Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: 23SMCV04416, Date: 2024-06-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV04416    Hearing Date: June 24, 2024    Dept: I

The motion to strike is DENIED.

Plaintiffs rented a room from defendant’s property.  There was a fire and plaintiffs awoke.  There were two doors out of the room to the outside.  One—the first one plaintiffs tried—was locked and they could not get out.  The other door was not reachable due to the fire.  Plaintiffs were able to escape, however, through an unlocked door leading to the house.  They roused the other occupants and escaped.  Plaintiffs allege that this was a harrowing experience for them, and the facts as alleged certainly would support that allegation.  Plaintiff allege that the fire was caused by loose wires near a gas can.  The wires allegedly ignited a fire and the gas in the gas can caused the fire to spread quickly. 

Plaintiff seek punitive damages, alleging that defendants’ actions in leaving loose wires near a gas can was so reckless and dangerous as to constitute malice or oppression.  Defendants move to strike the punitive damages allegation and plaintiffs oppose.

The court must agree with the plaintiffs here, but with the warning that this is because the motion is a pleading motion.  The allegations are on the border of whether allowing the dangerous condition to exist was grossly negligent or even reckless or was worse.  Gross negligence and recklessness are not generally enough to support an award of punitive damages.  (Ebaugh v. Rabkin (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 891.)  On the other hand, malice does not require an actual intent to harm; there need only be a showing that the probable result of the defendant’s conduct will be harm, which is enough of a conscious disregard for the safety of others to trigger the award, at least potentially.  And that is the real gist of plaintiffs’ theory.  The court analogizes to cases involving drunk driving.  A person who gets behind the wheel while drunk well knows or ought to know of the enhanced danger that person is posing to others.  Yet that alone will not support a punitive damages recovery.  (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890.)  What ultimately must be shown, both in the drunk driving case and here, is that the defendant acted with a conscious disregard for the safety of others.  Thus, if all a plaintiff can show is the act itself—whether it is drunk driving or loose wires and a gas can—it will not do.  But where there is more, malice might be found.  That, though, is usually not something that can be decided on the pleadings alone.

Here, it is not enough that there were loose wires and a gas can.  But there could have been other facts not yet known to plaintiffs.  For example, there could have been earlier close calls where the loose wires ignited a fire but it was put out quickly.  In other words, something more than the recitation of the facts will ultimately be required, but that “more” might well exist.  Ultimately, the place to test this is not the pleadings.  The place to test this is at summary judgment or, if there is a disputed question of fact, trial, especially given that the information, if it exists, lies with the defense.

Defendant has 30 days to answer.