Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: 24SMCV01384, Date: 2025-02-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV01384 Hearing Date: February 4, 2025 Dept: I
The demurrer is OVERRULED.
This is a products liability case against various
defendants, including TeamOne and Lopez.
Plaintiff was working at Skechers USA as a mechanic. Plaintiff alleges that while she was working
on a conveyer belt at the facility. When
she reached under the belt to remove a foreign object from the roller, Lopez,
who was employed by TeamOne, turned on the power (plaintiff had turned it off
before she began working on the machine).
That caused plaintiff’s hand to be caught and pulled into the roller,
leading to injuries. TeamOne demurs to
the third cause of action, which alleges negligence.
As an initial matter, plaintiff’s second and third amended
complaints have only been received, but not filed. That is because the complaint cannot be
amended as of right; rather an order was required. However, for purposes of this case, the court
will ORDER that the third amended complaint be filed. Because TeamOne assumed that the TAC was the
operative pleading, the demurrer is joined.
Defendant demurs in part on uncertainty. That is a disfavored ground to demur and only
applies in extreme cases, of which this is not one. The demurrer on that ground is OVERRULED.
The real thrust of the demurrer is that TeamOne had no duty
to plaintiff at all, and neither did Lopez.
It was not her employer; it was simply an entity with an office in the
building who supplied some people who could aid Skechers. As such, TeamOne argues that plaintiff’s
allegation that it should have trained Lopez on lock-out-tag-out procedures is
merely conclusory because plaintiff was the mechanic. But to accept that as defeating the cause of
action requires the court to ignore plaintiff’s allegations about defendant’s
training duties and infer that plaintiff and only plaintiff had control over
the machine. That is not a proper
inference on demurrer. Nor is the court
persuaded that 29 C.F.R. section 1910.147 defeats the cause of action. That regulation might lead to a good
comparative fault argument down the road, but it is too far a stretch on a
pleading motion to conclude that it defeats plaintiff’s cause of action
entirely or relieves defendant from any responsibility or duty here with regard
to its employee’s actions.
Beyond that, it is far from clear that there was no
duty. Here, plaintiff claims she was
injured due to Lopez’s negligence. To
hold TeamOne liable for that, plaintiff needs to show that TeamOne violated a
duty of care it owed to her or that the employee was liable for
committing the tort that caused the injury while working within the course and
scope of his employment. It would seem
obvious that the second prong is at least alleged here. But the first prong is also adequately
alleged. Plaintiff alleges that Lopez
was inadequately trained by TeamOne, which (plaintiff argues) should have
taught him safety measures when dealing with machinery such as the conveyor
belt. That may or may not wind up being
true, but it is sufficiently pled to withstand demurrer.
The court is aware that there is a lot of language in the
TAC concerning tenancies and the like, but the court does not see any of that
as being material for purposes of this demurrer.
TeamOne also argues Workers’ Compensation exclusivity. However, that doctrine applies only as
between an employee injured on the job who seeks redress from the
employer. That might well bar plaintiff
from suing Skechers, her employer, but it does not bar her from suing TeamOne,
for whom she does not work. TeamOne
relies on a joint venture argument—to the extent that Skechers and TeamOne were
really a joint venture that employed plaintiff, plaintiff might be barred. But that fails here. First, plaintiff does not allege a joint
venture arrangement. What she does
allege is that there was a special relationship because the TeamOne facility
was a tenant. The two are very different. Even beyond that, whether there was a joint
venture employment relationship is a fact-intensive inquiry that cannot be
decided on demurrer.
The demurrer is OVERRULED.
The demurring defendant has 30 days to answer the TAC.