Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: 23SMCV01463, Date: 2024-12-19 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23SMCV01463    Hearing Date: December 19, 2024    Dept: I

This is a motion for a preliminary injunction.  The matter was here earlier, but the court continued the hearing to allow further briefing.  The court incorporates that discussion here by reference for background purposes.  The additional (and helpful) briefing has been filed and the matter is ripe for determination.

Plaintiffs are the owners of two parcels of land: 1800 and 1550 Henry Ridge Motorway.  They assert that they do not have access to the public road system without using private roads that traverse the property of others.  There are two roads at issue: (1) Henry Ridge (sometimes referred to as the Northern route) and (2) Oldfield Road.  Plaintiffs assert that for many years they used the Oldfield Road to access the public roads at Greenleaf.  However, defendants have now locked the gates at either end of the private Oldfield Road and will not allow plaintiffs to drive on that road.  (The gates have been there for a little while, but plaintiffs contend that they were not locked, so plaintiffs could drive on Oldfield without hinderance.)  Plaintiffs seek a prescriptive easement or equitable easement that would allow them to use Oldfield Road.  At the prior hearing, the court had read the papers as alleging that absent the use of Oldfield Road, plaintiffs had no way to access their property.  The court likely over-read the papers.  Plaintiffs do not allege that they are trapped on the property; rather they allege that they have no present right to use the Henry Ridge route, and thus they must trespass to access the public road system unless they use Oldfield.

Plaintiffs allege that when they bought their properties in 2000, they believed that they had an actual right to drive over the Henry Ridge Motorway and Oldfield Road to reach the public roads, although there appears to be no recorded easement so allowing for either road.  Relatively recent disputes have arisen between plaintiffs and the purchasers of the property upon which Oldfield runs.  Plaintiffs contend that because they have to trespass to use Henry Ridge, they must be granted an easement to use Oldfield, and that pending a final judgment the court should preliminarily enjoin the defense from prohibiting plaintiffs from using Oldfield.  Defendants contend that plaintiffs have been using Henry Ridge and can continue to use that route, so there is no need for a preliminary injunction.  They also claim that Oldfield is a very narrow road that is unpaved in sections and is on a relatively steep hill (at least in places) such that there is an embankment on one side that a car could easily fall down.  There is not room, they argue, for two cars to pass one another.

The standards for a preliminary injunction are well known.  The purpose of the injunction is, in part, to maintain the status quo, meaning the status immediately before the dispute arose.  In addition, the court considers two factors on a sliding scale: the likelihood of success on the merits and the balance of hardships.  The stronger the showing on one, the less of a showing is needed on the other.  By balance of hardships, one weighs the hardship to the plaintiff if there is no injunction as against the hardship to the defense if an injunction issues.  The court also looks to see if any of the hardships are such that there will be no adequate remedy at law or that cannot be adequately mitigated by a bond or a damages award.

As to the status quo, plaintiffs state that they brought the case shortly after the locks on the gate were installed, and therefore the status quo ante favors them.  The defense has not really rebutted that point effectively.

Turning to the merits, there is a dispute.  Plaintiffs contend that they drove Oldfield regularly for many years—far more than the 5 years needed for a prescriptive easement.  They contend that although they thought they had the right to do so, they were apparently mistaken and the use was therefore a hostile one.  And it was open and notorious, they state.  The defense questions whether there really were five countable years.  Defendants also claim that plaintiffs’ use of Oldfield was rare and sporadic at best.  Defendants contend that plaintiffs will not be able to make out their claims.  At this stage, the court views the question as relatively mixed and evenly balanced, but if the court had to choose, the court thinks plaintiffs are a little bit more likely to prevail than the defense.

That leads to hardship.  Plaintiffs contend that they have no right to drive on Henry Ridge, and therefore absent the injunction they are either totally landlocked or must resort to breaking the law.  The court believes plaintiffs overstate the case.  First, at least in a letter to neighbors in 2006, plaintiffs stated that they did have a prescriptive easement over Henry Ridge, noting that prior owners had established such a right in a prior lawsuit.  In their supplemental brief plaintiffs disclaim that appellate decision, stating that it was only offhand dicta and did not in fact establish a prescriptive easement.  The court will not weigh in on that at this time, but it does undercut plaintiffs’ claims.  Further, plaintiffs have told their tenants that they could use the Henry Ridge route.  Plaintiffs discount that by stating that they did not say that the tenant MUST use that route; only that the tenant could.  But the point is the same.  Plaintiffs seem to believe that the Henry Ridge route is available to them and have told their tenants as much.  That undercuts their claim of dire consequences if they continue driving on it.  And at a minimum, the court would wonder why their claim of easement over Henry Ridge would not be at least as strong as the one over Oldfield (if not stronger, given the appellate decision).  Relatedly, even if it is true that plaintiffs have no right to use Henry Ridge, it appears that no one is stopping them or trying to do so.  The owners of the property on which the private Henry Ridge route runs do not seem to mind, and have written no letters to plaintiffs telling them not to drive on the road.  The court is certainly not finding that there is an express grant of permission or a license to use the road, but it at least seems that no one is complaining of plaintiffs’ use of it.  Plaintiffs assert that using Henry Ridge adds time to get to the public roadway system than does using Oldfield, but they do not specify the amount of additional time.  If it takes 45 minutes or so in additional time to reach the public roads as opposed to Oldfield that would be somewhat significant.  If it is an extra 10 minutes or so, that is another.  The court cannot tell with certainty, but looking at the maps it is hard to see a great hardship.  In short, the court sees a slight hardship in using the Henry Ridge route in terms of the delay, but nothing significant.  It appears to be more of a minor inconvenience than a true irreparable harm.  Plaintiffs do not need the Oldfield route; they only want it.

The court must also, of course, look to the hardship to the defense.  Plaintiffs claim there is none.  After all, it is not like they seek an exclusive use of the road, and the road is already there.  The court is not so sure.  First, at least in parts, there is room for only one car at a time.  If plaintiffs are driving one way and defendants are driving another way and the two cars meet, the court has no idea what the parties would do.  Second, the road is unpaved in some areas and appears to be dangerous.  There is at least a potential for liability.  The court is aware that plaintiffs can disclaim any liability by contract, but it is not clear that such a disclaimer would extend to their tenants.  And given the pictures, the court could easily see an accident—even a fatal or near-fatal one—occurring because Oldfield is (allegedly, at least in an ensuing law suit) not well enough maintained.  Defendants also assert that plaintiffs’ use interferes with their right to exclusive use of their land and that from at least some points on the road, a driver can see into their property including the area where their dwelling is.  While hardly a catastrophic harm, it is a harm.  And defendants assert that giving plaintiffs access to Oldfield would violate a settlement reached in another case.  The court is not sure that a court order to that effect would put defendants in breach, though, so the court discounts that argument.  The court also notes that plaintiffs do not contribute to the cost of maintaining the Oldfield route; there seems to be something inequitable about giving plaintiffs access to that route without their contributing to the upkeep and potentially making defendants liable for an accident that occurs on the road.

At bottom, the court believes that the balance of hardships tilts in defendants’ favor here, and not in a trivial way.  And while the court is aware that the status quo tends to favor plaintiffs and perhaps also the likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, the court is of the view that, in its discretion, plaintiffs have not shown adequate cause for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.  Of course, this is not a reflection on any ruling on equitable relief at trial.  And if, through no fault of their own, plaintiffs are truly denied access to the Henry Ridge route, the court will be open to reconsidering this order.

In closing, the court notes that this case really needs to settle.  A judgment—of any kind—is not going to be fully satisfactory to anyone (most likely).  What the parties need to do is get together and figure out how the roads will be used and who will pay for it.  That is best done through settlement, not trial.  Of course, the court cannot, and will not, order the parties to settle.  But this litigation can easily spin out of control, last for years, and result in a judgment that no one really wants.  Just saying.