Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: 23SMCV05352, Date: 2024-06-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV05352    Hearing Date: June 10, 2024    Dept: I

This is a demurrer brought by cross defendant Berry Gordy (Gordy).  The original case was brought by plaintiff Rockwell Entertainment alleging that defendant Thompson stole money.  Defendant Thompson then sued Kennedy Gordy (known as “Rockwell”) and Berry Gordy, as well as Rockwell Entertainment Enterprises.  She alleges that she was the victim of domestic and sexual abuse by Rockwell and that Gordy aided and abetted that abuse (although she does not allege that Gordy abused her personally).  She alleges that the physical and sexual abuse began long ago and that the most recent instance occurred in 2023. 

 

Only Gordy demurs.  He asserts that the causes of action, at least against him, are barred by the statute of limitations.  The court notes that the cross-complaint contains many details, which Gordy states are inserted more for the press than the court.  Gordy’s demurrer, in turn, has more adjectives than the dictionary and the court believes that it was largely written for a different audience.  The opposition and reply follow suit.

 

The gist of Gordy’s argument is that the things he is accused of doing all occurred outside of the statutory period.  More specifically, he alleges that from the cross-complaint itself it is plain that the abuse stopped in 2016, when Thompson and Rockwell separated.  Then, in 2020, Thompson returned to Rockwell’s life after he implored her to do so, and she started working for him again.  She alleges that the abuse then resumed and continued from that point.  According to Gordy, however, even according to the cross-complaint whatever role he played in the alleged abuse ended in 2016, which is beyond the statutory time line.

 

The court first turns, quickly, to Gordy’s motion to strike.  It is STRICKEN as untimely.  The motion to strike should have been served with the demurrer, or at least within the time allowed to file a demurrer.  The motion to strike was filed on May 21, 2024, which is untimely.  Further, it does not provide 16 court days’ notice.  The court need not say more.

 

The court also DENIES the request for judicial notice.  Gordy relies on the various documents to prove the truth of the matters contained therein, and that is not proper.  This is not an evidentiary motion; it is a pleading motion.  (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Borkerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369.)

 

The court also raises the question of civility.  The court certainly recognizes that the allegations in the cross-complaint are deeply personal in nature and that cross-defendant is upset by them.  Similarly, the court recognizes that the allegations in the cross-complaint reflect assertions of horrific conduct and that cross-complainant is equally upset at that conduct and also at being called a liar and a thief in the demurrer.  The court needs the lawyers to be the adults in the room.  If they want to hold press conferences and spew vitriol over each other, that is their right.  In court pleadings, however, the court is unmoved by such tactics.  The court’s job is to look at the law as it applies (in this case) to the pleadings.  Throwing mud at one another makes the court’s job harder and the motivations are transparent.  Further, in the court’s experience, the greater the number of adjectives in the brief the weaker the argument.  The court may, in the future, simply strike pleadings that appear to be written more for the press than the court.  The court has other tools in the toolbox.  (See Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 908.)  The court also ORDERS all counsel representing Thompson and Gordy to read the Litigation Guidelines appended to the court’s Local Rules.  Counsel are to file declarations under penalty of perjury stating that they have done so and the amount of time they spent doing it no later than 5 court days from today.  Failure to do so will result in sanctions.

 

The court now turns to the demurrer.  Unlike many torts, the Legislature has determined that cases of abuse are deemed continuing in nature.  That means that the statute of limitations on the entire course of conduct does not begin to run until the last act occurs.  (Code Civ. Proc. §340.15, subd. (a)(1).)  Here, the last act was in 2023, so it would appear that the action in general is timely for pleading purposes.  The question is whether, as Gordy argues, there was a significant enough break in the abuse in 2016 such that the later abuse should not be subject to the statute, at least insofar as he is concerned.  There is some heft to Gordy’s argument.  There are many specific instances of abuse in the cross-complaint, and most involve the time that Thompson and Rockwell were living together or both cared for their son, who passed away in 2016.  The cross-complaint, which seems to be generally chronological in terms of the abuse allegations, has a break in time between paragraphs 35 and 36.  Paragraph 35 discusses Ryan’s passing in 2016, and paragraph 36 discusses an event in 2020 in which Rockwell “implored Thompson to help him get his life back on track” and Thompson agreed to start working for Rockwell in February of that year.  More abuse is recounted after that, but at least starting in 2020, it does not appear that Thompson was living with Rockwell on Gordy’s estate.  Looking at the causes of action alleged against Gordy, they all appear to allege that Gordy failed to prevent Rockwell from abusing and assaulting Thompson while they were both living on the estate, that Gordy is responsible for emotionally forcing Thompson and Gordy to live on the estate where Thompson claims she was isolated and Rockwell could more easily continue his pattern of abuse, and that he further took steps to ensure that she did not seek help from any source including the authorities during that time.  However, in all cases, Gordy’s conduct seems to be tied to the time Thompson was living on the estate, which seems to have ended in 2016.  The court needs Thompson to clarify the otherwise inescapable inference that Thompson had moved out long before 2020 and what Gordy’s involvement ended at that time.  It could well be that Gordy continued to facilitate or aid Rockwell’s alleged abuse after 2020 and into 2023, but that is not a fair reading of the cross-complaint as it is currently written. 

 

Thompson also claims Gordy is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations.  That can occur where the defendant takes some action that prevents the plaintiff from bringing a timely suit.  In this case, Thompson alleges that Gordy assured Thompson he would help but he didn’t; that he kept Thompson isolated in the gatehouse on the estate; that Gordy did not provide Thompson with an unfettered ability to leave the premises; that Gordy promised that his security detail would keep Thompson safe but they did not do so; that when the police were called, Gordy interfered with Thompson’s ability to tell them what happened and that Gordy covered up the crime; and that Gordy threatened to cut Thompson off from child support if she pursued legal action and dissuaded her from doing so in other ways as well.  Thompson claims that such conduct essentially caused her not to bring suit in a timely fashion.  However, again, the only fair reading of the complaint is that Gordy’s conduct in that regard ended at some point in or before 2016—when Ryan died, and mostly while Thompson and Rockwell were living on Gordy’s property.  It does seem, at least at first blush, that it is hard to connect Gordy with any event occurring in or after 2016 or any action to stop Thompson from suing after that point.  And threatening to cut Thompson off from child support would be no threat after 2016, when there was no child support in any event.

 

The court is therefore inclined to SUSTAIN THE DEMURRER WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.  The court is not saying that the cross-complaint cannot be amended in a manner that will withstand demurrer.  The court is only saying that as it presently reads, the court needs to better understand how the apparent break between 2016 and 2020 (and beyond) and Gordy’s apparent lack of any action after 2016 can be explained in such a way to suggest that the allegations against Gordy might be within the statutory period.  The court reminds Gordy, however, that this is a pleading motion.  The court will not entertain arguments that the allegations are not true unless the arguments come within an established legal doctrine. 

 

Thompson has 30 days’ leave to amend.