Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: 24SMCV00593, Date: 2025-05-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV00593    Hearing Date: May 2, 2025    Dept: I

These are really four motions to compel further brought as one motion.  That is improper.  There are four motions, they need to be filed separately.  If the moving party wants to file an omnibus memorandum of points and authorities, that would be ok, but the motions are separate and need to be filed that way.  There are reasons for this that the court need not go into, but the suggestion that it is permitted is just wrong.  On the other side of the coin, the opposition was untimely.  It was only one day late, but it is still untimely.  An explanation and request to file an untimely opposition should have been filed, but before then, the opposing party should have reached out to the moving party to see if they could agree on an appropriate procedure to deal with the issue.

 

Turning to the merits, plaintiff served discovery on the defense.  Defendants asked for an extension to respond, which was granted.  However, by the new date, responses were not forthcoming.  Plaintiff sent a letter to the defense demanding responses without objection.  On January 14, 2025, defendant sent unverified responses, saying verifications would follow.  The responses had objections, however, and stated that only non-privileged information and documents would be provided.  Further, there was a preliminary statement.  There were also problems with accessing the documents produced, although the court gathers those were ultimately resolved.  When plaintiff saw the documents, though, plaintiff saw that there had been redactions.  Plaintiff sent a letter to the defense giving counsel until January 30, 2025, to provide unredacted documents.  Defense counsel stated that the client was still not in the office.  Plaintiff told the defense that all objections had been waived and that it needed the responses by February 5, 2025.  Defendant promised to send amended responses, but failed to do so, although additional material was submitted the next day.  There were still, however, no verifications from Wells Fargo and there were still objections. 

 

In opposition, defendants raise the technical arguments, and defendants seem to argue that the motions do not seek an order that defendant provide documents, but only that defendants amend the responses.  In any event, verifications were finally served for Wells Fargo on February 6, 2025, for the form interrogatories and on February 11, 2025, for the RFP’s.  Defendants defend the preliminary statement as mere “boilerplate” that does no one any harm.  Finally, as to the production of unredacted documents, defendants contend that the documents are privileged and therefore need not be produced. 

 

The parties need to step up their game.  Plaintiff’s view that it can by right combine four motions in one is based on nothing that looks like authority.  Rather, it seems to be ipse dixit, a phrase coined by the Roman orator and philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero and meaning “he himself said it,” suggesting that the utterance is enough to establish the point without the need for pesky facts or other authority.  But that is not sufficient in court.  Defendants, in addition to filing an untimely opposition, served untimely and unverified responses and do not seem to understand the Code’s plain statement that untimely responses waive all objections—expressly including privilege.  There is nothing resembling legal argument as to why the statute does not apply to defendants here.  The court is aware of some authority that suggests that a privilege waiver is less automatic than other sorts of waivers, notwithstanding the statute.  But the statute is hardly something that can be ignored.  As to work product, defense counsel says that the waiver does not extend to work product.  It is true that “work product” is not expressly stated in the statute, but it is still an objection, and all objections are waived.  The court needs more than the defense has given on that score.  It is “ipse dixit” again.  And the court has, to be honest, never heard of defending a bunch of objections on the ground that they are “boilerplate.”  That is usually something the other side says, although the argument does score points on the boldness scale.  Further, there is no basis in the Code for a “Preliminary Statement,” at least that contains objections. 

 

The preliminary statement is STRICKEN AS IMPROPER.  And given the defense’s lack of any justification for ignoring the statutory language regarding waiver, the court is forced to agree with plaintiff that the privilege has been waived.  While the court agrees that this should have been four motions, not one, the court will trade that irregularity for accepting the untimely opposition.  They cancel each other out.

 

Defendants will, therefore, provide verified responses without objection within 5 court days and unredacted documents will be provided at the same time.  However, as to privilege, the court will allow defendants to do the following: (1) provide a detailed privilege log within that time frame; and (2) provide a supplemental brief as to why the waiver language in the statute does not apply to them.  To the extent that is done, logged privileged information need not be produced at this time.  Legal authority in the brief would be a wise move.  As to the log, the log must be detailed enough to establish the privilege or work product protection as a prima facie matter without more.  If plaintiff seeks to compel production of the privileged material, it may bring a motion to compel, and it may argue that the privilege was in fact waived.  In opposing such a motion, the defense will not be allowed to supplement the log to make out the prima facie case. 

 

Sanctions are GRANTED in favor of plaintiff as prayed.

 

The court admonishes both parties that they need to work a little bit harder before filing things in this court.  The rules are there for a reason and the court must follow them.  Just because counsel says so does not make it so.  And this whole thing should never have been allowed to get this far in the first place.  This will be a long slog unless quality improves.

 

For the parties’ future use, the court appends its guidelines for discovery.

 

 

DISCOVERY RELATED GUIDELINES FOR DEPARTMENT I

The guidelines below are not “rules” and they are not universally applicable in all cases.  Rather, they are guidelines as to the court’s general views.  Each case, of course, will be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and some of the guidelines below may not apply to particular circumstances.  That said, the court does take these views seriously.

Discovery Responses

The court provides the following guidance concerning its general views on some common issues regarding responses to written objections.  The court has noticed that many attorneys view objections and the manner of making them in a way different than does the court.  To avoid these common pitfalls, the court offers the following in addition to the provisions of the Litigation Guidelines appended to the Los Angeles County Superior Court Local Rules.

First, “General Objections” are not permitted.  The Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for them, and therefore they are disregarded by the Court.  Any response that “incorporates” the “General Objections” is improper by definition. 

Second, the  court often views boilerplate objections as being in bad faith.  A bad faith response is no response at all in the court’s view.  Therefore, making boilerplate objections does not preserve those objections nor does it constitute a good faith response to written discovery.  A bad faith response is viewed by the court for what it is: bad faith.  The objections will be stricken and deemed waived.  In the context of a Request for Admission, such objections may lead to a finding that the request is deemed admitted, although that will depend on the facts of the particular case and the specific discovery at hand.

Objections should be tailored to each specific request.  If a request truly is overbroad, then an objection to that effect is proper.  But such an objection is best accompanied by some reasonable limitation by the responding party that will narrow the request appropriately and (as narrowed) provide a substantive response rather than a mere statement that the request is overbroad.  The same is true as to an objection that a request is unduly burdensome.  The court also notes that the party asserting that a request is unduly burdensome has the obligation at some point to provide an evidentiary basis for the objection, including evidence as to what the burden of compliance would be.  (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407.)  Often such an objection will include a statement by the responding party as to a narrower request that would not be unduly burdensome and provide substantive responses as so limited.  Objections that a request is “vague and ambiguous” should set forth the vague and ambiguous term as well as the responding party’s reasonable interpretation of that term as well as a statement that, so interpreted, the response will provide the discovery requested.  If there is no reasonable interpretation possible (which is a rare situation), then the responding party should so state.  Objections as to privilege must set forth the basis explaining why the information sought is in fact privileged.  Where a privilege is asserted in the context of a document request, a privilege log should accompany the answer or be provided within a short and reasonable time after the answer, and the log will serve as the explanation.  Where the objection is made in the context of an interrogatory, it must be clear from the objection the scope of the information being withheld.  If there is no log, there should be no privilege objection to a document request (meaning that a prophylactic privilege objection is the equivalent of no objection; it preserves nothing).  There are some rare exceptions, such as where the entire point of the discovery is to get allegedly privileged information or where compliance would require a log that is in essence an index of counsel’s file.  In that situation, the log is unnecessary, but the assertion should be made that the request is in that rare context.

Third, if an objection is made to the discovery but a response is being given, it must be clear whether information or documents are in fact being withheld on the basis of the objections.  If the objections are clear and done in the manner set forth above, with statements in the objection as to a narrowing that will make the request proper, this is usually a simple task.  The objections themselves state the limit and the response will be full and complete as limited.  But where the objections are not so clear, the response must clearly state whether any information or document is being withheld on the basis of the objection and, if so, the extent of the withholding.  Accordingly, in those situations, phrases like “Notwithstanding and subject to the foregoing objections, responding party states as follows” are generally improper.  Those sorts of phrases make the verification useless, as the verifier can always fall back on the ”objections” as the reason why a document was not produced or information was not disclosed.  On the other hand, where the line of demarcation is clear, the verification will still serve its purpose.

Fourth, for document requests, the substantive response must conform to the Code of Civil Procedure.  There are relatively tight rules as to what the response must say, and the response must say it.  For example, where a responding party is not producing documents because they are not in the party’s possession, custody, or control, the responding party must verify that a diligent search has been made and must further provide the information set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 in such cases.  In the case of interrogatories, the responses must also conform to the Code of Civil Procedure and must be made after diligent inquiry.  It is not proper to refuse to respond because the responding party has no personal knowledge.  If the knowledge is hearsay, it must still be disclosed, although it can be qualified to make it clear that it is not based on the verifier’s personal knowledge.

Fifth, the court frowns on responses that do not conform to the foregoing rules being served with the view that the responses will moot themselves out in the meet and confer process.  That is not how the process works.  A good faith response is required before the meet and confer process begins.  The meet and confer process will (hopefully) bridge the gaps between the parties’ respective positions.  Further, where a response to a request for documents is made and documents are to be produced subject to certain objections (with the documents withheld properly delineated), the documents should be turned over irrespective of the meet and confer.  The documents are to be produced with alacrity to the extent that there is no objection to them, but the court recognizes that there is often a lag between the date responses are served and the date that the documents are produced.

What this means is that the response to a discovery request is not a trivial undertaking.  Nabbing the response from the form file is a generally bad idea and can lead to all objections being waived.  The point is that the boilerplate often renders the remainder of the response useless.  The only exception is where it is clear that the substantive response is not in any way limited by the objections.  In that case, the objections do no harm, although they also do no good.

Meet and Confer

The Code of Civil Procedure requires that before a motion to compel further responses or a motion for a protective order is filed, the parties engage in a good faith attempt to resolve their differences.  They are to “meet and confer” for that purpose.  Only if that effort fails can a motion be brought. 

Sadly, many litigants view the meet and confer process as just another procedural hoop through which they must jump in order to bring the motion, similar to the need to include an actual demurrer with the demurrer papers.  The Code of Civil Procedure requires it, so they do it, but no one’s heart is really in it.  That is not sufficient.

Given that, the court believes it appropriate to set forth how the court views the meet and confer requirement.  Failure to abide by the guidelines below may well justify denial of the motion or a continuance of it to allow the process to take place.  If one party but not the other refuses to participate as set forth, more likely than not the party refusing to participate will find itself on the losing end of the motion.  The following quotation fairly sums up the court’s own view.

“[W]e feel compelled to observe that resort to the courts easily could have been avoided here had both parties actually taken to heart Justice Stone's admonitions in Townsend that ‘the statute requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution.’ (Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.)  Perhaps after 11 years it is necessary to remind trial counsel and the bar once again that ‘[a]rgument is not the same as informal negotiation’ (id at p. 1437); that attempting informal resolution means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent ‘to persuade the objector of the error of his ways’ (id. at p. 1435); and that ‘a reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel. . . .  Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.’ (Id. at p. 1439.)”  (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294, emphasis in original, parallel citations omitted.) 

In practical terms, it means as follows.  It is entirely appropriate to begin the process with a letter or other correspondence.  The letter should not include a demand in the form of an ultimatum, but it can certainly include the relief that is being sought with an invitation to meet and confer.  It is also entirely appropriate for the other party to respond with a letter or other correspondence to set forth its position on the issues.  Such an initial exchange can often be helpful to narrow the dispute or at least articulate plainly the boundaries.  Whether further exchanges make sense will depend on each case and each dispute.

However, at some point before impasse is reached the process must generally include an actual “meet.”  The letters might well suffice to “confer,” but an exchange of correspondence is not a meeting.  In the COVID-19 era, the “meeting” can be virtual or telephonic, but a meeting there should be.  The meeting must be attended by a person from each side with the authority to agree to the other side’s position without getting further permission from anyone, including the client.  If only the client can give the needed authority, then the client must be available instantaneously at all times during the meeting.  This does not mean that one side or the other must concede, but it does mean that the people meeting have the ability in real and practical terms to strike a deal.

The parties should approach the meet and confer process as a problem-solving exercise.  The purpose of the meet and confer is not to convince the other side of the bankruptcy of its position; rather the purpose is to reach an agreement by which the party seeking discovery is able to obtain the information that it reasonably needs and the party providing discovery is not put to an undue burden or forced to provide unnecessary information that might infringe on a privacy interest or disclose a competitive trade secret or the like.

At the conclusion of the meet and confer, the parties should have an agreed statement as to the outcome.  If the outcome is a total impasse, then they should agree on that.  If they have resolved some or all of their differences, then they should state—in writing—what that agreement is so that there will be no confusion later.  Often, an agreement will be without prejudice to a further request by the propounding party for more information after that party receives the further responses.

If a motion is still required, the declaration in support should describe with some detail the meet and confer process.  While the court is not interested in the back and forth (and indeed describing it can be counter-productive), the court is interested in when the meeting took place, who was there, and how long it lasted.

All communications—in writing or oral—must be civil, polite, and professional.  Name-calling and accusations are devices that undermine the process; they do not further it.  A party engaging in such activity generally is not acting in a good faith effort to reach an agreement.

Informal Discovery Conferences

The court generally prefers an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) before any party files a motion to compel further responses, and the failure to use this avenue of resolution can greatly affect the amount of sanctions that might be awarded because sanctions are limited to fees that are reasonable and necessary.  The goal of the IDC is to “get to yes.”  To achieve that goal, the court adopts the following.

  1. Five court days before the IDC, the parties will submit a JOINT statement no more than eight pages total (on pleading paper, but excluding the caption page) setting forth their respective positions.  Where a similar issue is raised that will resolve many requests, it can be dealt with as a single issue. 
  2. The IDC follows the good faith meet and confer.  It is not a substitute for the meet and confer.  The court’s time is to be spent only on issues after the parties have tried to narrow the dispute as much as possible.
  3. As stated above, the goal is to “get to yes.”  This means a few things.  One is that each party must be represented by a person who has the authority to agree to the other side’s position without getting further permission.  It need not be lead counsel and that authority need not be exercised.  But the people at the conference must have that authority.  If only the client has that authority, then the client will be present physically with counsel in a adjacent room without distraction after initial introductions are made.
  4. All IDC’s are “off the record.”  That means that whatever anyone says at the IDC will not be binding or quoted back at the party unless an agreement is struck.  It is very bad form to quote the court’s comments at an IDC during a later hearing unless the comments were part of a stipulated order.
  5. All parties have the right to change position if no deal is reached.  The court, for example, might strongly indicate that it believes one side or the other has the better position but rule in a completely different way if there is a formal motion.  Partial agreements that are contingent upon a full resolution are not binding unless a full resolution is reached.  Partial resolutions that are not contingent on a full resolution are binding.  Parties who are suggesting a resolution should make it clear whether their proposal depends upon other resolutions.
  6. Parties should be especially willing to give up sanctions at an IDC if it will resolve the dispute.  That is not a requirement, but the court’s experience is such that if a party is really going to insist on a sanction, the likelihood of a resolution is very low.
  7. It is likely that no party will get everything that it wants.  The goal is to abide the Code of Civil Procedure, but at the same time make sure that the party seeking discovery is not creating busy-work or demanding a lot of work for no benefit (or virtually no benefit).  The responding party might well have the right (should it come to motion practice) to avoid some aspect of the discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the responding party’s interest to be willing to offer something.  Conversely, the propounding party might have the right (should it come to motion practice) to get some aspect of discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the propounding party’s interest to forego aspects of the discovery that are not really needed, perhaps reserving the right to seek that information at a later time should it prove necessary.  The point is not to have the court simply hammer away at the opponent.  That might happen at a motion, but it is not the goal of the IDC.
  8. No orders will be made except on stipulation.  However, if there is an agreement, the court may well want to make an appropriate order or ask the parties to confirm it in writing.
  9. Parties should take careful notes on any agreements.  Because there are no Court Reporters, it is hard to put an agreement on the record.  However, unless the agreement is confirmed quickly, people have a tendency to forget or to have “buyer’s remorse.”  Therefore, it is best to have one party send an immediate confirming email to the other and obtain an agreement.  The court would prefer not to get into the specific wording of the agreement during the IDC unless absolutely necessary.
  10. The IDC process does not work if people view it as just a necessary step to filing a motion.  The court does not see it that way—if it did, then the court would abandon the IDC as a waste of time.  Rather, this is an off-ramp to avoid motion practice and the attendant costs and time.  Hopefully, it is also a way to get discovery more quickly than through formal motion practice.
  11. At the IDC, no matter how hot tempers have run in the past, the court expects all counsel to be polite and civil in tone to one another.  The court will not tolerate rudeness or unnecessary accusations.  They do not move the ball forward and they make it nigh impossible to reach an agreement.




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