Judge: Mark H. Epstein, Case: SC123657, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: SC123657    Hearing Date: December 12, 2022    Dept: R

The motion to quash is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff Triurol served a trial subpoena upon Farr Labs.  It seeks the production of 91 categories of documents at trial.  Farr has objected to the subpoena.

A trial subpoena is not like a deposition subpoena.  It must set forth “the exact materials or other things desired.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987 subd. (c).)  It is not meant as a substitute for discovery.  The fact that there are 91 categories itself suggests that it is improper, although the number is not itself dispositive.  One could easily imagine a fully compliant subpoena where the 91 categories are things like “the email from Smith to Jones sent on July 10, 2020 at 11:53 am” or “the original deed dated September 4, 2018, for the property known as 1234 Elm Street, Los Angeles, California, as recorded in the Recorder’s Office.”  There could be 91 such requests or 191 such requests; they would not be improper.  But that is not what this is.  The first 12 categories go to financial condition (probably for punitive damages purposes), and include things like all “documents evidencing” net worth.  That could be almost anything.  Bank statements, loan applications, tax returns, trial balances, and a host of other documents would suffice.  And it is not limited to the date of trial, but rather goes back 10 years.  Other document requests include all correspondence between two parties (again over a long period of time), sales reports for five separate years, all documents that concern dealings between Farr and Lundquist, documents relating to product manufacturers, and more. 

Plaintiff suggests that the court has already denied this motion at the October 31, 2022 conference.  Plaintiff is mistaken.  The issue there was a subpoena served on an individual.  While it did have essentially the same categories as are at issue here, in her motion to quash the court was informed that she had no responsive documents at all.  The court ordered that rather than go through the categories if she had no responsive documents she should just say so.  The court did not say what it would have done if she did have documents and the court had to consider the subpoena on its merits.  (The ancient case upon which plaintiff relies—decided before the Discovery Act—is off point.  The order at issue there is actually far more precise than the request here.)

The bottom line is that the court might well grant a protective order in the context of discovery for a request like this; relief must certainly be granted in the context of a trial subpoena.  The only question is whether the court should try and issue a protective order limiting the production or just quash the subpoena entirely.  The court chooses the latter option.  The court would feel different if this were a targeted subpoena with a category that was perhaps a bit overbroad.  But plaintiff here did not even try to comply with the Code of Civil Procedure, which indicates that plaintiff knew that the subpoena was not proper but served it anyway.  The entire subpoena is quashed.

The court was also considering directing that no further subpoenae can be issued.  The court will not go that far.  If plaintiff has a good (very) faith narrow subpoena that describes the “exact materials” to be produced, the court will not foreclose it.  This time.  That is, in part, because Triurol did offer to narrow the scope of the subpoena significantly.  The court is not saying it is enough, but it was at least an attempt.  Farr seems to have essentially blown off the attempt.

Farr has also requested sanctions.  The fact is that Triurol tried to meet and confer but Farr essentially failed to do so in good faith.  The failure to meet and confer means that no sanctions will be awarded.