Judge: Mark V. Mooney, Case: 20STCV10112, Date: 2022-10-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV10112 Hearing Date: October 13, 2022 Dept: 68
LUISA RAMIREZ v.
CHARTWELL STAFFING SERVICES INC., et al.
20STCV10112
TENTATIVE RULING:
RE THE MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION and JOINDER:
The Court GRANTS
the motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims. The
Court GRANTS Defendant American International Industries joinder to compel
arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims as a third-party.
The Court DENIES
the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s non-individual, or representative, PAGA
claims and STAYS proceedings pending the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case Number S274671.
Judicial Notice
Plaintiff asks the
Court to take to take judicial notice of seven recent Superior Court of
California rulings considering motions to compel arbitration after Viking
River. Plaintiff desires to have
this Court receive the benefit of the thinking of other Superior Court judges
regarding the issue before this Court.
“While courts take judicial notice of public records,
they do not take notice of matters stated therein.” (Herrera v. Deutsche
Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 (citing Love
v. Wolf (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 378, 403.) “When judicial notice is taken of
a document, however, the truthfulness and proper interpretations of the
document are disputable.” (StorMedia Inc. Superior Court (1999) 20
Cal.4th 449, fn. 9 (citing Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184
Cal.App.3d 369, 374).)
The Supreme Court
noted in People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 268 [14
Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 396, 841 P.2d 897, 916]:
“Defendant requests us to take judicial notice of the
record filed in the Court of Appeal in People v. Superior Court
(Rowland), supra, 194 Cal.App.3d 11, 239 Cal.Rptr. 257. We may, of
course, “take judicial notice” (Evid.Code, § 459, subd. (a)) of the “[r]ecords
of ... any court of this state” (id., § 452, subd. (d)). We fail to
see—and certainly, defendant fails to show—the relevance of the subject record.
From all that appears, the court did not make any determination in light
thereof. “Because ... no evidence is admissible except relevant evidence, it is
reasonable to hold that judicial notice, which is a substitute for formal proof
of a matter by evidence, cannot be taken of any matter that is irrelevant....”
(2 Jefferson, Cal.Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) Judicial Notice, § 47.1, p.
1749.) Consequently, we deny the request.”
The other Superior
Court decisions are not citable authority.
Accordingly, since judicially noticing the existence of the other
court decisions provides nothing relevant to the Court, the Court DENIES the
request for judicial notice.
Discussion
Defendant
Chartwell Staffing Services, Inc. (“Chartwell”) seeks to compel Plaintiff Luisa
Ramirez (“Plaintiff”) to arbitrate her individual PAGA claims and moves the
court to dismiss Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims for lack of standing.
Defendant American International Industries (“AII”) seeks to likewise compel arbitration
as a third-party. Plaintiff concedes that she is bound to arbitrate her
individual PAGA claims under her agreement.
This case is controlled by the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. [2022
U.S. LEXIS 2940] (“Viking River”). That decision mandates that the individual
PAGA claims are subject to arbitration, as the parties acknowledge. Hence the Court shall not dwell on the issue
of the arbitration of the individual PAGA claims. That motion shall be GRANTED, and the Joinder
GRANTED.
The only issue
remaining is the question of what to do with the representative PAGA
claims. Plaintiff opposes arbitration of
her non-individual PAGA claims. Defendant requests that the representative
claims be dismissed, although in the alternative Defendant asks the Court to
stay Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims pending the California Supreme
Court’s ruling in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case Number S274671.
In Viking River
the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that once Moriana was compelled to arbitrate
her individual claim, she would lack standing to pursue the nonindividual PAGA
claim because she was no longer an aggrieved employee under Labor Code section
2699, subdivisions (a) and (c). (Id. at *34-35.) However, while the determination of the
arbitrability of the individual PAGA claims turns on construction of federal
law, the standing of an individual to litigate representative PAGA claims turns
on state law. This Court is not bound by
the analysis of the United States Supreme Court interpreting California law on
standing under PAGA. That question is to
be determined by the California Supreme Court.
“In assessing
standing, California courts are not bound by the ‘case or controversy’
requirement of article III of the United States Constitution . . . .” (Bilafer
v. Bilafer (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 363, 370; Grosset v. Wenaas (2008)
42 Cal.4th 1100, 1117, fn. 13 [“Article III of the federal Constitution imposes
a ‘case-or-controversy limitation on federal court jurisdiction,’ requiring ‘
“the party requesting standing [to allege] ‘such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues.’ ” ’ [Citation.] There is no similar
requirement in our state Constitution.”]; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10 [trial
courts have jurisdiction in “all other causes” brought before it]; National
Paint & Coatings Assn. v. State of California (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th
753, 761 [rejecting federal cases for the standing requirement and stating that
the California Constitution “contains no ‘case or controversy’ requirement.”].)
In fact, as the
parties acknowledge the specific question of whether plaintiffs have standing
to maintain representative PAGA claims is currently pending before the
California Supreme Court in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
Accordingly,
Defendant Chartwell’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA claims
is DENIED. Proceedings are stayed pending the California Supreme Court’s
decision in Adolph.
Defendant AII as
Third-Party
Defendant AII
contends that it has the right as a third-party to compel Plaintiff to
arbitrate her claims against AII. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute this.
The arbitration
agreement, in relevant part reads:
“Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes. In the event of any
controversy, claim, or dispute arising from, related to, or having any
relationship or connection whatsoever with the employment of, or the
association between, the employee signing below (“Employee”) and Chartwell
Staffing Services, Inc., including its co-employers, present and former
partners, owners, shareholders, officers, managers, employees, agents, employee
benefit and health plans, as well as parent entities, successor entities,
related entities, and subsidiaries (together “Chartwell”), Employee and
Chartwell (together the “Parties”) agree to submit the dispute to binding
arbitration…” (Conti Decl., Ex. B ¶ 1.)
Here, the
arbitration agreement clearly articulates that “[Plaintiff] and Chartwell Staffing
Services, including its… agents…parent entities…and subsidiaries…agree to
submit the dispute to binding arbitration.” (Ibid.) Thus, Defendant AII, as the
agent and parent entity of Chartwell Staffing Services, is entitled to enforce
the arbitration agreement with respect to Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims.
However, the same analysis as above applies to Plaintiff’s non-individual PAGA
claims.
Accordingly,
Defendant American International Industries joinder to Defendant Chartwell
Staffing Services motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual PAGA
claims is GRANTED. But Defendant American International Industries joinder to
Defendant Chartwell Staffing Services motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
non-individual PAGA claims is DENIED. Proceedings are stayed pending the
California Supreme Court’s decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case
Number S274671.