Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: 24SMCV06270, Date: 2025-03-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV06270    Hearing Date: March 19, 2025    Dept: I

This is a motion to compel arbitration.  The underlying suit is by plaintiff, who alleges that defendants improperly reported a vehicle as stolen even though plaintiff had made all of the required payments.  As a result, plaintiff claims he was arrested and spent some time in jail.  The agreement at issue contains an arbitration provision, and this cause of action is within the terms.  As a result, the defense moves to compel arbitration.   

Plaintiff contends that he never signed the contract at issue; rather, it was signed by his wife.  As a non-party to the agreement, he continues, he cannot be bound by it or the arbitration agreement within it.  The court must disagree and it will GRANT the motion.

It is true that plaintiff’s wife signed the contract.  A short time earlier, plaintiff had signed an identical contract, though, so plaintiff presumably was aware of the form and its terms.  Further, the contract states that it binds not only plaintiff’s wife—who signed it—but also her spouse.  Thus, again, by its terms, the contract applies to plaintiff.  Of course, a party cannot bind a stranger to a contract without the other party’s knowledge and consent.  But there is consent here.  The contract was to rent the vehicle, and it was known by all parties to the agreement that both plaintiff and his wife would use the vehicle.  And in fact, plaintiff did use it.  The only rational inference is that plaintiff authorized his wife to sign the contract on her own behalf and on his as well and based on the evidence before the court, the court so finds as a factual matter. 

The court does not find the contract to be unconscionable.  While it was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the arbitration provision was not hidden.  So while there might be a degree of procedural unconscionability in the sense that this was a contract of adhesion, it is not as great as some situations the court has seen.  More difficult for plaintiff, though, is that the court sees no substantive unconscionability.  Under California law, a contract must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable to be voidable on that basis.  The stronger the showing of one, the less strong the other showing must be, but there must be both elements at least to some degree.  Plaintiff says it is substantively unconscionable, but other than saying the words that it is one-sided, plaintiff articulates no unconscionability.  Assuming by one-sided plaintiff means it is not mutual, that argument is belied by the contract’s language.  It is mutual in that both parties are required to arbitrate.

Plaintiff also contends that there is a problem because Centinela Gas is a party to the action (another defendant who acted as a dealer) and did not sign the contract.  But U-Haul suggests that Centinela Gas is within the contract’s terms and is agreeable to the arbitration.  Thus, there is no 1281.2 problem here.

Assuming that Centinela Gas formally confirms that it is bound by the arbitration agreement, the court will GRANT the motion.