Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: SC123117, Date: 2024-12-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: SC123117    Hearing Date: December 6, 2024    Dept: I

The motion for entry of judgment is DENIED.  A bit of history.  This very old case arises from a dispute that began well over a decade ago.  The procedural twists and turns are labyrinthian, and need not be recounted here.  Suffice it to say that the case finally went to trial and a jury rendered a verdict.  There was some issue at the time the verdict came in as to jury misconduct, but based on the record at the time the court denied the motion for a mistrial and took the verdict.  After that, the parties briefed and argued the remaining equitable issues and the court issued a Statement of Decision thereon.  The Statement of Decision and the verdict were then merged into a judgment, which the court entered.  Among other motions, the court received a motion for new trial from Illulian.  He included juror declarations attesting to alleged misconduct during (and to an extent even before) deliberations.  Rav-Noy opposed the motion and had counter-declarations.  The court heard argument on the motion and ultimately felt it was compelled to grant the motion, albeit reluctantly.  Granting a motion for a new trial is an appealable order (unlike in the federal system).  Before the time to appeal had run, Rav-Noy suggested that the court could nonetheless enter judgment based on the court’s determination of the equitable issues because that determination left nothing for a new jury to decide.  Faced with a timing deadline before Rav-Noy’s right to appeal the new trial order expired, the court noted the following.  First, the court did not believe it lacked jurisdiction over any matter not encompassed within the new trial appeal or that would effectively deprive the Court of Appeal of jurisdiction over the appeal.  Second, even if the court lacked jurisdiction, it always had jurisdiction to suggest to the Court of Appeal that if the matter were remanded the court would enter a judgment without the need for a new trial and that the appellate court might then remand the matter (or the appeal might be dismissed).  Thus, Rav-Noy filed a protective appeal, and the question whether the court could enter a judgment even in the teeth of the new trial order was continued.

Illulian argues that the court lacks jurisdiction—an argument Illulian did NOT waive at the prior hearing.  The court disagrees, but even were the court of Illulian’s view, it would still resolve the instant motion and the chips would then fall where they may.  Therefore, the court will proceed to the merits.

The court agrees with Rav-Noy that the logic in the Statement of Decision is what it is, and that it has an effect on any judgment with or without the jury verdict.  But that does not answer the question.  The question is whether the Statement of Decision disposes of the entire case.  For his part, Rav-Noy is willing to waive any additional relief to which he might be entitled in a new jury trial in return for a judgment.  That, however, is only half of the equation.  Illulian also had causes of action and claims (in fact, he is the plaintiff).  The jury essentially rejected them.  For example, Illulian contends that he was wrongly terminated from the two LLC’s.  Had the jury found in his favor, he would argue that he is entitled to his proportionate share of the proceeds from the sale of the buildings.  Both sides had evidence on this point, but the court does not believe that its Statement of Decision addresses the issue squarely.  Even if there was misconduct, a jury might or might not find that the misconduct was sufficient to warrant termination or might conclude that Rav-Noy’s motive to terminate was not the misconduct but rather an attempt to keep 100% of the proceeds.  Or, of course, a jury might find the termination to be fully justified based on Illulian’s conduct.  The point is that whether Illulian was wrongfully terminated is a jury question and one that must be resolved in that way.  The Statement of Decision did not purport to address that issue, expressly or impliedly.  Because the determination of that question could well lead to a more favorable judgment for Illulian than a judgment based solely on the Statement of Decision, the court agrees with Illulian that, on the merits, no judgment can be entered at this time, even assuming that the court has jurisdiction to do so.  Because the only question before the court at this time is whether a judgment can be entered without the need for a new trial in light of the Statement of Decision, the court need not, and does not, address any of the other issues or arguments made.