 28 of the complaint. 

The other issue is harder.  Defendant contends that once a statute of limitations has expired as to a cause of action created by statute, an act by the Legislature extending the statute is a denial of due process and thus unconstitutional.  The case upon which defendant relies is Chambers v. Gallagher (1918) 177 Cal. 704.  That case—decided more than a century ago by a three justice panel of the Supreme Court (one of whom was pro tem)—has never been expressly overruled.  In that case, like this one, the Legislature extended a statute of limitations.  The defendant there challenged the lawsuit on the ground that he had been denied of due process because his right to be free of litigation had vested when the statute ran.  (The case involved the alleged non-payment of certain estate taxes by the executor.  A statute allowed suit to be brought against the executor, but, not surprisingly, there was a statute of limitations that applied.)  The state argued to the contrary, relying on a United States Supreme Court decision, Campbell v. Holt (1885) 115 U.S. 620, which expressly held that the federal due process clause did not bar a legislative body from extending a statute of limitations even after it had expired.  Our Supreme Court, in contrast, relied on a well known treatise at the time and decisions in other states and concluded that once the statute ran, the right not to be sued was vested and could not be revived consistent with California due process.    Although defendant concedes that Chambers’ broad holding—which on its face would apply to all causes of action—no longer fully applies, defendant contends that Chambers remains good law as to causes of action created by statute as opposed to common law torts.  (The statute at issue in Chambers was one created by statute.)  Plaintiff argues that Chambers is no longer good law at all, and cites to decisions by the Court of Appeal that, although distinguishable in some ways, are logically incompatible with Chambers.  Defendant points out, rightly, that the Court of Appeal cannot overrule the Supreme Court.  This court must agree with that, even when the Supreme Court decision was only by a panel of the Court (which, at that time, sat in bank only for the more important cases).  But the court believes nonetheless that Chambers is no longer good law.

The court looks to two cases for its conclusion that it is not bound by Chambers.  The first is People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737, abrogated on other bases by Stogner v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607.  In Frazer, the issue was Penal Code section 803(g).  That statute extended the statute of limitations for certain sex offenses to one year after the victim reported the offense.  That had the effect of reviving some causes of action that were otherwise barred by the statute of limitations.  The Frazer Court adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson 304.  In Chase, the High Court, citing to Campbell, found no constitutional infirmity in such an extension in the securities law field.  The Frazer Court, citing to Chase, noted that there was no constitutionally protected interest that vests once the statute of limitations has run, at least as a facial matter.  By relying in Chase, which relied on Campbell, the Frazer Court signaled that Chambers was no longer good law or authority.  True, Frazer was looking mostly at the ex post facto issue.  The court noted that the ex post facto clause did not bar the extension because ex post facto is a doctrine that makes unlawful that which was lawful when done (or increases the punishment for the wrongful act).  In Frazer, the act at issue was unlawful when done; the running of the statute of limitations did not make the prior act lawful or increase the penalty.  But after finding no ex post facto ban, the Court turned to due process considerations.  The Supreme Court rejected the notion that there was a federal due process problem by reviving a statute of limitations—even in a criminal case—for a crime where the statute had already expired.  Indeed, the notion of “repose” was expressly rejected.  (Id., at p. 766.)  That said, it is true that the Court’s opinion in this regard was decided as to federal due process law.  California due process law was relegated to a footnote.  In that footnote, the court noted that the defendant, relying on Chambers, argued that state due process law was more protective than federal law.  In that footnote, the Court noted that Chambers was old even then, and rarely cited for the purpose of striking down a law like the one at issue in Frazer.  The Court concluded that potentially there could be an as applied due process challenge to a statute reviving an otherwise expired claim, but such a argument would have to be made in another case because Frazer involved a facial challenge only (much like the motion before the court now).  (Id., at p. 766, fn.32.)  Justice Kennard, joined by Justice Mosk, wrote a dissent pointing out that Chambers was not overruled.  The court has great respect for Justice Kennard, but the court must agree with the majority that Chambers is questionable at best and no longer good law at all as against a facial challenge like the one at bar, and appellate courts appear to agree.  The court has reviewed that appellate authority and agrees with the reasoning therein.

More recently, the California Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the issue.  In In re Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179, our Supreme Court considered the retroactive effect of a statute that extended the time to bring suit for unpaid support.  The Court found no constitutional infirmity.  Rather, it discussed the general rule of retroactive application of extensions of statutes of limitations.  First, it is settled that such an extension is not retroactive unless the Legislature says that it is (which it did here).  If it is retroactive and would revive a cause of action that would otherwise be barred, courts look to a more nuanced test to determine whether due process bars the statute.  Specifically, the court looks to two factors: (1) the significance of the state interest served by the law and (2) the extent of reliance of the former law and the extent of actions taken on the basis of that reliance such that extension of the statute would disrupt those actions.  (Id., at p. 189.)  Interestingly, although this court believes that support in the family law context is a right created by statute, not the common law, the Fellows Court never mentioned Chambers.  This court believes that the Supreme Court was well aware of Chambers, and therefore the fact that it was not even addressed strongly suggests that the Court no longer views Chambers as good law.

The court chooses to follow Frazer and Fellows, two much more recent California Supreme Court cases.  The court also notes that there is no logic whatsoever to distinguish the due process rights that might exist as between a cause of action created by statute and one created by the common law.  Certainly nothing in Chambers suggests as much.  Indeed, if anything, logic might suggest that a right to a cause of action that the Legislature created can be more easily changed than a law that the Legislature did not create.  But whether one is more dominant by the other, the logic as to due process would seem to be the same.  And while defendant here argues that the distinction is critical, the defense offers no justification therefor.  This court credits the Supreme Court with more consistent thinking than the blind adherence to an arbitrary rule more than a century old and not even articulated in the case upon which the rule is based.

Even if Chambers did apply, the court does not believe it would bar the statute.  As defendant suggests, Chambers is (at most) now limited to rights created by statute.  This is such a right, but in a somewhat different way.  The conduct at issue is unlawful and improper whether or not there is a statute.  The point of the statute is not to deem the conduct wrongful, but rather to abrogate sovereign immunity.  Absent the statute, one could not sue the LAUSD because it is (as an agency of the government) immune from suit.  That would have been true had the case been brought two days after the event allegedly occurred.  Thus, the statute here did not define the unlawful nature of the act or LAUSD’s improper behavior (allegedly) at the time.  What the statute does is create a procedure for a remedy.  The conditional waiver of sovereign immunity, the court believes, would not be covered by Chambers.  Indeed, one would think that the decision whether and how to waive sovereign immunity is best made by the sovereign, as it was here.  Given that at best Chambers has been limited to its facts, this court sees no basis for expansion.

Turning, then, to the two part test, the court finds no infirmity in the statute.  The importance of the state interest is plainly viewed highly.  It is in protecting our children and giving them relief from life-altering harm inflicted upon them at a vulnerable time and by those that the state itself has placed in a position of authority.  Indeed, the Legislature has shown the importance of the policy by amending the statute more than once as to the statute of limitations.  This court will be slow indeed before it second-guesses that legislative determination.  And as to reliance, there has been no particularized showing by the LAUSD. 

The court does not mean to downplay the issue from the defense perspective.  Our schools are arguably the most important of our public institutions.  We entrust our children to their care; we rely on them to socialize our children and teach them both the basic and the advanced skills they will require to survive and thrive in an ever more complex and hostile world.  And public schools are especially important.  Private schools by definition do not take all comers.  Some focus on particular kinds of children; some are based on religious views; and still others focus on a particular kind of education.  Many are open to the poorest in society, but others are reserved for the well off or those relatively few lucky enough to obtain a scholarship and have the means to get to the school.  But public schools take all comers.  They are, more and more, places where people from different backgrounds can come to meet, to learn, and to experience.  They are the ultimate guarantors that all in our society have the opportunity to be given the gift of learning and the chance to lead full, productive, and happy lives.  And from the time of the country’s founding, the concept of a vibrant democracy is tightly bound to the concept of an educated electorate.  Of course, the court knows all too well that the public schools are not perfect.  They are run by humans, and humans are, by definition, flawed.  And given the wide variety of students, they do better with some than with others.  Not every public school has or provides the same resources.  And money is always in short supply.  School teachers, staff, and administrators are underpaid (at least in the court’s view), campuses can often be run down, technology may be outdated or in short supply.  There is no doubt but that taking money from LAUSD’s budget will require those basic and critical needs to be funded in another way. 

The point, though, is that this is a balance to be struck by a policy-making body—specifically the Legislature.  The California Constitution did not strike the balance, and it is not the office of the judicial branch to do so either.  The Legislature has unambiguously made its decision.  Unless the decision violates the California Constitution, this court will abide by it.  And here, at least on this record, the court cannot see that the right was so vested that extending the statute of limitations will deny LAUSD its due process. 

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.